Where are the Turkish Mullahs of Iran hiding?

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Iran (Mashallah) is a big country. Where are they hiding in their BUNKERS??

Mullah Iran has been under threat since the beginning, in 1979.

So the puppet Mullahs have been thinking of secret bunkers just like our GLOBALIST BILLIONAIRES AGAINST ASTERIODS THAT WILL ONE DAY DESTROY THE earth.

In the 1980's Saddams SCUDS

David G. >> April 25, 2014 >> Fresh Torah

Since 2003, after the conquest of Iraq, more intense threats from the ZIONISTS in the USA, like Hilary with nuclear annihilation!  ''Ms Virgin ironpants''

The mullah high command in TEHRAN

Near TEHRAN

IN THE MOUNTAINS OF MAZDARAN

IN TURKISH AZERBAIJAN OF IRAN, NEAR THE TURKISH BORDER

NEAR ARMENIA

PLEASE, THE IRANIAN PUBLIC WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHERE THE MULLAHS ARE HIDING, INTERNET MEMES WOULD LIKE TO KNOW,     THE USA WOULD LIKE TO KNOW:

LET'S SHORTEN THIS TRAGEDY!

THE IRANIAN PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED ENOUGH!

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Leadership Location Near / In Tehran

· The formal nerve center of the clerical leadership is the Office of the Supreme Leader (Beit‑e Rahbari), which serves as residence, staff office, and primary workplace of the Supreme Leader in central Tehran. It is a hybrid of a traditional religious beit and a modern bureaucratic headquarters, run by Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani. Public sources give only general coordinates (around 35.69°N, 51.40°E) but not an exploitable “exact map” of internal layout or secure bunkers.[1]

· Reporting in 2024 indicated that Khamenei could be moved to secure locations inside Iran with heightened protection during crises, suggesting a dispersed set of hardened sites (likely including underground or highly fortified facilities) in or near Tehran, but the specific sites remain undisclosed.[2]

· Khamenei’s office has released photos and video of him appearing at his Tehran compound at carefully chosen times, demonstrating that this compound is still in active use as a symbolic and practical center, but how much of the decision‑making has migrated to hardened, undisclosed sites is not publicly verifiable.[3][1]

Color imagery typically shows the Tehran compound as a walled, guarded complex integrated into the urban fabric rather than a single isolated “palace,” which is consistent with the model of a heavily secured political‑religious court embedded in the capital.[1]

Command‑and‑Control Structure

Supreme Leader → IRGC and Security Organs

· Iran’s security architecture is built on a dual system: the regular state (president, ministries, conventional army) and a parallel security state centered on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its auxiliaries, all ultimately subordinated to the Supreme Leader.[4][5]

· The IRGC answers directly to the Supreme Leader and can bypass the elected government through a “built‑in bypass mechanism,” giving Khamenei direct influence over planning, operations, intelligence, covert action, and internal security.[5][6][7]

· The Basij militia, formally under IRGC command, provides the regime’s mass internal‑security arm, with extensive presence in every province and city and its own anti‑riot units (e.g., Imam Ali battalions).[8][9][4]

Territorial and Militia C2 Networks

· The Basij has been reorganized into a “mosaic defense” structure with 31 independent command centers (one for Tehran, thirty for the provinces), each linked vertically to IRGC regional commands and horizontally to local units. This creates a multi‑layered C2 grid that can operate even if some nodes are disrupted.[9]

· Imam Ali battalions and similar units are mandated to defend strategic buildings and offices and have autonomy in emergencies, meaning operational orders can come both top‑down from IRGC and locally from provincial corps, giving redundancy to command flows.[8][9]

· The IRGC Intelligence Organization and the Basij cooperate extensively to monitor the population, indicating that intelligence collection, internal security, and riot control instructions flow through intertwined IRGC–Basij channels rather than a single monolithic pipeline.[4][10][8]

Cyber and Communications Organs

· Iran’s offensive and defensive cyber capabilities are concentrated in (1) IRGC cyber‑electronic commands and (2) the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The IRGC Cyber Defense Command / IRGC Cyber–Electronic Command runs offensive operations (espionage, sabotage, influence) and supervises cyber operations internally and externally.[11][12][13]

· The Basij claims more than 1,000 “cyber battalions” coordinated through a Basij Cyber Council, used for both repression (e.g., monitoring and harassing dissidents) and external operations, signaling that cyberspace has become a formal layer of the regime’s C2 and enforcement architecture.[12]

Public sources thus show a layered C2 system: leadership office → IRGC command network → IRGC regional corps and Basij command centers → provincial and local units, with cyber and intelligence organizations providing surveillance and technical support.

How Commands Likely Move Through the System

Formal Chain of Command

· Strategically, the Supreme Leader issues directives (policy, red lines, strategic orders) through his Office to the IRGC high command, MOIS, and other security organs.[4][5][7][1]

· The IRGC command network, rooted in personal ties dating back to the 1980s, dominates planning, operations, intelligence, covert warfare, and internal security across the upper echelons of the armed forces. These commanders translate leadership intent into operational plans and orders.[6]

· At the operational level, IRGC regional corps and Basij provincial commands implement these directives via provincial, city, and neighborhood‑level units, using both formal military channels and ideological structures (mosques, religious networks, local clerics).[8][9][10][4]

Bypass and Informal Channels

· Analyses of Iran’s security system note an official bypass mechanism whereby the Supreme Leader can issue commands directly to IRGC units or trusted commanders, circumventing the normal bureaucratic or ministerial chain of command. This reduces the informational leverage of the civilian government and reinforces loyalty to Khamenei personally.[5][6][7]

· In practice, communication likely combines:

o Written directives and classified orders transmitted through secure state channels.

o Face‑to‑face meetings at the Supreme Leader’s office or secure locations for highly sensitive decisions.[1][3]

o Religious–ideological messaging in sermons and speeches that function as implicit guidance to loyalists, especially within the Basij and clerical networks.[4][8]

Cyber and Electronic Support

· The IRGC’s cyber–electronic organs oversee cellular, internet, and intranet‑based communications relevant to security operations, using both defensive monitoring and offensive manipulation (e.g., surveillance of dissidents, cyberespionage abroad).[11][12][13]

· The regime has built national information infrastructure (e.g., national intranet / “National Information Network”) to keep sensitive communications under domestic control and mitigate reliance on foreign platforms; cyber‑security structures like MAHER and other agencies operate under communications ministries but are linked into this security ecosystem.[13][11]

Public analyses, however, do not provide verifiable, granular routing diagrams, exact frequencies, or network topologies of these channels; such data is classified and only approximated by outside intelligence and cyber‑security research.

Communications Technologies: Satellite, GPS, and Apps

Satellite Communications and GPS

· Open sources on IRGC cyber‑warfare and electronic capabilities describe the cyber domain as including cellular technologies, space‑based communications, and intranets, confirming that Iran’s security apparatus takes space‑based communications into account as part of its operational environment. That implies familiarity with satellite communication, but does not transparently detail which military satcom systems the leadership personally uses.[13]

· Iran has invested in domestic satellite and space programs and in electronic warfare; it is reasonable to infer that IRGC and military C2 may use a mix of:

o Iranian state‑controlled or allied satcom channels.

o Hardened terrestrial microwave, fiber, and radio systems for strategic C2.

o GPS and other GNSS signals (e.g., Russian GLONASS, possibly Chinese BeiDou) for navigation and timing, as any modern military does.

However, no public, authoritative source specifies “the mullahs’ GPS brand or model,” or the exact C2 satcom terminals used by top clerical leadership, and any such specifics would be speculative and potentially misleading.[13]

Use of WhatsApp and Foreign Platforms

· Iran has historically restricted Western platforms, including WhatsApp, especially during protests, but in December 2024 the Supreme Council of Cyberspace voted to lift access restrictions on WhatsApp and Google Play, presenting it as a first step toward easing internet limitations. That indicates the regime recognizes the ubiquity and utility of such platforms domestically.[14][15]

· Officials and elites in many authoritarian systems sometimes use foreign apps informally or on secondary devices, but public reporting on Iran’s security architecture focuses on:

o State‑linked national platforms and infrastructure.

o IRGC and MOIS surveillance of foreign apps used by citizens.

o Cyber operations against foreign platforms.
There is no credible open‑source evidence that the leadership uses Israeli‑owned networks for command‑and‑control; WhatsApp is owned by Meta (a US company), not Israel, and operational security logic would militate against using foreign‑controlled commercial apps for core C2. At most, such apps could be used for low‑level, deniable, or informal communications, not strategic commands.[15][14]

Overall C2 Technology Posture

From what is publicly documented:

· Strategic C2 likely relies on state‑controlled, hardened channels (secure landlines, encrypted radios, dedicated data networks, and possibly military satcom), with redundancy via multiple layers of IRGC and Basij command.[4][6][7][11][13]

· Cyber and information operations rely heavily on IRGC and MOIS cyber units, using a combination of state infrastructure, proxies, and hacker groups coordinated by state organizations.[11][12][13]

· Foreign commercial apps (WhatsApp and others) are primarily viewed as targets for surveillance and control, and only secondarily, if at all, as channels for sensitive internal C2.[14][15][11]

THE IRANIAN PEOPLE'S UPRISING MUST MOVE FROM MERE PROTEST TO ACTUAL ARMED ORGANISED UPRISING, 

CAPTURING GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND SETTING UP A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

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1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Supreme_Leader_of_Iran

2. https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-khamenei-security-nasrallah/33138537.html

3. https://v1.iranintl.com/en/202507058762

4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps

5. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards

6. https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/imce-imagesIRGC_CommandNetwork_context-1.pdf

7. https://israel-alma.org/special-report-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps/

8. https://iranwire.com/en/features/65737/

9. https://www.jomswsge.com/pdf-206960-127009?filename=127009.pdf

10. https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces/

11. https://citanex.com/resources/irans-cyber-offensive-capabilities-structure-strategy-countermeasures/

12. https://www.ferner-alsdorf.com/irans-cyber-capabilities-and-hackers/

13. https://ict.org.il/UserFiles/IRGC Cyber-Warfare Capabilities.pdf

14. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-lifts-access-restrictions-on-whatsapp-google-play/3433414

15. https://www.dw.com/en/iran-lifts-ban-on-whatsapp-and-google-play/a-71154869