.
.
.
.
The political objective is to capture government buildings and bureaucratic offices in Tehran first IN ORDER TO GOVERN, and neutralise the Mullah security forces, IRGC, Basij, Military and Intelligence Savama.
There are American, Israeli, and MEK agents inside Iran, working with the protestors, but their policy of destruction is useful in the short term (to sow chaos), but in the long term, self-destructive to Iran.
THE REVOLUTION MUST QUICKLY MOVE FROM MERE PROTEST TO GOVERNANCE.
THE PUPPET MULLAHS INSTALLED BY THE USA IN 1979 ARE IMPERVIOUS TO PROTEST BY ORDINARY IRANIANS. Tomorrow, the Turkish mullahs will not say,
''Oh, OK, you know what, I think there is value in what you say, and we empathise with your world view, we understand and hear your pain and suffering around water, food and money.''
It is just not going to happen with the tunnel vision of the Mullahs.
PROTESTS ARE AN IMPORTANT CHANNEL OF EMOTIONAL RELEASE, CATHARSIS BY ORDINARY ANGRY IRANIANS, BUT WE MUST MOVE TOWARDS
POWER,
CONTROL,
AND GOVERNANCE.
____________________________________________________
The Revolutionary Imperative: Why Revolutions Must Preserve State Institutions Rather Than Destroy Them
Introduction: The Dialectic of Revolutionary Transformation
Revolutionary movements confront an essential paradox: while they seek to fundamentally transform society and overthrow existing power structures, they cannot afford to completely destroy the institutional apparatus through which societies function.
The historical experiences of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany—two of the twentieth century's most radical political transformations—demonstrate that even the most revolutionary governments must preserve significant elements of the previous state's institutional framework to achieve their objectives.
This thesis argues that the complete destruction of state institutions represents not revolutionary radicalism but political suicide, as administrative capacity, technical expertise, and bureaucratic infrastructure constitute the indispensable tools through which any government, revolutionary or otherwise, must govern.
UNLESS YOU WANT TO INHERIT A FAILED STATE, LIKE SOMALIA, WHICH THEN BECOMES RIPE FOR FOREIGN COLONIAL WESTERN EXPLOITATION:
Somalia possesses significant untapped mineral wealth, including large reserves of uranium, iron ore, gypsum, tin, sepiolite, and potential for oil & gas, alongside deposits of gold, copper, limestone, rare earth elements, and salt**, but lacks modern surveys and infrastructure, making their current monetary value difficult to quantify, though resources like oil/gas and critical minerals represent high future potential for development and revenue.
Key Mineral Resources:Oil & Gas: Significant reserves (estimated 20B barrels oil, 6B m³ gas) are known, with exploration underway by companies like Turkish Petroleum.
Uranium: Large deposits are identified in Galmudug, Gedo, and Jubaland regions, with exploration by Almond Energy.
Iron Ore: Major untapped deposits exist, though not yet mined commercially.
Gypsum: Large reserves (around 22M tons) near Berbera are known, with plans for development.
Sepiolite (Meerschaum): Among the world's largest deposits, located in south-central Somalia.
Tin, Gold, Copper, Rare Earth Elements: Deposits of these critical minerals hold significant future value but remain undeveloped.
Coal: Deposits are present but quality/quantity often deemed insufficient for large-scale mining.
Value & Potential:Untapped Potential: Somalia's mineral wealth is largely unexploited due to conflict, lack of investment, and poor infrastructure, notes Amazon Web Services (AWS), African Mining Online.
Value & Potential:Untapped Potential: Somalia's mineral wealth is largely unexploited due to conflict, lack of investment, and poor infrastructure, notes Amazon Web Services (AWS), African Mining Online.
Future Economic Drivers: Minerals like oil, gas, uranium, iron, and rare earths are crucial for clean energy and technology, offering high economic potential if developed, according to SFA (Oxford).
Quantifying Value is Difficult: Specific monetary values are not readily available as most deposits lack feasibility studies and commercial exploitation, requiring extensive investment and surveys.
In essence, Somalia holds vast mineral wealth, but it's largely an undeveloped asset awaiting stability and investment to unlock its true economic value, particularly in oil and gas and strategic minerals.
Seeing History Unfold at Berlin's Reichstag by Rick Steves
Theoretical Foundations: Marx, Lenin, and the State Question
The Marxist Conception of "Smashing" the State
The revolutionary tradition's relationship with state institutions begins with Karl Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune of 1871, which he characterized as the first genuine workers' government. Marx famously declared that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes". However, this statement—often interpreted as a call for total institutional destruction—requires careful unpacking.[1][2]
Marx's conception of "smashing the state" did not mean the wholesale abolition of all administrative functions. Rather, as his writings on the Commune reveal, it meant two distinct processes: first, the complete elimination of the repressive and illegitimate functions of the bourgeois state—the standing army, the political police, and the mechanisms of class oppression—and second, the radical transformation of legitimate administrative functions by placing them under direct popular control. The Commune abolished the standing army and stripped the police of political powers, but it did not eliminate the need for public administration. Instead, it reorganized governance so that officials were elected, paid workers' wages, subject to immediate recall, and directly accountable to the community.[3][4]
This distinction is crucial: Marx advocated destroying the machinery of class domination while preserving and democratizing the functions of social administration. Engels later clarified that the Commune was "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word," suggesting that revolutionary transformation involves not the destruction of administrative capacity but its fundamental reorganization from an instrument of minority rule into a form of community self-organization.[3]
Lenin's Pragmatic Synthesis
Vladimir Lenin, building on Marx's analysis in The State and Revolution, developed a more nuanced understanding of revolutionary state-building that would prove prophetic when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917. Lenin argued that the proletariat must "smash" the bourgeois state machine and replace it with a workers' state—but this workers' state would still require administrative functions, technical expertise, and mechanisms of accounting and control.[1][2][5]
Lenin emphasized that after the overthrow of capitalists, revolutionary society would need to "proceed immediately, overnight, to replace them in the control over production and distribution, in the work of keeping account of labor and products". Critically, he distinguished between political control and technical administration, noting that "the question of control and accounting should not be confused with the question of the scientifically trained staff of engineers, agronomists, and so on. These gentlemen are working today in obedience to the wishes of the capitalists and will work even better tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers".[5]
This theoretical framework acknowledged an uncomfortable truth: revolutions require bureaucracy, expertise, and administrative continuity even as they transform political power. The state as an instrument of class rule must be destroyed; the state as an administrative apparatus must be preserved and repurposed.
Government of Vladimir Lenin - Wikipedia
The Soviet Experience: Reluctant Continuity with Tsarist Bureaucracy
The Inheritance of Chinovniks
When the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917, they inherited a vast, complex administrative apparatus from Tsarist Russia. The Russian Empire had developed an extensive bureaucratic system organized through the Table of Ranks, established by Peter the Great in 1722, which created a formal hierarchy of civil servants known as chinovniks. Lenin himself had written before the revolution: "Just as the peasants were the slaves of the landlords, so the Russian people are still the slaves of the officials".[6][7]
The revolutionary government's initial instinct was to sweep away this entire system. The Table of Ranks was formally abolished, and the Bolsheviks attempted to build an entirely new administrative structure staffed by revolutionary militants. However, this approach quickly proved untenable. As Lenin admitted at the Eleventh Congress, the Party confronted a stark reality: Russia could not be governed without administrative expertise, and that expertise resided primarily in the former Tsarist bureaucracy.[8][9][6]
The Pragmatic Turn
The Communist Party, despite its revolutionary ideology, "fell back, albeit reluctantly, upon the expertise of the more reliable tsarist civil servants". This was not merely a temporary expedient but a structural necessity. As Lenin acknowledged, Russia's relative underdevelopment compared to advanced capitalist countries meant it lacked a sufficient pool of technically trained administrators from the working class. The revolution therefore required the continued employment of "bourgeois specialists" and former Tsarist officials who possessed the knowledge to operate the machinery of state.[8][9]
History of Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union (1917–1927 ...
This pragmatic accommodation created profound tensions. Lenin repeatedly inveighed against "bureaucratism" and the tendency of the old apparatus to corrupt revolutionary aims. At the Eleventh Congress in 1922, he offered a devastating assessment: "If we take Moscow, with its 4,700 Communists in responsible positions, and if we take the huge bureaucratic machine, that gigantic heap, we must ask: who is directing whom? I doubt very much whether it can be truthfully said that the Communists are directing that heap. To tell the truth, they are not directing, they are being directed".[10][11]
Institutional Evolution Under Stalin
Joseph Stalin, who became General Secretary in 1922, understood the centrality of administrative control to political power. He earned the nickname "Comrade File Cabinet" for his meticulous attention to bureaucratic appointments and developed the Central Committee's patronage system to place political supporters in key positions. Rather than destroying the bureaucratic apparatus, Stalin systematically captured and repurposed it.[6][8]
The Soviet nomenklatura system that emerged represented a "continuation of the old Tsarist regime," as many former chinovniks or "careerists" joined the Bolshevik government during and after the Civil War. While the formal structure changed and political criteria for appointment became paramount, the fundamental administrative architecture—the necessity of hierarchical bureaucratic organization, specialized functions, and technical expertise—persisted and even expanded under Soviet rule.[8][6]
Stalin and other Soviet leaders fought against bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, establishing institutions like the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to combat deficiencies in the state apparatus. However, these efforts aimed to improve bureaucratic performance, not to eliminate bureaucracy itself. The revolution transformed who controlled the administrative apparatus and in whose interests it operated, but it could not dispense with administrative institutions themselves.[11][8]
Nazi Germany: Gleichschaltung Through Institutional Preservation
The Weimar Inheritance
The Nazi seizure of power in January 1933 provides an equally instructive case of revolutionary transformation through institutional preservation rather than destruction. Adolf Hitler became Chancellor within the existing constitutional framework of the Weimar Republic, and the Nazi consolidation of power proceeded through the systematic co-optation of existing state institutions rather than their wholesale replacement.[12][13][14]
First a German, then a Civil Servant” (July 31, 1933 ...
The Weimar Republic had established a professional, Weberian bureaucracy with strong regulatory barriers against politicization. This civil service represented a crucial "anchor of stability and continuity" in Germany's politically and economically turbulent interwar period. When the Nazis came to power, they confronted a well-established administrative apparatus staffed by conservative, nationalistic, and authoritarian officials who, while not necessarily radical antisemites, generally opposed the Weimar democratic system.[14][15][16]
The Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service
Rather than dismantling this bureaucracy, the Nazis enacted the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service on April 7, 1933—just two months after Hitler became Chancellor and two weeks after the Enabling Act granted him dictatorial powers. This law provides a masterclass in revolutionary transformation through selective purging rather than institutional destruction.[17][18]
The law allowed the dismissal of civil servants on several grounds: those of "non-Aryan descent" (particularly Jews), members of the Communist Party or affiliated organizations, and those whose "political activity affords no guarantee that they will act in the interest of the national state". However—and this is crucial—the law explicitly maintained exemptions for Jewish civil servants who had served since August 1, 1914, fought in World War I, or lost family members in the war.[18][19][17]
More significantly, the law preserved the civil service structure itself. It mandated that dismissed officials could be replaced and that remaining civil servants could be transferred to different positions, even with reduced rank or salary, but the bureaucratic framework remained intact. The Nazi regime understood that it needed the administrative expertise, institutional knowledge, and operational capacity that the existing civil service provided.[17][18]
The Mechanics of Gleichschaltung
The Nazi process of Gleichschaltung (coordination)—the systematic alignment of all institutions with Nazi ideology—worked through existing institutions rather than by creating entirely new ones. The Weimar Constitution technically remained in effect until Germany's surrender in 1945, though its democratic provisions were effectively suspended. Germany's federal states were reorganized into Nazi provinces called Gaue, but this represented administrative restructuring rather than institutional destruction.[12][13][20]
Heinrich Himmler's assumption of control over the German police in 1936 illustrates this pattern. Rather than creating an entirely new police force, Himmler centralized control over Germany's existing police forces, dividing them into the Order Police (uniformed forces) and Security Police (Gestapo and Kripo). The personnel, organizational structures, and operational expertise remained largely continuous with the Weimar period; what changed was the political direction and ideological mission.[21]
Germany 1933: from democracy to dictatorship | Anne Frank House
German judges, civil servants, and administrators largely shared the Nazis' conservative, nationalistic, and authoritarian outlook. They did not resist the rollback of democratic freedoms, and many actively facilitated Nazi policies by drafting and implementing discriminatory laws. This ideological compatibility made institutional preservation particularly effective: the Nazis could rely on existing bureaucratic capacity while redirecting it toward their revolutionary objectives.[15]
The Nazi experience demonstrates that even totalitarian transformations depend on inherited institutional capacity. The regime could not have implemented its racial policies, mobilized for war, or administered occupied territories without the sophisticated administrative apparatus it inherited from Weimar Germany.
The Imperative of State Capacity
State Capacity as a Foundation for Governance
The experiences of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany illustrate a broader truth about revolutionary government: state capacity—defined as the ability to collect taxes, enforce law and order, provide public services, and implement policy—constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for any government to function.[22][23][24][25]
Research on state capacity demonstrates its fundamental importance for economic development and public goods provision. Counties and municipalities with stronger state capacity provide significantly better public goods including treated water, education, healthcare, and telecommunications infrastructure. In China, regions exhibiting a one standard deviation increase in state capacity show socio-economic activities nearly 84 percent greater than regions with lower capacity. This enhancement derives from increased government spending on public goods and heightened incentives for private investment that a capable state creates.[23][22]
State capacity operates through network effects: administrative capacity in one jurisdiction strengthens and facilitates capacity in neighboring areas. This means that building state capacity from scratch in areas where it has been entirely destroyed proves extraordinarily difficult. Conversely, preserving and transforming existing institutional capacity allows revolutionary governments to maintain basic governance functions while pursuing transformative objectives.[24][23]
The Components of Administrative Capacity
State capacity requires several elements that cannot be instantly created or easily replaced:
Technical Expertise: Modern governance demands specialized knowledge in fields ranging from engineering and public health to finance and urban planning. Revolutionary governments cannot simply decree this expertise into existence; they must either employ those who possess it or accept dramatically reduced governmental capacity during the extended period required to train replacements.[22][23][5]
Institutional Knowledge: Bureaucracies accumulate operational knowledge about how systems function, where resources are located, how services are delivered, and how policies are implemented. This tacit knowledge resides in institutional practices and experienced personnel, not in formal organizational charts.[26][27][9]
Administrative Infrastructure: Physical infrastructure—offices, communication systems, record-keeping apparatus, transportation networks—as well as institutional infrastructure including established procedures, legal frameworks, and coordination mechanisms form the material basis for governance.[28][23][22]
Legitimacy and Compliance: Even revolutionary governments require some degree of voluntary compliance from the population. Maintaining continuity in basic administrative functions—taxation, property registration, legal documentation—helps sustain this compliance during political transitions.[29][30]
SOVIET ARCHITECTURE
The Costs of Institutional Destruction
Historical evidence demonstrates that revolutionary movements that completely destroy existing state institutions face catastrophic governance failures. State collapse—"the catastrophic breakdown of a sovereign state's institutional apparatus, resulting in the inability to sustain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force"—typically leads to a vicious cycle of declining government resources, dominance of the informal economy, loss of public trust, and potential civil war.[31][32][33]
Recent examples reinforce this lesson. The Arab Spring revolutions largely failed because they destroyed existing authority structures without successfully building replacement institutions with sufficient capacity. Libya's 2011 revolution overthrew Muammar Gaddafi but destroyed state capacity in the process, leading to ongoing civil war and a significant decline in living standards and security. Syria's opposition attempted to build alternative state institutions including a civil registry system, but the bureaucratic revolution struggled to achieve legitimacy and effectiveness without inherited administrative capacity.[34][29][35]
These failures highlight what the Soviet and Nazi cases successfully managed: revolutionary transformation requires selective institutional destruction combined with systematic preservation and repurposing of administrative capacity.
The Theoretical Resolution: Transformation Without Destruction
Distinguishing Political Power from Administrative Capacity
The resolution to the apparent paradox—how revolutions can be both radical and institutionally conservative—lies in distinguishing between the seizure of political power and the preservation of administrative capacity. Revolutions must destroy the machinery of class domination and political oppression: the repressive state apparatus (special police, political surveillance, mechanisms of censorship), the structures that concentrate power in the hands of the old ruling class, and the legal frameworks that legitimize exploitation and oppression.[1][2][36][37][38]
However, revolutions must simultaneously preserve and transform the administrative state apparatus: the bureaucratic mechanisms that collect revenue, maintain records, deliver services, coordinate economic activity, and perform the countless technical functions required for modern governance. The revolutionary project involves capturing this administrative apparatus and redirecting it toward new political objectives, not destroying it.[2][36][37][38][22][23][3]
6 masterpieces of Soviet architecture from the 1920s-1950s ...
The Process of Revolutionary State Building
Successful revolutionary transformation follows a pattern visible in both the Soviet and Nazi cases:
1. Rapid Political Capture: The revolutionary movement seizes control of key political institutions—executive power, legislative bodies, military command—establishing new sources of political authority.[12][13][6][9]
2. Selective Purging: The revolution removes from administrative positions those most ideologically opposed or most closely identified with the old regime's political leadership, while retaining technically competent personnel whose expertise is essential.[14][6][15][8][17][18]
3. Structural Reorganization: The revolution reorganizes institutional relationships, creates new oversight mechanisms, and establishes new channels of political control, but works through existing bureaucratic structures rather than creating entirely new administrative systems.[6][8][9][12]
4. Gradual Personnel Transformation: Over time, the revolution trains and promotes a new generation of administrators loyal to the revolutionary regime, gradually reducing dependence on holdovers from the old order.[8][30][6]
5. Functional Preservation: Throughout this process, basic administrative functions continue to operate, maintaining state capacity even as political power fundamentally transforms.[9][30][14][6]
This pattern allows revolutionary governments to achieve their transformative objectives while maintaining the administrative capacity necessary to govern. The alternative—complete institutional destruction—leads not to revolutionary transformation but to state collapse, civil war, or counter-revolution.
Contemporary Relevance and Conclusion
Lessons for Revolutionary Movements
The historical experiences examined here offer crucial lessons for contemporary revolutionary movements and post-conflict state-building efforts. The collapse of revolutionary projects in the Middle East, the difficulties of post-Soviet transitions, and the challenges facing movements seeking fundamental political change all reflect inadequate attention to the preservation of state capacity.[39][26][34][29][30]
Revolutionary movements must recognize that destruction is easy; construction is hard. Overthrowing a regime may require only sufficient coercive force and popular mobilization, but building a functioning state capable of implementing revolutionary objectives requires administrative capacity that cannot be created overnight. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore observes, "abolition is about presence, not absence. It's about building life-affirming institutions". This principle applies to revolutionary state-building generally: the revolution must build new political institutions and social relations, but it cannot dispense with the administrative infrastructure that makes governance possible.[38][34][29][32][33]
6 masterpieces of Soviet architecture from the 1920s-1950s ...
The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany succeeded in consolidating power and implementing their revolutionary agendas—however morally abhorrent those agendas may have been—precisely because they preserved administrative capacity inherited from previous regimes. Both regimes transformed the political character of the state and redirected administrative institutions toward new objectives, but neither attempted to govern without bureaucracy, technical expertise, or institutional continuity.[12][13][14][6][15][8][9]
The Dialectic of Revolutionary Conservatism
The revolutionary imperative to preserve state institutions represents a form of "revolutionary conservatism"—a dialectical synthesis that is simultaneously radical in its political transformation and conservative in its institutional preservation. This dialectic reflects the material constraints of governance: societies require functioning administrative systems to provide public goods, maintain economic coordination, and enable collective life.[36][22][40][23][25]
Revolutionary theory must therefore move beyond the simplistic dichotomy of "smashing" versus "seizing" the state to embrace a more nuanced understanding of revolutionary transformation as involving the destruction of oppressive political structures, the preservation of essential administrative capacity, and the gradual construction of new institutional forms that serve revolutionary objectives. Marx glimpsed this understanding in his analysis of the Paris Commune; Lenin articulated it more explicitly in The State and Revolution; and the historical experiences of twentieth-century revolutions—both successful and failed—have confirmed its validity.[1][2][37][38][6][9][34][29][3][4][36]
Final Thesis
Revolutions should not destroy all the tools of former government state institutions because administrative capacity constitutes the indispensable infrastructure through which any government—revolutionary or otherwise—must govern. The complete destruction of state institutions eliminates not only the machinery of oppression but also the means of public administration, economic coordination, and social organization. Revolutionary movements that fail to preserve administrative capacity condemn themselves either to collapse, to dependence on external actors, or to lengthy periods of instability during which their transformative objectives become impossible to achieve.
The experiences of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany—two of history's most radical political transformations—demonstrate that even revolutionary governments committed to fundamentally reordering society must preserve significant elements of inherited bureaucratic structures, technical expertise, and administrative infrastructure. The revolution transforms who wields state power and toward what ends, but it cannot dispense with state power itself. In this sense, successful revolutions are simultaneously destructive and conservative: they must destroy the political structures that perpetuate oppression while preserving the administrative structures that enable governance.
This recognition does not diminish revolutionary aspirations but grounds them in material reality. The goal remains the fundamental transformation of social relations and the creation of genuinely democratic, egalitarian societies. However, achieving this goal requires not the destruction but the transformation of state institutions—a process that demands both revolutionary audacity and strategic pragmatism in equal measure.
________________________________________________________
⁂
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