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The Structural Impossibility of Presidential-Led Democratic Transition in Revolutionary Iran: An Analysis of Systemic Constraints and Alternative Pathways
Executive Summary
The proposed scenario—in which Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian facilitates a smooth democratic transition, enables the return of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, employs truth-telling to mobilize protesters, and continues in politics after revolutionary change—confronts fundamental constitutional, institutional, and historical barriers that render it structurally impossible.
This thesis examines Iran's theocratic power architecture, documents the systematic constraints on presidential authority, analyzes the current protest movement and opposition dynamics, and evaluates realistic transition pathways.
The analysis concludes that meaningful political transformation in Iran requires systemic collapse rather than incremental presidential action, and any democratic transition will be protracted, contested, and chaotic rather than smooth or seamless.
Reformist lawmaker Masoud Pezeshkian wins Iran's ...
Iran's Constitutional Architecture: The Illusion of Presidential Power
The Supreme Leader's Absolute Authority
Iran's political system operates under the principle of Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which concentrates ultimate authority in the Supreme Leader, currently 86-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Article 110 of Iran's constitution grants the Supreme Leader comprehensive powers that subsume all other governmental functions: command of the armed forces, declaration of war and peace, appointment of judiciary chiefs, control over state media, supervision of all three branches of government, and authority to dismiss the elected president.[1][2][3]
This constitutional design creates a hierarchical power structure in which the president occupies a subordinate position despite being Iran's highest elected official. The Supreme Leader directly appoints half of the Guardian Council's members (the other half are nominated by the judiciary chief, whom the Supreme Leader also appoints), creating a self-reinforcing cycle that prevents institutional checks on his authority. The Assembly of Experts, constitutionally empowered to remove the Supreme Leader, can only convene members approved by the Guardian Council—which itself answers to the Supreme Leader. This circular arrangement ensures that no institutional mechanism exists to constrain Khamenei's power.[4][5][6]
Iran Nuclear Deal: Who Is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei?
Presidential Powers: Circumscribed and Contingent
While Article 113 of Iran's constitution designates the president as head of the executive branch, it explicitly subordinates this authority to "the office of Leadership". The president's powers remain largely confined to domestic economic and administrative functions, with the Supreme Leader retaining final authority over all strategic decisions. In foreign policy, nuclear negotiations, and national security matters—the domains most relevant to any potential transition—presidential input is advisory at best.[5][7]
The Supreme Leader exercises direct control over key cabinet appointments. The ministers of intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs require pre-approval from Khamenei's office before presidential nomination. When President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attempted to dismiss Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi in 2011, Khamenei personally blocked the removal. During Pezeshkian's cabinet formation in 2024, the Supreme Leader compelled him to retain Esmail Khatib as intelligence minister—the first time a new president has been forced to keep his predecessor's intelligence chief. Similarly, Pezeshkian's nomination of Eskandar Momeni as interior minister was imposed upon him rather than representing his genuine choice.[8][9]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's most powerful military and economic institution with approximately 125,000 personnel plus 90,000 Basij paramilitary forces, reports directly to the Supreme Leader and operates entirely outside presidential authority. This institutional arrangement means the president lacks control over the very security apparatus that would be essential to any political transition or confrontation with the clerical establishment.[10][11][5]
The Historical Failure of Reformist Presidencies
The Khatami Precedent (1997-2005)
Mohammad Khatami's presidency represents the most ambitious reformist experiment within the Islamic Republic's framework and its most instructive failure. Elected in 1997 with nearly 70% of the vote on a platform of civil society development, rule of law, and political participation, Khatami quickly encountered the system's built-in resistance mechanisms. The conservative-dominated Guardian Council systematically rejected reformist legislation passed by the parliament. When Khatami attempted to ease press restrictions, the judiciary—appointed by and answering to Khamenei—shut down more than 100 newspapers and imprisoned journalists.[12][13][14]
Khatami's experience demonstrated that the Iranian system allows reformists to win elections but prevents them from implementing meaningful change. The "dual sovereignty" structure—with parallel elected and unelected institutions, the latter always dominant—ensures that reformist energy dissipates through institutional obstruction rather than catalyzing transformation.[4][13]
The Rouhani Experience (2013-2021)
Hassan Rouhani's two-term presidency further illustrated these constraints. Despite promises to lift internet censorship and ease hijab enforcement, neither materialized. When confronted about his failure to deliver on campaign pledges, Rouhani acknowledged that "the matter was out of his control and his hands were tied". The 2019 nationwide protests saw a weeklong total internet blackout ordered without presidential consent, revealing where actual decision-making authority resided.[15][16]
Rouhani's sole significant achievement—the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement—occurred only because Supreme Leader Khamenei permitted it. When the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement in 2018, Rouhani had no power to independently re-engage in negotiations. The president could advocate for diplomacy but could not determine policy.[17][5][7]
Who is Iran's supreme leader? Ali Khamenei vows not to ...
Pezeshkian's Presidency: Pragmatism Over Principle
Electoral Engineering and Limited Mandate
Masoud Pezeshkian's July 2024 election followed the death of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. The Guardian Council's decision to qualify only one reformist candidate—Pezeshkian—while disqualifying more prominent figures like Ali Larijani represented calculated electoral engineering. By allowing a single reformist to compete against multiple conservatives, the system ensured opposition voters would consolidate behind Pezeshkian while conservative votes fragmented. His 53.7% runoff victory reflected tactical voting against his hardline opponent Saeed Jalili rather than enthusiastic support for his reform agenda.[1][18][19]
Pezeshkian's campaign carefully balanced reformist rhetoric with explicit deference to Supreme Leader Khamenei. He emphasized his loyalty to the system and made clear that all major decisions would remain Khamenei's prerogative. This positioning reflected the political reality that any candidate questioning the Supreme Leader's authority would never receive Guardian Council approval to run.[20][21]
Cabinet Formation: Compromise and Cooptation
Pezeshkian's cabinet appointments revealed his administration's actual character. Rather than selecting transformational reformists for key positions, he nominated technocrats, retained several ministers from Raisi's hardline government, and appointed conservatives to sensitive security portfolios. Esmail Khatib remained as intelligence minister, Amin Hossein Rahim continued as justice minister, and the appointment of interior minister Eskandar Momeni was reportedly forced upon Pezeshkian by conservative power brokers.[20][22][9]
The conservative-dominated parliament approved all 19 cabinet nominees without rejecting a single one—the first time since 2001 that a new cabinet received complete parliamentary endorsement. This unprecedented unanimity signaled not reformist victory but rather Pezeshkian's successful accommodation to the system's red lines. By avoiding appointees who might challenge the clerical establishment, intelligence apparatus, or IRGC interests, Pezeshkian ensured his government's approval while sacrificing its transformational potential.[22]
The Reality of Constrained Reform
Six months into his presidency, Pezeshkian's administration has delivered minimal reform. Despite campaign promises to unblock Instagram and other social media platforms, internet restrictions remain largely intact, with only limited exceptions like WhatsApp and Google Play. The promised easing of hijab enforcement has not materialized. Pezeshkian's 2025 budget allocates increased funding to hardline institutions including the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), religious seminaries, and ideological organizations controlled by conservatives.[23][24]
In December 2024, Pezeshkian publicly acknowledged his limitations, stating "I can't make miracles" and admitting that he cannot override the Supreme Leader on contentious issues like social media restrictions. These admissions contrast sharply with the transformational role imagined in scenarios of presidential-led transition.[25]
What to Know About Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ...
The Pezeshkian Paradox
Analysts have identified what they term the "Pezeshkian Paradox": the president must either appease the IRGC's power and ideology, alienating his reformist constituency, or advance his supporters' expectations, losing IRGC backing and facing administrative sabotage. Evidence suggests Pezeshkian has chosen the former path. In September 2024, he visited IRGC facilities, praised intelligence operatives as "true soldiers" of the revolution, and declared himself "a Basiji"—explicitly identifying with the paramilitary force responsible for suppressing protests. His meetings with IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami and inspection of IRGC economic projects signaled alignment with the security establishment rather than confrontation.[26][27]
When Israel assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran shortly after Pezeshkian's inauguration in July 2024, the new president reportedly advocated for a restrained response to avoid all-out war with Israel. The IRGC, however, dismissed his position as irrelevant. An IRGC official told The Telegraph that "nobody in the organization is paying much attention to Pezeshkian" and that striking Tel Aviv remained the priority regardless of presidential preferences. This incident starkly illustrated the president's marginalization in national security decisions.[28]
The January 2026 Protest Movement and State Response
Economic Catalysts and Political Demands
The protests that began on December 28, 2025, initially erupted over economic grievances—rampant inflation (42% officially, 70% for food), currency devaluation (the rial losing approximately 50% of its value against the dollar in 2025), and declining purchasing power. Tehran bazaar merchants initiated strikes, historically a significant political signal in Iran, with demonstrations subsequently spreading to universities and broader segments of urban society.[29][30][31]
Within days, economic protest evolved into explicitly political opposition. Demonstrators began chanting slogans against Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Islamic Republic system itself, echoing the 2022 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests that followed Mahsa Amini's death in morality police custody. By early January 2026, protests had emerged in over 170 locations across 25 of Iran's 31 provinces, with particular intensity in western regions with Kurdish and Lor minority populations.[32][33][30][29]
State Repression and Presidential Silence
The regime's response has been characteristically brutal. Security forces have killed at least 12-15 protesters, with Revolutionary Guards opening fire on demonstrators in Malekshahi county, Ilam province, killing four members of the Kurdish minority. Authorities have arrested more than 580 people, raided hospitals to confiscate bodies of those killed, and deployed internet shutdowns to disrupt protest coordination.[29][32][34]
President Pezeshkian has remained conspicuously silent on the protests. Unlike his 2009 parliamentary speech condemning violence against Green Movement demonstrators—when he quoted Imam Ali saying "Do not kill people like a wild animal"—Pezeshkian has offered no public solidarity with current protesters. This silence reflects both his political calculation and his structural powerlessness: expressing sympathy for demonstrators would antagonize Khamenei and the IRGC without providing any protection or reform, while denouncing protesters would further alienate his already disillusioned reformist base.[21][35]
Iran's protests have been crushed, but Mahsa Amini's death ...
Reza Pahlavi and the Fragmented Opposition
The Munich Coalition and Defection Strategy
Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah of Iran, has emerged as the most visible opposition figure in exile. In July 2024, he convened a Convention of National Cooperation to Save Iran in Munich, bringing together over 500 representatives from diverse political, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. The gathering marked an unprecedented display of opposition unity, with participants ranging from republican activists to monarchists, secular democrats to minority rights advocates.[36][37]
Pahlavi's five-pillar strategy articulates a comprehensive approach to regime change: maximum international pressure to weaken the Islamic Republic's capacity to govern; maximum support from foreign governments and civil society; maximum defections from regime insiders; maximum mobilization of opposition forces; and development of a detailed post-regime vision through the Iran Prosperity Project. Central to this strategy is a secure communications channel for regime officials wishing to defect, which Pahlavi claims has been contacted by over 50,000 individuals.[38][36]
In January 2026, amid the current protest wave, Pahlavi issued his first direct call for demonstrations, urging coordinated action and announcing plans for a National Unity Summit and transitional governance framework. His platform emphasizes three core principles: Iran's territorial integrity, individual liberties and equality for all citizens, and separation of religion from state. Notably, Pahlavi insists he does not seek political office personally but aims to facilitate democratic transition and free elections.[39][40][41][36][38]
Opposition Fragmentation and Credibility Challenges
Despite Pahlavi's coalition-building efforts, the Iranian opposition remains deeply fractured. Ideological divisions separate monarchists from republicans, secular democrats from religious reformists, ethnic minority movements from Persian nationalists, and established opposition groups from grassroots activists. The People's Mojahedin of Iran (MEK/NCRI), led by Maryam Rajavi, maintains a separate organizational structure and refuses alliances, claiming exclusive legitimacy for Iran's future.[42][43][44]
Previous attempts at opposition unity have collapsed. In 2023, Pahlavi announced the Alliance for Democracy and Freedom in Iran (ADFI), bringing together prominent activists including Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi. Within months, internal conflicts led to mass resignations and the coalition's disintegration. Pahlavi's earlier initiative, the National Council of Iran launched in 2013, similarly withered, prompting his resignation from its presidency in 2017.[45]
The opposition's diaspora character raises questions about internal legitimacy. While a 2024 GAMAAN poll found approximately 80% of Iranians prefer Pahlavi over the current leadership, diaspora support does not automatically translate into revolutionary capacity inside Iran. Successful regime change requires organized networks within the country capable of coordinating mass action, facilitating security force defections, and managing the chaos of transition. The absence of such organizational infrastructure represents a critical gap between popular dissatisfaction and revolutionary potential.[37][46][47][48]
Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi - Queen Farah Pahlavi
Structural Pathways to Regime Change
Scenario Analysis: Four Transition Models
Comparative analysis of authoritarian transitions reveals four potential scenarios for Iran, each with distinct mechanisms, probability assessments, and implications.[49][50]
Scenario 1: IRGC-Managed Transition (Highest Probability: ~40-50%)
The most likely pathway involves the IRGC orchestrating a managed succession following Khamenei's death or incapacitation. In this scenario, the Revolutionary Guards leverage their economic entrenchment (controlling major sectors including construction, telecommunications, energy, and smuggling networks) and security dominance to install a new Supreme Leader amenable to their interests. Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's 55-year-old son, represents the leading candidate, having cultivated close relationships with IRGC commanders and serving as a gatekeeper to his father.[10][51][52][53][50][49]
This transition would preserve the Islamic Republic's fundamental structure while implementing selective economic reforms to address public grievances. Social restrictions might ease—perhaps allowing more flexibility on hijab enforcement or controlled internet access—but the surveillance state, arbitrary detention system, and restrictions on political organization would remain intact. The transition would represent a metamorphosis rather than transformation: the regime would change its external appearance while its internal organs remained essentially unchanged.[49]
Scenario 2: Popular Uprising with Elite Defection (Medium Probability: ~20-30%)
A genuine democratic transition requires not just popular mobilization but also elite fragmentation and security force defection or neutrality. Historical precedents—the Soviet Union's collapse, the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and the Tunisian revolution—demonstrate that authoritarian regimes survive mass protests when security forces maintain cohesion but collapse when those forces refuse to shoot protesters or actively support demonstrators.[46][47][54]
For this scenario to materialize in Iran, several conditions must converge: economic collapse severe enough to prevent the regime from paying security forces; widespread protests across demographic and geographic boundaries; credible alternative leadership that can channel popular energy; and crucially, IRGC and Basij commanders concluding that the Islamic Republic is unsalvageable and their interests lie in supporting transition rather than defending the status quo. Intelligence reports of defections, weapon depots opening to protesters, or security personnel joining demonstrations would signal this pathway's activation.[47][54]
The opposition's current organizational deficit represents a major obstacle. Successful revolutions require not just the will to resist but also the capacity to coordinate complex collective action under repression, maintain nonviolent discipline, formulate coherent demands, and prepare for post-revolutionary governance. Iranian civil society possesses substantial resilience and creativity in developing resistance tactics, but these capabilities have not yet coalesced into the unified strategic framework necessary for regime overthrow.[42][55][56][57][58][46]
Scenario 3: Negotiated Elite Transition (Low Probability: ~10-15%)
A third scenario envisions regime insiders—recognizing the system's unsustainability—negotiating a managed democratic opening. This pathway would likely involve pragmatic figures like former President Hassan Rouhani, former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani forming a transitional government that includes both regime moderates and acceptable opposition representatives. The transition would unfold gradually: constitutional amendments limiting the Supreme Leader's powers, Guardian Council reform allowing genuine electoral competition, IRGC subordination to civilian authority, and eventual free elections.[59][60][61]
This scenario faces formidable obstacles. It requires Supreme Leader Khamenei's death or removal, as he has demonstrated no willingness to voluntarily diminish his authority. It demands IRGC acceptance of losing its economic privileges and political dominance—an unlikely concession given the Revolutionary Guards' institutional interests. Most critically, it presumes regime insiders possess sufficient legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the Iranian people, when decades of repression have destroyed public trust in anyone associated with the Islamic Republic.[62][63][52][43][13]
Scenario 4: Externally Imposed Regime Change (Minimal Probability: <5%)
Military intervention by external powers represents the least viable pathway. The catastrophic consequences of regime change in Iraq and Libya demonstrate that foreign-imposed transitions, absent indigenous political infrastructure, produce state collapse rather than democracy. Iran's nationalist political culture, forged through resistance to foreign interference from the 19th-century Qajar dynasty through the 1953 CIA-backed coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, would generate fierce opposition to external military action regardless of dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic.[46]
Regional and global powers—particularly Russia and China—maintain strategic interests in Iran and would resist Western military intervention. The scale of military force required for regime change (given Iran's size, population, and defensive capabilities) and the absence of international consensus for such action render this scenario implausible.[64][59][46]
Truth, Reconciliation, and Post-Authoritarian Justice
The Role of Truth-Telling in Democratic Transitions
The invocation of "TRUTH" as a mechanism for presidential connection with protesters and facilitation of transition requires examination through the lens of transitional justice scholarship. Truth commissions—formal investigative bodies established to document human rights violations under previous regimes—represent one mechanism among several for addressing past atrocities, including prosecutions, lustration (vetting and removal of officials), reparations programs, and institutional reforms.[65][66]
Critically, truth commissions function as post-transition mechanisms, not instruments of regime change. They are established after a political transition creates space for honest reckoning with the past, not as catalysts for the transition itself. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the most celebrated example, was created in 1995 by democratic legislation after the apartheid system had already ended. Chile's National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation operated after President Augusto Pinochet left power, not as a means to remove him.[66][65]
Prerequisites for Transitional Justice in Iran
Effective truth-seeking in Iran would require several prerequisites currently absent: cessation of ongoing human rights violations; government with legitimacy to mandate investigation; protection for victims, witnesses, and truth-tellers; independent judiciary capable of following evidence wherever it leads; and political consensus that accountability serves national interest rather than factional advantage.[65][66][67]
Reformist lawmaker Masoud Pezeshkian wins Iran's ...
Iran's Constitutional Architecture: The Illusion of Presidential Power
The Supreme Leader's Absolute Authority
Iran's political system operates under the principle of Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which concentrates ultimate authority in the Supreme Leader, currently 86-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Article 110 of Iran's constitution grants the Supreme Leader comprehensive powers that subsume all other governmental functions: command of the armed forces, declaration of war and peace, appointment of judiciary chiefs, control over state media, supervision of all three branches of government, and authority to dismiss the elected president.[1][2][3]
This constitutional design creates a hierarchical power structure in which the president occupies a subordinate position despite being Iran's highest elected official. The Supreme Leader directly appoints half of the Guardian Council's members (the other half are nominated by the judiciary chief, whom the Supreme Leader also appoints), creating a self-reinforcing cycle that prevents institutional checks on his authority. The Assembly of Experts, constitutionally empowered to remove the Supreme Leader, can only convene members approved by the Guardian Council—which itself answers to the Supreme Leader. This circular arrangement ensures that no institutional mechanism exists to constrain Khamenei's power.[4][5][6]
Iran Nuclear Deal: Who Is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei?
Presidential Powers: Circumscribed and Contingent
While Article 113 of Iran's constitution designates the president as head of the executive branch, it explicitly subordinates this authority to "the office of Leadership". The president's powers remain largely confined to domestic economic and administrative functions, with the Supreme Leader retaining final authority over all strategic decisions. In foreign policy, nuclear negotiations, and national security matters—the domains most relevant to any potential transition—presidential input is advisory at best.[5][7]
The Supreme Leader exercises direct control over key cabinet appointments. The ministers of intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs require pre-approval from Khamenei's office before presidential nomination. When President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attempted to dismiss Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi in 2011, Khamenei personally blocked the removal. During Pezeshkian's cabinet formation in 2024, the Supreme Leader compelled him to retain Esmail Khatib as intelligence minister—the first time a new president has been forced to keep his predecessor's intelligence chief. Similarly, Pezeshkian's nomination of Eskandar Momeni as interior minister was imposed upon him rather than representing his genuine choice.[8][9]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's most powerful military and economic institution with approximately 125,000 personnel plus 90,000 Basij paramilitary forces, reports directly to the Supreme Leader and operates entirely outside presidential authority. This institutional arrangement means the president lacks control over the very security apparatus that would be essential to any political transition or confrontation with the clerical establishment.[10][11][5]
The Historical Failure of Reformist Presidencies
The Khatami Precedent (1997-2005)
Mohammad Khatami's presidency represents the most ambitious reformist experiment within the Islamic Republic's framework and its most instructive failure. Elected in 1997 with nearly 70% of the vote on a platform of civil society development, rule of law, and political participation, Khatami quickly encountered the system's built-in resistance mechanisms. The conservative-dominated Guardian Council systematically rejected reformist legislation passed by the parliament. When Khatami attempted to ease press restrictions, the judiciary—appointed by and answering to Khamenei—shut down more than 100 newspapers and imprisoned journalists.[12][13][14]
Khatami's experience demonstrated that the Iranian system allows reformists to win elections but prevents them from implementing meaningful change. The "dual sovereignty" structure—with parallel elected and unelected institutions, the latter always dominant—ensures that reformist energy dissipates through institutional obstruction rather than catalyzing transformation.[4][13]
The Rouhani Experience (2013-2021)
Hassan Rouhani's two-term presidency further illustrated these constraints. Despite promises to lift internet censorship and ease hijab enforcement, neither materialized. When confronted about his failure to deliver on campaign pledges, Rouhani acknowledged that "the matter was out of his control and his hands were tied". The 2019 nationwide protests saw a weeklong total internet blackout ordered without presidential consent, revealing where actual decision-making authority resided.[15][16]
Rouhani's sole significant achievement—the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement—occurred only because Supreme Leader Khamenei permitted it. When the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement in 2018, Rouhani had no power to independently re-engage in negotiations. The president could advocate for diplomacy but could not determine policy.[17][5][7]
Who is Iran's supreme leader? Ali Khamenei vows not to ...
Pezeshkian's Presidency: Pragmatism Over Principle
Electoral Engineering and Limited Mandate
Masoud Pezeshkian's July 2024 election followed the death of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. The Guardian Council's decision to qualify only one reformist candidate—Pezeshkian—while disqualifying more prominent figures like Ali Larijani represented calculated electoral engineering. By allowing a single reformist to compete against multiple conservatives, the system ensured opposition voters would consolidate behind Pezeshkian while conservative votes fragmented. His 53.7% runoff victory reflected tactical voting against his hardline opponent Saeed Jalili rather than enthusiastic support for his reform agenda.[1][18][19]
Pezeshkian's campaign carefully balanced reformist rhetoric with explicit deference to Supreme Leader Khamenei. He emphasized his loyalty to the system and made clear that all major decisions would remain Khamenei's prerogative. This positioning reflected the political reality that any candidate questioning the Supreme Leader's authority would never receive Guardian Council approval to run.[20][21]
Cabinet Formation: Compromise and Cooptation
Pezeshkian's cabinet appointments revealed his administration's actual character. Rather than selecting transformational reformists for key positions, he nominated technocrats, retained several ministers from Raisi's hardline government, and appointed conservatives to sensitive security portfolios. Esmail Khatib remained as intelligence minister, Amin Hossein Rahim continued as justice minister, and the appointment of interior minister Eskandar Momeni was reportedly forced upon Pezeshkian by conservative power brokers.[20][22][9]
The conservative-dominated parliament approved all 19 cabinet nominees without rejecting a single one—the first time since 2001 that a new cabinet received complete parliamentary endorsement. This unprecedented unanimity signaled not reformist victory but rather Pezeshkian's successful accommodation to the system's red lines. By avoiding appointees who might challenge the clerical establishment, intelligence apparatus, or IRGC interests, Pezeshkian ensured his government's approval while sacrificing its transformational potential.[22]
The Reality of Constrained Reform
Six months into his presidency, Pezeshkian's administration has delivered minimal reform. Despite campaign promises to unblock Instagram and other social media platforms, internet restrictions remain largely intact, with only limited exceptions like WhatsApp and Google Play. The promised easing of hijab enforcement has not materialized. Pezeshkian's 2025 budget allocates increased funding to hardline institutions including the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), religious seminaries, and ideological organizations controlled by conservatives.[23][24]
In December 2024, Pezeshkian publicly acknowledged his limitations, stating "I can't make miracles" and admitting that he cannot override the Supreme Leader on contentious issues like social media restrictions. These admissions contrast sharply with the transformational role imagined in scenarios of presidential-led transition.[25]
What to Know About Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ...
The Pezeshkian Paradox
Analysts have identified what they term the "Pezeshkian Paradox": the president must either appease the IRGC's power and ideology, alienating his reformist constituency, or advance his supporters' expectations, losing IRGC backing and facing administrative sabotage. Evidence suggests Pezeshkian has chosen the former path. In September 2024, he visited IRGC facilities, praised intelligence operatives as "true soldiers" of the revolution, and declared himself "a Basiji"—explicitly identifying with the paramilitary force responsible for suppressing protests. His meetings with IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami and inspection of IRGC economic projects signaled alignment with the security establishment rather than confrontation.[26][27]
When Israel assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran shortly after Pezeshkian's inauguration in July 2024, the new president reportedly advocated for a restrained response to avoid all-out war with Israel. The IRGC, however, dismissed his position as irrelevant. An IRGC official told The Telegraph that "nobody in the organization is paying much attention to Pezeshkian" and that striking Tel Aviv remained the priority regardless of presidential preferences. This incident starkly illustrated the president's marginalization in national security decisions.[28]
The January 2026 Protest Movement and State Response
Economic Catalysts and Political Demands
The protests that began on December 28, 2025, initially erupted over economic grievances—rampant inflation (42% officially, 70% for food), currency devaluation (the rial losing approximately 50% of its value against the dollar in 2025), and declining purchasing power. Tehran bazaar merchants initiated strikes, historically a significant political signal in Iran, with demonstrations subsequently spreading to universities and broader segments of urban society.[29][30][31]
Within days, economic protest evolved into explicitly political opposition. Demonstrators began chanting slogans against Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Islamic Republic system itself, echoing the 2022 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests that followed Mahsa Amini's death in morality police custody. By early January 2026, protests had emerged in over 170 locations across 25 of Iran's 31 provinces, with particular intensity in western regions with Kurdish and Lor minority populations.[32][33][30][29]
State Repression and Presidential Silence
The regime's response has been characteristically brutal. Security forces have killed at least 12-15 protesters, with Revolutionary Guards opening fire on demonstrators in Malekshahi county, Ilam province, killing four members of the Kurdish minority. Authorities have arrested more than 580 people, raided hospitals to confiscate bodies of those killed, and deployed internet shutdowns to disrupt protest coordination.[29][32][34]
President Pezeshkian has remained conspicuously silent on the protests. Unlike his 2009 parliamentary speech condemning violence against Green Movement demonstrators—when he quoted Imam Ali saying "Do not kill people like a wild animal"—Pezeshkian has offered no public solidarity with current protesters. This silence reflects both his political calculation and his structural powerlessness: expressing sympathy for demonstrators would antagonize Khamenei and the IRGC without providing any protection or reform, while denouncing protesters would further alienate his already disillusioned reformist base.[21][35]
Iran's protests have been crushed, but Mahsa Amini's death ...
Reza Pahlavi and the Fragmented Opposition
The Munich Coalition and Defection Strategy
Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah of Iran, has emerged as the most visible opposition figure in exile. In July 2024, he convened a Convention of National Cooperation to Save Iran in Munich, bringing together over 500 representatives from diverse political, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. The gathering marked an unprecedented display of opposition unity, with participants ranging from republican activists to monarchists, secular democrats to minority rights advocates.[36][37]
Pahlavi's five-pillar strategy articulates a comprehensive approach to regime change: maximum international pressure to weaken the Islamic Republic's capacity to govern; maximum support from foreign governments and civil society; maximum defections from regime insiders; maximum mobilization of opposition forces; and development of a detailed post-regime vision through the Iran Prosperity Project. Central to this strategy is a secure communications channel for regime officials wishing to defect, which Pahlavi claims has been contacted by over 50,000 individuals.[38][36]
In January 2026, amid the current protest wave, Pahlavi issued his first direct call for demonstrations, urging coordinated action and announcing plans for a National Unity Summit and transitional governance framework. His platform emphasizes three core principles: Iran's territorial integrity, individual liberties and equality for all citizens, and separation of religion from state. Notably, Pahlavi insists he does not seek political office personally but aims to facilitate democratic transition and free elections.[39][40][41][36][38]
Opposition Fragmentation and Credibility Challenges
Despite Pahlavi's coalition-building efforts, the Iranian opposition remains deeply fractured. Ideological divisions separate monarchists from republicans, secular democrats from religious reformists, ethnic minority movements from Persian nationalists, and established opposition groups from grassroots activists. The People's Mojahedin of Iran (MEK/NCRI), led by Maryam Rajavi, maintains a separate organizational structure and refuses alliances, claiming exclusive legitimacy for Iran's future.[42][43][44]
Previous attempts at opposition unity have collapsed. In 2023, Pahlavi announced the Alliance for Democracy and Freedom in Iran (ADFI), bringing together prominent activists including Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi. Within months, internal conflicts led to mass resignations and the coalition's disintegration. Pahlavi's earlier initiative, the National Council of Iran launched in 2013, similarly withered, prompting his resignation from its presidency in 2017.[45]
The opposition's diaspora character raises questions about internal legitimacy. While a 2024 GAMAAN poll found approximately 80% of Iranians prefer Pahlavi over the current leadership, diaspora support does not automatically translate into revolutionary capacity inside Iran. Successful regime change requires organized networks within the country capable of coordinating mass action, facilitating security force defections, and managing the chaos of transition. The absence of such organizational infrastructure represents a critical gap between popular dissatisfaction and revolutionary potential.[37][46][47][48]
Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi - Queen Farah Pahlavi
Structural Pathways to Regime Change
Scenario Analysis: Four Transition Models
Comparative analysis of authoritarian transitions reveals four potential scenarios for Iran, each with distinct mechanisms, probability assessments, and implications.[49][50]
Scenario 1: IRGC-Managed Transition (Highest Probability: ~40-50%)
The most likely pathway involves the IRGC orchestrating a managed succession following Khamenei's death or incapacitation. In this scenario, the Revolutionary Guards leverage their economic entrenchment (controlling major sectors including construction, telecommunications, energy, and smuggling networks) and security dominance to install a new Supreme Leader amenable to their interests. Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's 55-year-old son, represents the leading candidate, having cultivated close relationships with IRGC commanders and serving as a gatekeeper to his father.[10][51][52][53][50][49]
This transition would preserve the Islamic Republic's fundamental structure while implementing selective economic reforms to address public grievances. Social restrictions might ease—perhaps allowing more flexibility on hijab enforcement or controlled internet access—but the surveillance state, arbitrary detention system, and restrictions on political organization would remain intact. The transition would represent a metamorphosis rather than transformation: the regime would change its external appearance while its internal organs remained essentially unchanged.[49]
Scenario 2: Popular Uprising with Elite Defection (Medium Probability: ~20-30%)
A genuine democratic transition requires not just popular mobilization but also elite fragmentation and security force defection or neutrality. Historical precedents—the Soviet Union's collapse, the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and the Tunisian revolution—demonstrate that authoritarian regimes survive mass protests when security forces maintain cohesion but collapse when those forces refuse to shoot protesters or actively support demonstrators.[46][47][54]
For this scenario to materialize in Iran, several conditions must converge: economic collapse severe enough to prevent the regime from paying security forces; widespread protests across demographic and geographic boundaries; credible alternative leadership that can channel popular energy; and crucially, IRGC and Basij commanders concluding that the Islamic Republic is unsalvageable and their interests lie in supporting transition rather than defending the status quo. Intelligence reports of defections, weapon depots opening to protesters, or security personnel joining demonstrations would signal this pathway's activation.[47][54]
The opposition's current organizational deficit represents a major obstacle. Successful revolutions require not just the will to resist but also the capacity to coordinate complex collective action under repression, maintain nonviolent discipline, formulate coherent demands, and prepare for post-revolutionary governance. Iranian civil society possesses substantial resilience and creativity in developing resistance tactics, but these capabilities have not yet coalesced into the unified strategic framework necessary for regime overthrow.[42][55][56][57][58][46]
Scenario 3: Negotiated Elite Transition (Low Probability: ~10-15%)
A third scenario envisions regime insiders—recognizing the system's unsustainability—negotiating a managed democratic opening. This pathway would likely involve pragmatic figures like former President Hassan Rouhani, former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani forming a transitional government that includes both regime moderates and acceptable opposition representatives. The transition would unfold gradually: constitutional amendments limiting the Supreme Leader's powers, Guardian Council reform allowing genuine electoral competition, IRGC subordination to civilian authority, and eventual free elections.[59][60][61]
This scenario faces formidable obstacles. It requires Supreme Leader Khamenei's death or removal, as he has demonstrated no willingness to voluntarily diminish his authority. It demands IRGC acceptance of losing its economic privileges and political dominance—an unlikely concession given the Revolutionary Guards' institutional interests. Most critically, it presumes regime insiders possess sufficient legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the Iranian people, when decades of repression have destroyed public trust in anyone associated with the Islamic Republic.[62][63][52][43][13]
Scenario 4: Externally Imposed Regime Change (Minimal Probability: <5%)
Military intervention by external powers represents the least viable pathway. The catastrophic consequences of regime change in Iraq and Libya demonstrate that foreign-imposed transitions, absent indigenous political infrastructure, produce state collapse rather than democracy. Iran's nationalist political culture, forged through resistance to foreign interference from the 19th-century Qajar dynasty through the 1953 CIA-backed coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, would generate fierce opposition to external military action regardless of dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic.[46]
Regional and global powers—particularly Russia and China—maintain strategic interests in Iran and would resist Western military intervention. The scale of military force required for regime change (given Iran's size, population, and defensive capabilities) and the absence of international consensus for such action render this scenario implausible.[64][59][46]
Truth, Reconciliation, and Post-Authoritarian Justice
The Role of Truth-Telling in Democratic Transitions
The invocation of "TRUTH" as a mechanism for presidential connection with protesters and facilitation of transition requires examination through the lens of transitional justice scholarship. Truth commissions—formal investigative bodies established to document human rights violations under previous regimes—represent one mechanism among several for addressing past atrocities, including prosecutions, lustration (vetting and removal of officials), reparations programs, and institutional reforms.[65][66]
57 million Iranians live in poverty, one of the highest rates in the world.(62%) Thats how bad things are in the Mullah run economy.
Critically, truth commissions function as post-transition mechanisms, not instruments of regime change. They are established after a political transition creates space for honest reckoning with the past, not as catalysts for the transition itself. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the most celebrated example, was created in 1995 by democratic legislation after the apartheid system had already ended. Chile's National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation operated after President Augusto Pinochet left power, not as a means to remove him.[66][65]
Prerequisites for Transitional Justice in Iran
Effective truth-seeking in Iran would require several prerequisites currently absent: cessation of ongoing human rights violations; government with legitimacy to mandate investigation; protection for victims, witnesses, and truth-tellers; independent judiciary capable of following evidence wherever it leads; and political consensus that accountability serves national interest rather than factional advantage.[65][66][67]
The mullahs never go hungry!
The scale of documentation required is immense. Iran Human Rights and other monitoring organizations have documented hundreds of protesters killed since 2022, thousands imprisoned on vague national security charges, systematic torture in detention facilities, and dozens executed after grossly unfair trials. These recent violations compound four decades of repression including the 1980s mass executions of political prisoners, serial murders of dissidents in the 1990s, suppression of the 2009 Green Movement, and ongoing persecution of ethnic and religious minorities.[68][34][58]
A comprehensive truth process would need to investigate IRGC economic corruption, intelligence ministry surveillance of citizens, judiciary complicity in unfair trials, and clerical establishment's ideological justification for repression. Given that perpetrators currently control state institutions, such investigation is structurally impossible under the existing system. Truth-telling, therefore, must follow rather than precede regime change.[62][10][52]
Civil Society and Nonviolent Resistance
Iranian civil society has demonstrated remarkable creativity and resilience in developing nonviolent resistance strategies despite severe repression. These include: economic boycotts targeting IRGC-affiliated companies; bank withdrawals to drain regime financial resources; strikes by oil workers, teachers, and other sectors; dispersed tactics like graffiti and social media campaigns that are harder to suppress than concentrated protests; and cultural resistance through music, art, and literature that contest official narratives.[55][56][57][58]
The Mullahs have no knowledge of or skills in business, and yet they are some of the richest people in Iran. Their children play in Dubai and London.
The 2009 Green Movement, while ultimately suppressed, provided crucial lessons about maintaining nonviolent discipline, the importance of tactical diversity and innovation, and the challenges of sustaining mobilization against brutal repression without clear strategic planning. The 2022 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests that erupted after Mahsa Amini's death represented an evolution in Iranian resistance: more explicitly rejecting the entire Islamic Republic system rather than seeking reform within it, greater participation from younger generations, stronger role for women as leaders and strategic actors, and coordination across ethnic and class boundaries.[68][30][56][57]
These movements reveal both the Iranian people's determination to resist authoritarianism and the system's capacity to absorb and suppress challenges. The regime has perfected techniques of graduated repression: initially tolerating limited protest to gauge intensity, selectively targeting leaders for arrest or assassination, deploying propaganda to delegitimize protesters, mobilizing Basij paramilitaries to attack demonstrations, and ultimately authorizing lethal force when other methods fail.[34][10][68]
Why Presidential-Led Transition is Structurally Impossible
Constitutional Barriers
The Iranian constitution's design precludes presidential challenge to the system. Unlike parliamentary democracies where a prime minister with legislative majority can implement policy, or presidential systems with independent executive authority, Iran's hybrid theocratic structure subordinates all elected officials to the unelected Supreme Leader. The president cannot appoint cabinet ministers without Supreme Leader approval for key positions, cannot control security forces, cannot set foreign policy, cannot reform the judiciary, cannot modify electoral procedures, and critically, cannot amend the constitution without Guardian Council approval—a body controlled by the Supreme Leader.[4][5][13][8]
The Mullahs are mean, stingy and spiteful, imposing a kind of Islam that is harsh and cruel. To the point where most people in the cities where 73% of the population, actually HATE BEING CALLED MUSLIMS. This is a remarkable social engineering achievement by the puppet Mullahs.
This architecture means that even a president genuinely committed to democratic transition lacks the institutional leverage to implement it. Any attempt to mobilize popular support against the Supreme Leader would result in immediate presidential dismissal under Article 110 of the constitution, which grants the Supreme Leader authority to remove the president. The precedent of Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani demonstrates that the system permits reformist rhetoric to maintain legitimacy but blocks reformist action to preserve power.[2][15][13][69][19]
The IRGC Factor
The Revolutionary Guards represent the decisive institutional barrier to presidential-led change. With approximately 125,000 active personnel, control over ballistic missile programs, extensive intelligence networks, vast economic holdings, and direct reporting to the Supreme Leader, the IRGC functions as the regime's ultimate guarantor. Historical precedent shows the IRGC's willingness to use lethal force against protesters: during the 2019 demonstrations over fuel price increases, security forces killed approximately 1,500 people in just three days.[26][34][10][11][70]
President Pezeshkian has no authority over the IRGC. When tensions with Israel escalated in 2024, the Revolutionary Guards dismissed Pezeshkian's advocacy for restraint and proceeded with their preferred military response regardless of presidential objections. The IRGC's institutional interests—maintaining economic monopolies, avoiding accountability for corruption and human rights violations, preserving ideological commitment to exporting the revolution—directly conflict with democratic transition. Any president attempting to facilitate such transition would face IRGC opposition that could manifest as political sabotage, economic disruption, or even arrest on national security charges.[10][52][5][28][7]
Supreme Leader Khamenei, age 86 with reported health issues including prostate cancer and intestinal obstruction requiring surgery, represents a critical variable in Iran's political future. His eventual death will create a succession crisis given the absence of clear mechanism for identifying a replacement and the competing interests of various power centers. However, this succession moment offers no opening for presidential action to facilitate democratic transition.[51][71][53][72]
The Assembly of Experts, constitutionally responsible for selecting the new Supreme Leader, consists exclusively of clerics vetted by the Guardian Council. Recent Assembly elections in March 2024 saw further consolidation of hardline control, with moderates disqualified and younger clerics loyal to Khamenei elevated. When succession occurs, the Assembly will likely select either Mojtaba Khamenei (providing dynastic continuity) or an IRGC-aligned cleric acceptable to the Revolutionary Guards. The president will play no meaningful role in this process.[53][73][6][74][75][76][51]
Historical Precedent: Why Reform from Within Fails
Every attempt at reform through presidential action has failed in the Islamic Republic's 45-year history. Mohammad Khatami's reformist government (1997-2005) achieved limited cultural opening but no structural change; the Guardian Council rejected reformist legislation, the judiciary imprisoned reformist journalists and activists, and the system emerged from Khatami's presidency fundamentally unchanged. Hassan Rouhani's administration (2013-2021) secured the JCPOA nuclear agreement—representing the ceiling of what a reformist president can achieve with Supreme Leader support—but failed to deliver on domestic reform promises.[17][12][15][13][16][77]
Extreme poverty in Iran: Real wealth in the hands of the 1%
Why Pezeshkian Cannot "Continue in Politics After Revolution"
The conceptual incoherence in imagining presidential continuity through revolutionary transition reveals misunderstanding of what revolution entails. Revolution, by definition, involves fundamental transformation of political structures, not merely leadership change within existing frameworks. If revolution succeeds in Iran—through popular uprising, elite defection, or IRGC fragmentation—it will sweep away the Islamic Republic's entire institutional architecture, including the presidency.[49][46][44]
The position of president exists only within the 1979 constitution's framework of Velayat-e faqih. Democratic transition would require constitutional replacement, not amendment. Reza Pahlavi's Emergency Phase Plan explicitly abolishes the Islamic Republic's constitution and voids all laws contradicting democracy and human rights. Any transitional government would need to establish entirely new structures through processes like constituent assemblies, constitutional conventions, and popular referendums.[44][4][61][80][41][81]
Furthermore, Pezeshkian's identification with the Islamic Republic system eliminates his viability as a post-revolution political actor. His September 2024 declaration "I have been, am, and will continue to be a Basiji," his praise for intelligence operatives suppressing dissent, and his appointments of hardliners to security positions have defined him as a regime functionary rather than a reformist or democratic alternative. In any genuine transition, Pezeshkian would face accountability for system collaboration, not continuation in politics. The post-revolutionary requirement for lustration—vetting officials for complicity in authoritarian governance—would likely disqualify most Islamic Republic officials from future political participation.[65][82][27][81]
Alternative Scenario: Limited Presidential Defection
While presidential leadership of democratic transition is structurally impossible, one could theoretically envision a limited role for Pezeshkian in regime collapse through defection rather than transformation. This alternative scenario would require the president to:
Refuse orders to suppress protests: If mass demonstrations reach critical intensity, Pezeshkian could publicly refuse to authorize or endorse crackdown measures, citing conscience and national interest. This would not prevent IRGC violence (which the president does not control) but could contribute to regime delegitimization and encourage security force defections.[21][47]
Publicly acknowledge system illegitimacy: The president could break with protocol by explicitly stating that the Islamic Republic cannot be reformed and must be replaced. Such a statement would constitute political suicide, resulting in immediate removal and likely arrest, but it could accelerate elite fragmentation and embolden protesters.[25][47]
Facilitate information flow to opposition: Using his position's residual access to intelligence, Pezeshkian could covertly provide information about regime plans and vulnerabilities to opposition forces. This would constitute treason under Islamic Republic law and risk execution if discovered.[27]
Provide symbolic protection to protesters: The president could attempt to visit protest sites, meet with opposition leaders, or otherwise use his office's symbolic authority to complicate regime repression. This tactic has precedent in other authoritarian contexts where officials sought to constrain security forces through their presence.[47]
None of these actions would constitute leadership of transition or guarantee its success. They would represent acts of individual conscience with high personal cost and uncertain strategic value. More critically, nothing in Pezeshkian's behavior during his first six months suggests willingness to pursue such a path. His consistent pattern of accommodation to IRGC and clerical establishment, combined with explicit declarations of loyalty to the revolutionary system, indicates he has chosen regime service over regime resistance.[20][26][27]
Realistic Pathways Forward
Short-Term Trajectory (2026-2027): Intensifying Crisis
Iran faces converging pressures that will shape its near-term trajectory: economic crisis with 42% inflation, 70% food inflation, and continued currency devaluation; ongoing protests with potential for escalation if economic conditions worsen; regional isolation following Israel's degradation of Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Syria; nuclear program standoff with increasing international pressure; and the looming succession crisis as Khamenei ages.[30][31][83]
These pressures create instability but not necessarily transformation. The regime has survived multiple crisis periods through superior coercive capacity and opposition fragmentation. The current protests, while significant, have not reached the scale of the 2022 "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement, which itself was ultimately suppressed through mass arrests, executions, and systematic terror.[68][34][84][30]
Do Not kill poor people! PASDARAN.
President Pezeshkian's administration will likely continue its current pattern: rhetorical reformism combined with substantive compliance with hardline directives, occasional minor policy adjustments to mollify protesters (perhaps easing some internet restrictions or reducing hijab enforcement in select cities), but no structural reforms challenging clerical or IRGC power. Economic crisis management will consume most governmental attention, with limited success given systemic corruption and sanctions constraints.[20][23][24][85][25]
Medium-Term Scenarios (2027-2030): Succession and Instability
The most consequential near-term variable is Khamenei's succession. If the Supreme Leader dies or becomes incapacitated, the Assembly of Experts' selection process will determine whether Iran continues with authoritarian continuity (Mojtaba Khamenei or IRGC-aligned cleric) or experiences succession crisis that opens space for transformation.[51][53][83][6][72]
DO NOT KILL POOR PEOPLE PASDARAN!
Succession crisis becomes more likely if: competing IRGC factions cannot agree on a candidate and mobilize their respective clients; the Assembly of Experts fragments between clerics supporting different successors; public protests reach intensity that threatens regime during vulnerable transition moment; or regional/international powers perceive opportunity to press advantage during leadership vacuum. Under these conditions, elite defection becomes possible as regime insiders calculate that their survival requires abandoning the Islamic Republic rather than defending it.[83][46][47][72][51]
Even in crisis scenarios, transformation is not inevitable. Syria's Bashar al-Assad survived prolonged civil war through external support (Russia, Iran, Hezbollah) and willingness to employ unlimited violence against opposition. Iran's government could pursue similar strategies, potentially inviting Russian or Chinese security assistance to suppress internal challenges. The lesson of failed Arab Spring uprisings in Bahrain, Egypt (after initial success), and Syria is that authoritarian regimes with cohesive security forces and external support can survive mass protest.[86][64][78][87]
Long-Term Transformation (2030+): Conditional Democracy
Genuine democratic transition in Iran requires not presidential action but rather systemic collapse followed by successful constitutional reconstruction. This process would unfold in distinct phases:[49][44][61]
Phase 1: Regime Collapse (Duration: Days to Months)
Triggered by combination of elite defection, security force fragmentation, sustained mass mobilization, and/or external shock. Critical indicators include: high-level officials (cabinet ministers, IRGC commanders, judiciary members) publicly breaking with the regime; security forces refusing to shoot protesters or actively joining demonstrations; loss of territorial control in provinces; collapse of rial and banking system; and international recognition of opposition as legitimate representatives.[46][47][54][49]
Phase 2: Transitional Authority (Duration: 6 months to 3 years)
Formation of interim government responsible for maintaining order, preventing revenge violence, and organizing constitutional process. This government would likely include: opposition leaders like Reza Pahlavi or other exile figures; defected regime technocrats needed for administrative continuity (following de-Baathification lessons from Iraq); civil society representatives with internal legitimacy; and potentially international monitors or advisors.[44][41][81][46]
Key transitional tasks include: disarming or integrating armed groups; preventing ethnic or sectarian violence; restoring basic services (electricity, water, healthcare); stabilizing economy and currency; beginning accountability process for regime officials; and establishing electoral commission and constitutional assembly.[65][81][44]
Phase 3: Constitutional Design (Duration: 1-2 years)
Elected constituent assembly drafts new constitution establishing democratic governance. Critical design choices include: parliamentary versus presidential versus mixed system; degree of decentralization and minority rights protection; judicial independence mechanisms; role of religion in public life (secular state versus accommodationist approaches); and property rights/economic system.[61][41][81][44]
This process would be contentious given Iranian society's diversity of preferences on governance structure (monarchy versus republic), economic policy (state-directed versus market-oriented), ethnic and religious accommodation (Persian nationalism versus pluralism), and relationship with religion (secular versus Islamic democracy). International experience suggests constitutional design succeeds when it incorporates broad stakeholder participation, protects minority rights, provides clear transition timelines, and includes enforcement mechanisms.[42][43][66][65][61]
Phase 4: Democratic Consolidation (Duration: 5-15 years)
Holding founding elections, forming government, implementing constitution, addressing transitional justice, and building democratic institutions and culture. Historical precedent shows this phase determines whether democratic transition succeeds or reverts to authoritarianism. Success factors include: civilian control over military and security forces; independent judiciary with professional judges; free press and robust civil society; competitive party system allowing alternation of power; constitutional constraints on executive authority; and economic performance delivering tangible benefits.[66][78][65][61]
Conclusion: Honest Assessment of Possibilities
The scenario of President Masoud Pezeshkian facilitating smooth democratic transition, enabling Reza Pahlavi's return, using truth to connect with protesters, outmaneuvering the clerical establishment, and continuing in post-revolutionary politics confronts insurmountable structural, institutional, and historical barriers. This analysis has documented why such a pathway is not merely unlikely but constitutionally impossible given Iran's political architecture.
The Iranian presidency lacks the authority, institutional control, and independent power base necessary to challenge the Supreme Leader and IRGC-dominated system. All historical attempts at presidential reform have failed when they encountered the regime's built-in veto points. President Pezeshkian's first six months demonstrate his administration follows this pattern of rhetorical reform and substantive compliance rather than challenging the system's fundamental character.
Genuine democratic transition in Iran requires systemic collapse rather than incremental presidential action. Such collapse could result from sustained popular uprising combined with elite defection, IRGC fragmentation during succession crisis, economic implosion that prevents regime from paying security forces, or external shock that exposes the Islamic Republic's vulnerability. But these pathways depend on social forces and institutional dynamics beyond presidential control or influence.
The invocation of "TRUTH" as a transitional mechanism misunderstands the sequencing of democratic transformation. Truth commissions and reconciliation processes are post-transition mechanisms that address past atrocities after regime change has already occurred, not instruments for achieving that change. They require security for victims and witnesses, independent judiciary, and political will for accountability—conditions absent in Iran under Islamic Republic rule and only possible after its removal.
If revolutionary transformation occurs in Iran, it will sweep away the presidency along with other Islamic Republic institutions. The notion of presidential continuity through revolution represents conceptual incoherence: revolution by definition replaces institutional structures rather than preserving them. Any democratic transition would require constitutional replacement through processes like constituent assemblies and popular referendums that establish entirely new governance frameworks.
The most likely near-term scenario involves IRGC-managed succession after Khamenei's death, preserving authoritarian structures with possible tactical economic reforms. Popular uprising leading to genuine democracy remains possible but faces formidable obstacles: opposition fragmentation, absence of organized alternative government, IRGC coercive capacity, and regional powers' interests in preventing democratic transformation. Any democratic transition will be protracted, contested, and chaotic rather than smooth or seamless.
Iranian civil society's resilience, the opposition's gradual convergence around secular democratic principles, and the Islamic Republic's deepening crises create conditions where transformation becomes increasingly plausible even if not imminent. The path forward requires not presidential leadership—which is structurally impossible—but rather sustained popular mobilization, opposition unity around transitional governance plans, security force defections at critical moments, and international support for democratic transformation. These elements can coalesce to end authoritarian rule, but only if Iranians themselves generate the organized capacity for revolutionary change from below rather than expecting it from presidents above.
The image of a "smooth, seamless transition" represents wishful thinking disconnected from revolutionary dynamics and Iranian institutional realities. Democratic transformation, if it comes, will emerge through conflict, sacrifice, and sustained collective action—not through presidential facilitation or careful management. The role of external observers and democratic governments should be to support Iranian civil society, hold the regime accountable for human rights violations, facilitate defections by offering protection to regime officials who break with authoritarianism, and prepare for post-transition reconstruction rather than imagining that change will come smoothly through existing institutional channels.
President Pezeshkian faces a stark choice: continue serving as window dressing for authoritarianism, or break decisively with the regime at enormous personal cost with uncertain strategic impact.
His actions to date suggest he has chosen the former. Iranian democrats should therefore invest their energies not in hoping for presidential salvation but in building the organizational capacity, strategic coherence, and popular mobilization necessary to achieve transformation through their own power.
Democracy, when it comes to Iran, will be won by Iranians from below, not granted by presidents from above.
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79. https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Irans_Authoritarian_Playbook.pdf
80. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989
81. https://fund.nufdiran.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/EmergPhase_v3_ENG.pdf
82. https://www.cmi.no/publications/1052-truth-in-transition
83. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/succession-plans-irans-khamenei-hit-top-gear-2025-06-23/
84. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601053422
85. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601016383
86. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/irans-transition-six-months-repression-meets-resilience
87. https://www.stimson.org/2025/reform-is-happening-in-iran-and-assads-fall-could-accelerate-it/
88. https://iranhr.net/en/articles/7400/
89. https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/1fzgpb0/popular_iranian_opinion_of_reza_pahlavi_his_role/
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91. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-resistance/free-iran-convention-2025-defining-the-roadmap-for-irans-democratic-transition/
92. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/iran-after-the-summer/
93. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/masoud-pezeshkian-reformist-game-changer-election-president/
94. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Masoud-Pezeshkian
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96. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cmm25dq14j3o
97. https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/UANI_Resource_Pezeshkian_JR_KA_JR_KA_JMB_JR_KA 22 July (1)_JMB.pdf
98. https://mecouncil.org/publication/irans-foreign-policy-under-masoud-pezeshkian-tendencies-and-challenges/
99. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=11595&lid=7065
100. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/07/06/heart-surgeon-who-rose-to-power-in-parliament-is-now-irans-president-elect-00166692
101. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y-MToL34s6E
102. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/has-reza-pahlavi-become-opposition-irans-alireza-nader-chcne
103. https://www.cfr.org/article/islamic-republics-power-centers https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-882490
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REFERENCES AND CITATIONS
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NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
