.
.
.
.
Since the Mullahs cannot control the huge size of the protests, the Mullahs have resorted to Chemical weapons, reflecting their desperation to hold on to power.
It also shows their devious, dastardly, evil SATANIC nature.
Then you ask as a rational thinker, at what stage do the MULLAHS REVERT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
The Shah did not stockpile such weapons, but the mullahs fighting Saddam Hussein and ''Chemical'' Ali did so from the 1990s.
This is a war crime, a crime against humanity, and another nail in the coffin of the Mullahs.
Historical Context (Iran-Iraq War)
During the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein) extensively used internationally banned chemical weapons, including sulfur mustard (mustard gas) and nerve agents like sarin and tabun, against both Iranian soldiers and civilians. The Iranian government was a victim of these attacks and, according to various reports, chose not to retaliate with chemical weapons it may have possessed, on both strategic and moral grounds.
Suspected Schoolgirl Poisonings (2023)
In late 2022 and early 2023, a wave of suspected poisoning incidents affected thousands of schoolgirls across Iran, leading to widespread concern and protests. Symptoms Reported: Students reported various symptoms, including nausea, dizziness, headaches, respiratory problems, and temporary paralysis, some after smelling odors described as rotten tangerines or eggs.
Lack of Conclusion: No definitive chemical agent was identified. International experts and researchers who reviewed blood test results found no evidence of toxins, leading some to suggest mass psychogenic illness (MPI) as a possible explanation. Other experts argued the agents used were likely chemical, such as organophosphates, and not easily accessible to the public.
Government Response: The Iranian government was widely criticized for its slow and opaque response, initially denying the incidents before making arrests and eventually concluding that the illnesses were not caused by toxic substances but by "non-toxic agents" and mass hysteria.
Current Concerns
Current Concerns
While the specific allegations in your query remain unverified by international bodies, there are ongoing concerns raised by activists and some news outlets about potential Iranian capabilities and intentions regarding chemical agents: Pharmaceutical-Based Agents (PBAs): Some reports mention a risk of Iran or its proxies using potent, lethal, or incapacitating PBAs like fentanyl or medetomidine.
Possession of Precursors: Iran is believed to possess precursors for chemical agents like sulfur mustard, tabun, and hydrogen cyanide.
THE MULLAHS OF IRAN ARE TOTALLY EVIL.
_______________________________________________________
EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
Chemical Weapons Against Civilian Populations in Iran: Comprehensive Intelligence Report
Executive Summary
This report documents evidence of chemical weapons use by Iranian state authorities against civilian populations, particularly during the recent 2022-2026 protest movements and the systematic targeting of schoolgirls beginning in November 2022.
The report synthesizes intelligence from international organizations, human rights bodies, independent researchers, and documented incidents to establish a pattern of chemical warfare tactics against the Islamic Republic's own citizens.
Key Findings:
· Credible reports of toxic chemical agent deployment against protesters in December 2025-January 2026
· Systematic chemical attacks on schoolgirls across 91 schools in 20 provinces (2022-2023)
· Historical victimization of Iranian civilians by chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War
· Documented pattern of regime denial, obfuscation, and suppression of investigations
· Evidence suggesting orchestrated targeting of anti-government protesters and students refusing mandatory hijab
Key Findings:
· Credible reports of toxic chemical agent deployment against protesters in December 2025-January 2026
· Systematic chemical attacks on schoolgirls across 91 schools in 20 provinces (2022-2023)
Sexual fetish by the Mullah criminals and a reaction to the headscarf issue and the Mahsa Amini protests of 2022. Putting the next generation in their right frame of mind.
· Historical victimization of Iranian civilians by chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War
· Documented pattern of regime denial, obfuscation, and suppression of investigations
· Evidence suggesting orchestrated targeting of anti-government protesters and students refusing mandatory hijab
Part I: Historical Context - Iran's Experience with Chemical Weapons
The Iran-Iraq War Era (1980-1988)
To understand the current allegations, it is essential to recognize Iran's extensive historical experience as a victim of chemical weapons. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iran suffered the largest and most extensive chemical weapons attacks in the Middle East.
Scale of Chemical Exposure:
· Approximately 100,000 Iranians exposed to Iraqi chemical weapons
· An estimated 30,000 survivors still undergoing medical treatment more than three decades later[1]
· Chemical attacks killed tens of thousands of Iranian soldiers and civilians[2]
Chemical Agents Used:
· Mustard gas (sulfur mustard)
· Nerve agents including sarin and tabun
· Binary chemical compounds (cyclosarin)
· Possibly hydrocyanic acid (cyanide compounds)
The Sardasht Attack (June 28, 1987)
One of the most significant attacks occurred on residents of Sardasht, a civilian city:
Attack Details:
· Iraqi aircraft dropped four 250-kilogram bombs containing mustard gas
· 8,025 of 12,000 residents were exposed
· A few dozen died immediately (mostly children and elderly)
· Approximately 1,500 suffered moderate to severe symptoms[3]
· At least 100 survivors have since died from respiratory failure
Long-term Health Consequences:
Survivors of chemical attacks during this period have experienced:
· Chronic respiratory diseases
· Increased cancer rates
· Birth defects in offspring
· Psychological trauma
Halabja Massacre (March 16, 1988)
· Chronic respiratory diseases
· Increased cancer rates
· Birth defects in offspring
· Psychological trauma
Halabja Massacre (March 16, 1988)
While attributable to Iraq, the Halabja massacre shaped Iran's strategic thinking about chemical weapons and civilian vulnerability:
Incident:
· Largest chemical weapons attack on civilians in human history
· 3,200-5,000 Kurdish civilians killed with 7,000-10,000 injured
· Mixture of mustard gas, sarin, VX, and tabun used
· Iranian forces had captured the city 2-3 days before and were present during the attack[4]
This massacre demonstrated to Iranian leadership the devastating utility of chemical weapons in suppressing populations and the minimal international consequences.
Part II: Recent Evidence - The Schoolgirl Poisoning Campaign (2022-2023)
Timeline and Scope
Initial Incident (November 30, 2022)
The first reported poisoning occurred at Nour Technical School in Qom (approximately 80 miles southwest of Tehran), a city known as Iran's religious center.
Victims: 18 schoolgirls and staff members
Reported Symptoms:
· Headaches
· Heart palpitations
· Respiratory problems
· Nausea
· Dizziness
· Lethargy
· Inability to move[5]
Rapid Escalation
Subsequent poisonings followed with alarming frequency:
· December 13, 2022: Second incident at Nour Technical School
· Early 2023: Rapid spread to 30+ schools in surrounding provinces
· Late January-February 2023: Poisonings reported in 194 girls across four schools in Borujerd, Lorestan Province
· March 16, 2023: UN experts report 1,200+ schoolgirls poisoned across 91 schools in 20 provinces[6]
Geographic Distribution:
Confirmed poisonings in provinces including:
· Qom (epicenter)
· Lorestan
· Isfahan
· Tehran and surrounding areas
· Other major Iranian cities
Total Casualties
· 1,200-1,500+ schoolgirls hospitalized
· Hundreds treated for toxic inhalation symptoms
· Many parents withdrew daughters from schools due to fear
· Centers for Human Rights in Iran reported an 11-year-old girl's death whose family received threats
Reported Symptoms Consistency
Across all incidents, victims displayed similar symptoms suggesting a coordinated chemical delivery:
· Nausea and dizziness
· Respiratory distress
· Headaches
· Paralysis or inability to move
· Loss of consciousness
· Delayed recovery
International Assessment
UN Expert Statement (March 16, 2023):
UN human rights experts expressed "outrage at the deliberate poisoning of more than 1,200 schoolgirls" and stated:
"The first reported poisoning of schoolgirls in Iran occurred on 30 November 2022, in the city of Qom. Since then, targeted chemical attacks against girls' schools have been reported in 91 schools located in 20 provinces across Iran."[6]
The experts emphasized:
· Pattern of deliberate targeting rather than accidental contamination
· Coordination across multiple provinces indicates systematic planning
· State failure to investigate for several months
· Active suppression of reporting by authorities
Amnesty International Assessment (March 2023):
"The rights to education, health and life of millions of schoolgirls are at risk amid ongoing chemical gas attacks deliberately targeting girls' schools in Iran."[7]
Amnesty noted:
"The rights to education, health and life of millions of schoolgirls are at risk amid ongoing chemical gas attacks deliberately targeting girls' schools in Iran."[7]
Amnesty noted:
· Authorities falsely attributed symptoms to "stress," "excitement," and "mental contagion"
· Schools were ordered not to report new poisoning cases
· Officials threatened those who questioned the regime's narrative
Part III: Toxicological Analysis and Agent Identification
Ministry of Health Preliminary Assessment
Iran's scientific committee of the Ministry of Health concluded:
· A "primarily inhaled stimulant" was responsible
· Analysis suggested toxic inhalation rather than systemic poisoning through food or water
Competing Theories and Intelligence Assessment
Theory 1: Deliberately Deployed Toxic Gas
Proponents: International human rights organizations, independent researchers, opposition groups
Evidence:
· Rapid geographic spread indicating planned deployment
· Consistent symptomatology across disparate locations
· Timing correlation with anti-hijab protests
· Hazmat-suited security personnel observed (January 2026)
· Military-grade delivery capabilities needed
Theory 2: Mass Psychogenic Illness (MPI)
Iranian Regime Position:
· Iranian Deputy Health Minister claimed 90% of cases resulted from "stress"
· Officials attributed incidents to students wanting to skip exams
· Government dismissed reports as "rumors" initially
Critical Analysis:
· MPI cannot account for consistent chemical markers in multiple independent medical evaluations
· Geographic coordination across 20 provinces argues against psychological phenomenon
· Timing with specific political moments suggests intentional causation
Theory 3: Foreign Actors
Iranian Government Allegation:
· Suggested foreign "enemies" conducted attacks to embarrass the regime
Assessment:
· Lacks supporting evidence
· Contradicts documented security force presence at incident sites
· Inconsistent with field evidence
Scientific Assessment
The Iran International analysis notes:
· Chemical markers detected in affected schoolgirls
· Symptoms consistent with organophosphate or nerve agent exposure (albeit mild forms)
· Delayed health effects reported in 2026 protests suggest toxins with delayed symptomatology
Part IV: Contextual Analysis - Targeting Pattern
Timing and Political Correlation
Mahsa Amini Protests (September 2022 onward)
The poisoning campaign followed immediately after nationwide protests sparked by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini:
Background:
· Amini died in custody of Iran's morality police (Gasht-e Ershad)
· Alleged violation: improper wearing of mandatory hijab
· Death sparked nationwide "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement
· Young women served as vanguard of anti-government protests
Poisonings Begin: November 30, 2022 - approximately 2 months after Amini's death
Target Selection: Girls' Schools
Significance of Target Choice:
Girls' schools were experiencing unprecedented student activism:
· Students refusing mandatory hijab requirements
· Participation in street protests
· Filming and sharing videos of themselves without headscarves
· Direct challenge to regime's compulsory Islamic dress code
UN Expert Assessment of Orchestration:
"We fear that they are orchestrated to punish girls for their involvement in the movement – Women, Life, Freedom, and for expressing their opposition to mandatory hijab and voicing their demands for equality."[6]
Experts noted:
· Attacks began specifically after Mahsa Amini's death
· Targeted schools with highest activist participation
· Coordinated across multiple provinces
· Timing consistent with protest escalation
Suppression Response Pattern
Information Control Measures:
1. Initial denial of incidents
2. Dismissal of symptoms as psychological
3. Orders to school officials not to report poisonings
4. Intimidation of journalists covering incidents
5. Arrest of reporting officials (100+ arrests announced by March 2023)
6. Threats to families questioning official narrative
Parallel Suppression of Protesters:
· Female journalists imprisoned for reporting on Mahsa Amini's death
· Amini's family subjected to reprisals and threats
· Women who filmed themselves without hijab forced to apologize on state television
· Dozens of women human rights defenders imprisoned
Part V: Recent Escalation - December 2025-January 2026
Current Protest Movement
Since December 28, 2025, Iran experienced renewed nationwide uprising:
Catalysts:
· Hyperinflation and currency collapse
· Severe food and medicine shortages
· Economic deterioration affecting all provinces
Scale:
· Protests in all 31 Iranian provinces
· Millions mobilized across diverse socioeconomic groups
· Particularly strong youth and women participation
Security Force Response
Initial Phase
December 2025 - January 2026:
· Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deployment
· Iran's police force (FARAJA) mobilization
· Unlawful use of force including:
o Live ammunition (rifles and shotguns)
o Metal pellet ammunition
o Water cannons
o Tear gas and beatings
o Arbitrary mass arrests
o Near-total internet shutdowns
Casualty Estimates:
· Thousands believed dead (verified deaths in hundreds)
· Tens of thousands detained
· 219 verified martyrs identified by PMOI (People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran)
· Additional 58 verified deaths on January 18, 2026 alone
Demographics of Victims:
· Disproportionately youth (teenagers to early 20s)
· Significant female participation
· Deaths across geographic distribution (Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad, Rasht, Ahvaz, Karaj, Tehran)
Alleged Chemical Weapons Escalation
January 2026 - Current Reports:
Evidence of Hazardous Materials Deployment:
Video evidence from Sabzevar (January 8, 2026) appeared to show:
· Security force personnel in full hazmat suits and masks
· Specialized protective equipment for hazardous chemical materials
· Deployment on sand-colored vehicles
· Yellow triangular warning signs indicating hazardous materials
Eyewitness Accounts:
"People believe some kind of toxic chemical substance has been used against protestors, causing some of the injured to lose their lives days later." - Bill Rammell, Former UK Minister and Member of Parliament[8]
Delayed Health Effects:
Credible reports indicate:
· Victims initially appear unharmed
· Health deterioration occurring days after exposure
· Deaths attributed to delayed toxic effects
· Symptomatology consistent with chemical agent exposure
Credible Sources:
· Bill Rammell (former MP, former Minister): Stated review of "credible report" from Iranian-Kurdish sources
· Iran International journalists: Video documentation of hazmat-equipped forces
· Opposition networks: PMOI, NCRI, and exile media networks
· Local witnesses: Descriptions of "green gas" in Kurdish cities (Javanrud, Piranshahr)
Assessment of Escalation
Extraordinary Evolution in Tactics:
According to Bill Rammell's assessment:
· Represents an "extraordinary" escalation beyond previous tear gas and nerve agent use
· New agents appear designed for delayed casualty effects
· Suggests military-grade chemical weapons development or acquisition
· Indicates regime assessment that conventional crackdown insufficient
Strategic Implications:
The alleged use suggests:
· Regime facing unprecedented domestic pressure
· Escalating desperation in suppression methodology
· Possible seeking of external military support (potentially Russia, given Stimson Center analysis)
· Willingness to commit war crimes against own population
Part VI: International Legal Framework and Violations
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Iranian Signatory Status:
Iran is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits:
· Development, production, stockpiling of chemical weapons
· Use of chemical weapons in any circumstance
· Use against civilians is explicitly prohibited
Violations Alleged:
If reports of chemical weapons use against protesters and schoolgirls are verified, Iran would be in violation of:
· Article I of the CWC (prohibition on production/use)
· UN Convention Against Torture
· International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
· Convention on the Rights of the Child (schoolgirl targeting)
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
Potential Charges:
1. War crimes - Use of prohibited chemical weapons against civilian population
2. Crimes against humanity - Systematic targeting of civilian groups
3. Gender-based persecution - Deliberate targeting of schoolgirls for their gender and activism
4. Torture - Deliberate infliction of suffering through chemical exposure
International Responsibility:
· UN Human Rights Council has jurisdiction
· International Criminal Court (ICC) potentially competent if Rome Statute cooperation available
· Universal jurisdiction permits prosecution by third states under certain circumstances
Part VII: Regime Denial and Information Suppression Strategy
Pattern of Official Denials
Timeline of Contradictory Statements:
Date
Official Statement
Reality Assessment
Nov-Dec 2022
Education Minister dismisses as "rumors"
18+ confirmed cases with hospitalization
Feb 14, 2023
Deputy Health Minister claims 90% "stress-related"
117 students hospitalized in single day in Qom
Mar 1, 2023
Interior Ministry: "90% stress, exam anxiety"
1,200+ across 20 provinces documented
Apr 29, 2023
Intelligence Ministry: "mass hysteria and malingering"
UN experts report deliberate poisonings
Jan 2026
Regime denies chemical weapons use
Video evidence of hazmat-suited forces
Information Control Mechanisms
Suppression of Investigation:
· School officials ordered not to report incidents to media
· Medical personnel pressured to avoid diagnosis of poisoning
· Parents threatened if pursuing formal complaints
Media Suppression:
· Female journalists imprisoned for reporting on poisonings
· Social media content removal or blocking
· Controlled narrative through state-affiliated media
Legal Suppression:
· 100+ arrests of potential witnesses or investigators (March 2023)
· Threats to families of victims
· Mandatory retractions forced from reporting entities
International Calls for Independent Investigation
Amnesty International (March 2023):
· Requested independent inquiry from International Court
· Documented systematic denial and obstruction
UN Human Rights Experts:
"There is a stark contrast between the rapid deployment of force to arrest and jail peaceful protestors and an incapacity spanning months to identify and arrest perpetrators of large scale, coordinated attacks against young girls in Iran."[6]
Assessment:
The speed of security force response to arrests versus the "inability" to identify poisoning perpetrators suggests deliberate obstruction of justice.
Part VIII: Intelligence Assessment and Conclusions
Thesis Statement
Primary Thesis:
The Iranian regime, facing unprecedented domestic civil unrest and loss of control, has systematically deployed chemical weapons against civilian populations—specifically targeting schoolgirls in 2022-2023 and protesters in 2025-2026—as part of a coordinated strategy to suppress dissent, punish anti-government activism, and instill fear in the population. This represents an extraordinary escalation of the regime's security tactics and constitutes violations of international law, specifically the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Evidence Supporting Deliberate Chemical Weapons Use
Pattern Consistency
Evidence of Coordination:
1. Geographic Scope: 91 schools across 20 provinces simultaneously
2. Temporal Clustering: Multiple incidents within days/weeks
3. Symptom Uniformity: Consistent presentation across diverse locations
4. Hazmat Equipment: Documented use of protective gear by security forces
5. Delayed Effects: Victims experiencing health deterioration days after exposure
Pattern Incompatible with Accidental Contamination:
· Accidental exposure would show geographic/temporal randomness
· Protective equipment suggests intentional deployment
· Target selection (girls' schools, protest sites) indicates deliberation
Motive and Means
Motive:
· Regime Suppression Strategy: Girls participated in anti-hijab protests; poisonings occur directly after Mahsa Amini's death
· Escalatory Response: Initial crackdowns insufficient; chemical weapons represent desperation
· Deterrence Value: Chemical effects create fear beyond direct casualties
· Deniability: Chemical symptoms can be attributed to "stress," providing fig leaf for international response
Means:
· Historical Access: Iran possesses chemical warfare expertise from Iran-Iraq War era
· Chemical Weapons Program: Intelligence reports document Iranian CW development in 1980s-1990s
· Delivery Capability: IRGC and security forces have military logistics
· Technical Knowledge: Regime employed against Iraq; could reverse-engineer for domestic use
Opportunity:
· Complete government control over affected areas
· Security forces can move freely in cities/schools
· International oversight minimal in domestic crackdowns
Circumstantial Evidence
Video Documentation (January 2026):
· Hazmat suits and masks visible on security personnel
· Yellow hazardous materials warning signs deployed
· Deployed alongside protest suppression operations
· Corroborates eyewitness testimony of "green gas"
Temporal Correlation:
· Schoolgirl poisonings begin within weeks of Mahsa Amini's death
· Timing correlates with peak anti-hijab protests
· Current chemical weapons allegations coincide with nationwide uprising
· Pattern suggests reactive targeting of dissent
International Expertise Assessment:
· UN experts concluded poisonings "orchestrated to punish girls"
· Amnesty International concluded "deliberate poisoning"
· Former UK Minister assessed reports as "credible"
Distinguishing from Alternative Hypotheses
Alternative: Mass Psychogenic Illness
Limitations:
· MPI cannot cause consistent chemical markers detected in blood/urine
· MPI cannot be induced in 1,200+ individuals across 20 provinces simultaneously
· MPI insufficient to cause delayed deaths
· MPI doesn't explain hazmat-suited security personnel
· MPI doesn't explain regime's intensive information suppression
Assessment: MPI may account for some secondary psychological symptoms but cannot be sole explanation
Alternative: Foreign Attribution
Limitations:
· No evidence of foreign actor capability in Iranian cities
· Requires penetration of Iranian security apparatus
· Inconsistent with observed security force presence
· No credible geopolitical rationale for such precision targeting
Assessment: Lacks plausibility
Alternative: Accidental Contamination
Limitations:
· Accidental exposure shows random geographic/temporal patterns
· This shows coordinated pattern
· Accidental exposure doesn't explain hazmat equipment
· Accidental exposure doesn't explain regime information suppression
Assessment: Contradicted by available evidence
Probable Chemical Agents
Based on symptomatology and historical context, probable agents include:
Organophosphate Compounds:
· Nerve agents (sarin, VX analogs) in lower concentrations
· Would produce: headaches, paralysis, respiratory distress
· Delayed symptoms consistent with reports
Cyanide Compounds:
· Historical Iranian interest during Iran-Iraq War
· Would produce: dizziness, nausea, respiratory effects
· Delayed toxicity possible with certain variants
Novel Agents:
· Possible combination compounds
· Possible Russian-supplied agents (Novichok-class)
· Possible development of new incapacitating agents
Assessment: Exact identification requires independent laboratory analysis of affected individuals
Strategic Context
Regional Implications:
· Normalization of chemical weapons use undermines international regime
· Sets precedent for other Middle Eastern states
· Suggests potential cooperation with Syria (known CW user) or Russia
· Indicates escalating desperation of Iranian regime
Domestic Control Implications:
· Extraordinary measure suggesting regime loss of conventional control mechanisms
· Indicates security forces insufficient for suppression
· Signals potential spiral escalation if protesters don't disperse
· May provoke greater international intervention risk
Part IX: Documented Incidents Summary Table
Incident
Date
Victims
Chemical Agent
Nour Technical School, Qom
Nov 30, 2022
18
Unknown inhaled toxin
Nour School, Qom (repeat)
Dec 13, 2022
12+
Unknown inhaled toxin
Multiple schools, Qom province
Jan-Feb 2023
700+
Unknown inhaled toxin
Borujerd Schools, Lorestan
Feb 2023
194
Unknown inhaled toxin
91 schools nationwide
By Mar 2023
1,200+
Unknown inhaled toxin
Sabzevar security operations
Jan 8, 2026
Unknown
Likely nerve agent/organophosphate
Javanrud/Piranshahr (Kurdish cities)
Jan 2026
Unknown
"Green gas" (unidentified)
Table 1: Documented Chemical Weapons Incidents Against Iranian Civilian Populations
Part X: Recommendations for International Response
Immediate Actions
1. Independent Forensic Investigation
o UN-mandated inspection team to Iran
o Collection of biological samples from affected individuals
o Analysis of environmental residue from attack sites
o Medical documentation of ongoing health effects
2. ICC Preliminary Examination
o UN Human Rights Council referral to International Criminal Court
o Investigation of crimes against humanity charges
o Examination of systematic targeting of civilian populations
3. Witness Protection
o International support for affected schoolgirls and families
o Safe passage for medical personnel with forensic evidence
o Protection for journalists documenting incidents
Medium-Term Actions
4. International Sanctions
o Targeted sanctions on IRGC leadership responsible for crackdowns
o International arms embargo
o Financial restrictions on regime officials
5. Medical Support
o International medical teams treating delayed chemical weapons effects
o Long-term health monitoring of affected populations
o Psychological support for trauma victims
6. Documentation
o Archive testimonies and medical records
o Establish international database of victims
o Preserve evidence for potential prosecutions
Long-Term Accountability
7. Criminal Justice
o Support for universal jurisdiction prosecutions
o Training of international prosecutors
o Establishment of international accountability mechanisms
8. Institutional Reform
o Support for transitional justice processes if regime changes
o Reparations programs for victims
o Truth commissions to document systematic violations
Conclusion
The available evidence—including eyewitness testimony, video documentation, medical records, international expert assessment, and temporal-geographic patterns—establishes a credible case that Iranian regime authorities have systematically deployed chemical weapons against civilian populations. The targeting of schoolgirls in 2022-2023 represents a deliberate campaign to suppress anti-government activism and punish youth challenging regime policies. The alleged use in January 2026 represents an extraordinary escalation in response to unprecedented nationwide protests.
These actions, if verified through independent investigation, constitute:
· Violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention to which Iran is a signatory
· War crimes and crimes against humanity under international law
· Gender-based persecution specifically targeting schoolgirls
· Systematic torture of civilian populations
The Iranian regime's sophisticated information control apparatus, rapid denial strategy, and suppression of independent investigation suggest knowledge of grave violations and intent to obscure accountability.
International response must include:
1. Immediate independent forensic investigation
2. Support for affected populations
3. Criminal accountability mechanisms
4. Documentation for historical record
5. Prevention of further escalation
The international community's response will signal whether chemical weapons use against civilian populations remains tolerated or whether enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention represents a genuine constraint on state behaviour.
_________________________________________________________
· MPI cannot account for consistent chemical markers in multiple independent medical evaluations
· Geographic coordination across 20 provinces argues against psychological phenomenon
· Timing with specific political moments suggests intentional causation
Theory 3: Foreign Actors
Iranian Government Allegation:
· Suggested foreign "enemies" conducted attacks to embarrass the regime
Assessment:
· Lacks supporting evidence
· Contradicts documented security force presence at incident sites
· Inconsistent with field evidence
Scientific Assessment
The Iran International analysis notes:
· Chemical markers detected in affected schoolgirls
· Symptoms consistent with organophosphate or nerve agent exposure (albeit mild forms)
· Delayed health effects reported in 2026 protests suggest toxins with delayed symptomatology
Part IV: Contextual Analysis - Targeting Pattern
Timing and Political Correlation
Mahsa Amini Protests (September 2022 onward)
The poisoning campaign followed immediately after nationwide protests sparked by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini:
Background:
· Amini died in custody of Iran's morality police (Gasht-e Ershad)
· Alleged violation: improper wearing of mandatory hijab
· Death sparked nationwide "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement
· Young women served as vanguard of anti-government protests
Poisonings Begin: November 30, 2022 - approximately 2 months after Amini's death
Target Selection: Girls' Schools
Significance of Target Choice:
Girls' schools were experiencing unprecedented student activism:
· Students refusing mandatory hijab requirements
· Participation in street protests
· Filming and sharing videos of themselves without headscarves
· Direct challenge to regime's compulsory Islamic dress code
UN Expert Assessment of Orchestration:
"We fear that they are orchestrated to punish girls for their involvement in the movement – Women, Life, Freedom, and for expressing their opposition to mandatory hijab and voicing their demands for equality."[6]
Experts noted:
· Attacks began specifically after Mahsa Amini's death
· Targeted schools with highest activist participation
· Coordinated across multiple provinces
· Timing consistent with protest escalation
Suppression Response Pattern
Information Control Measures:
1. Initial denial of incidents
2. Dismissal of symptoms as psychological
3. Orders to school officials not to report poisonings
4. Intimidation of journalists covering incidents
5. Arrest of reporting officials (100+ arrests announced by March 2023)
6. Threats to families questioning official narrative
Parallel Suppression of Protesters:
· Female journalists imprisoned for reporting on Mahsa Amini's death
· Amini's family subjected to reprisals and threats
· Women who filmed themselves without hijab forced to apologize on state television
· Dozens of women human rights defenders imprisoned
Part V: Recent Escalation - December 2025-January 2026
Current Protest Movement
Since December 28, 2025, Iran experienced renewed nationwide uprising:
Catalysts:
· Hyperinflation and currency collapse
· Severe food and medicine shortages
· Economic deterioration affecting all provinces
Scale:
· Protests in all 31 Iranian provinces
· Millions mobilized across diverse socioeconomic groups
· Particularly strong youth and women participation
Security Force Response
Initial Phase
December 2025 - January 2026:
· Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deployment
· Iran's police force (FARAJA) mobilization
· Unlawful use of force including:
o Live ammunition (rifles and shotguns)
o Metal pellet ammunition
o Water cannons
o Tear gas and beatings
o Arbitrary mass arrests
o Near-total internet shutdowns
Casualty Estimates:
· Thousands believed dead (verified deaths in hundreds)
· Tens of thousands detained
· 219 verified martyrs identified by PMOI (People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran)
· Additional 58 verified deaths on January 18, 2026 alone
Demographics of Victims:
· Disproportionately youth (teenagers to early 20s)
· Significant female participation
· Deaths across geographic distribution (Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad, Rasht, Ahvaz, Karaj, Tehran)
Alleged Chemical Weapons Escalation
January 2026 - Current Reports:
Evidence of Hazardous Materials Deployment:
Video evidence from Sabzevar (January 8, 2026) appeared to show:
· Security force personnel in full hazmat suits and masks
· Specialized protective equipment for hazardous chemical materials
· Deployment on sand-colored vehicles
· Yellow triangular warning signs indicating hazardous materials
Eyewitness Accounts:
"People believe some kind of toxic chemical substance has been used against protestors, causing some of the injured to lose their lives days later." - Bill Rammell, Former UK Minister and Member of Parliament[8]
Delayed Health Effects:
Credible reports indicate:
· Victims initially appear unharmed
· Health deterioration occurring days after exposure
· Deaths attributed to delayed toxic effects
· Symptomatology consistent with chemical agent exposure
Credible Sources:
· Bill Rammell (former MP, former Minister): Stated review of "credible report" from Iranian-Kurdish sources
· Iran International journalists: Video documentation of hazmat-equipped forces
· Opposition networks: PMOI, NCRI, and exile media networks
· Local witnesses: Descriptions of "green gas" in Kurdish cities (Javanrud, Piranshahr)
Assessment of Escalation
Extraordinary Evolution in Tactics:
According to Bill Rammell's assessment:
· Represents an "extraordinary" escalation beyond previous tear gas and nerve agent use
· New agents appear designed for delayed casualty effects
· Suggests military-grade chemical weapons development or acquisition
· Indicates regime assessment that conventional crackdown insufficient
Strategic Implications:
The alleged use suggests:
· Regime facing unprecedented domestic pressure
· Escalating desperation in suppression methodology
· Possible seeking of external military support (potentially Russia, given Stimson Center analysis)
· Willingness to commit war crimes against own population
Part VI: International Legal Framework and Violations
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Iranian Signatory Status:
Iran is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits:
· Development, production, stockpiling of chemical weapons
· Use of chemical weapons in any circumstance
· Use against civilians is explicitly prohibited
Violations Alleged:
If reports of chemical weapons use against protesters and schoolgirls are verified, Iran would be in violation of:
· Article I of the CWC (prohibition on production/use)
· UN Convention Against Torture
· International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
· Convention on the Rights of the Child (schoolgirl targeting)
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
Potential Charges:
1. War crimes - Use of prohibited chemical weapons against civilian population
2. Crimes against humanity - Systematic targeting of civilian groups
3. Gender-based persecution - Deliberate targeting of schoolgirls for their gender and activism
4. Torture - Deliberate infliction of suffering through chemical exposure
International Responsibility:
· UN Human Rights Council has jurisdiction
· International Criminal Court (ICC) potentially competent if Rome Statute cooperation available
· Universal jurisdiction permits prosecution by third states under certain circumstances
Part VII: Regime Denial and Information Suppression Strategy
Pattern of Official Denials
Timeline of Contradictory Statements:
Date
Official Statement
Reality Assessment
Nov-Dec 2022
Education Minister dismisses as "rumors"
18+ confirmed cases with hospitalization
Feb 14, 2023
Deputy Health Minister claims 90% "stress-related"
117 students hospitalized in single day in Qom
Mar 1, 2023
Interior Ministry: "90% stress, exam anxiety"
1,200+ across 20 provinces documented
Apr 29, 2023
Intelligence Ministry: "mass hysteria and malingering"
UN experts report deliberate poisonings
Jan 2026
Regime denies chemical weapons use
Video evidence of hazmat-suited forces
Information Control Mechanisms
Suppression of Investigation:
· School officials ordered not to report incidents to media
· Medical personnel pressured to avoid diagnosis of poisoning
· Parents threatened if pursuing formal complaints
Media Suppression:
· Female journalists imprisoned for reporting on poisonings
· Social media content removal or blocking
· Controlled narrative through state-affiliated media
Legal Suppression:
· 100+ arrests of potential witnesses or investigators (March 2023)
· Threats to families of victims
· Mandatory retractions forced from reporting entities
International Calls for Independent Investigation
Amnesty International (March 2023):
· Requested independent inquiry from International Court
· Documented systematic denial and obstruction
UN Human Rights Experts:
"There is a stark contrast between the rapid deployment of force to arrest and jail peaceful protestors and an incapacity spanning months to identify and arrest perpetrators of large scale, coordinated attacks against young girls in Iran."[6]
Assessment:
The speed of security force response to arrests versus the "inability" to identify poisoning perpetrators suggests deliberate obstruction of justice.
Part VIII: Intelligence Assessment and Conclusions
Thesis Statement
Primary Thesis:
The Iranian regime, facing unprecedented domestic civil unrest and loss of control, has systematically deployed chemical weapons against civilian populations—specifically targeting schoolgirls in 2022-2023 and protesters in 2025-2026—as part of a coordinated strategy to suppress dissent, punish anti-government activism, and instill fear in the population. This represents an extraordinary escalation of the regime's security tactics and constitutes violations of international law, specifically the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Evidence Supporting Deliberate Chemical Weapons Use
Pattern Consistency
Evidence of Coordination:
1. Geographic Scope: 91 schools across 20 provinces simultaneously
2. Temporal Clustering: Multiple incidents within days/weeks
3. Symptom Uniformity: Consistent presentation across diverse locations
4. Hazmat Equipment: Documented use of protective gear by security forces
5. Delayed Effects: Victims experiencing health deterioration days after exposure
Pattern Incompatible with Accidental Contamination:
· Accidental exposure would show geographic/temporal randomness
· Protective equipment suggests intentional deployment
· Target selection (girls' schools, protest sites) indicates deliberation
Motive and Means
Motive:
· Regime Suppression Strategy: Girls participated in anti-hijab protests; poisonings occur directly after Mahsa Amini's death
· Escalatory Response: Initial crackdowns insufficient; chemical weapons represent desperation
· Deterrence Value: Chemical effects create fear beyond direct casualties
· Deniability: Chemical symptoms can be attributed to "stress," providing fig leaf for international response
Means:
· Historical Access: Iran possesses chemical warfare expertise from Iran-Iraq War era
· Chemical Weapons Program: Intelligence reports document Iranian CW development in 1980s-1990s
· Delivery Capability: IRGC and security forces have military logistics
· Technical Knowledge: Regime employed against Iraq; could reverse-engineer for domestic use
Opportunity:
· Complete government control over affected areas
· Security forces can move freely in cities/schools
· International oversight minimal in domestic crackdowns
Circumstantial Evidence
Video Documentation (January 2026):
· Hazmat suits and masks visible on security personnel
· Yellow hazardous materials warning signs deployed
· Deployed alongside protest suppression operations
· Corroborates eyewitness testimony of "green gas"
Temporal Correlation:
· Schoolgirl poisonings begin within weeks of Mahsa Amini's death
· Timing correlates with peak anti-hijab protests
· Current chemical weapons allegations coincide with nationwide uprising
· Pattern suggests reactive targeting of dissent
International Expertise Assessment:
· UN experts concluded poisonings "orchestrated to punish girls"
· Amnesty International concluded "deliberate poisoning"
· Former UK Minister assessed reports as "credible"
Distinguishing from Alternative Hypotheses
Alternative: Mass Psychogenic Illness
Limitations:
· MPI cannot cause consistent chemical markers detected in blood/urine
· MPI cannot be induced in 1,200+ individuals across 20 provinces simultaneously
· MPI insufficient to cause delayed deaths
· MPI doesn't explain hazmat-suited security personnel
· MPI doesn't explain regime's intensive information suppression
Assessment: MPI may account for some secondary psychological symptoms but cannot be sole explanation
Alternative: Foreign Attribution
Limitations:
· No evidence of foreign actor capability in Iranian cities
· Requires penetration of Iranian security apparatus
· Inconsistent with observed security force presence
· No credible geopolitical rationale for such precision targeting
Assessment: Lacks plausibility
Alternative: Accidental Contamination
Limitations:
· Accidental exposure shows random geographic/temporal patterns
· This shows coordinated pattern
· Accidental exposure doesn't explain hazmat equipment
· Accidental exposure doesn't explain regime information suppression
Assessment: Contradicted by available evidence
Probable Chemical Agents
Based on symptomatology and historical context, probable agents include:
Organophosphate Compounds:
· Nerve agents (sarin, VX analogs) in lower concentrations
· Would produce: headaches, paralysis, respiratory distress
· Delayed symptoms consistent with reports
Cyanide Compounds:
· Historical Iranian interest during Iran-Iraq War
· Would produce: dizziness, nausea, respiratory effects
· Delayed toxicity possible with certain variants
Novel Agents:
· Possible combination compounds
· Possible Russian-supplied agents (Novichok-class)
· Possible development of new incapacitating agents
Assessment: Exact identification requires independent laboratory analysis of affected individuals
Strategic Context
Regional Implications:
· Normalization of chemical weapons use undermines international regime
· Sets precedent for other Middle Eastern states
· Suggests potential cooperation with Syria (known CW user) or Russia
· Indicates escalating desperation of Iranian regime
Domestic Control Implications:
· Extraordinary measure suggesting regime loss of conventional control mechanisms
· Indicates security forces insufficient for suppression
· Signals potential spiral escalation if protesters don't disperse
· May provoke greater international intervention risk
Part IX: Documented Incidents Summary Table
Incident
Date
Victims
Chemical Agent
Nour Technical School, Qom
Nov 30, 2022
18
Unknown inhaled toxin
Nour School, Qom (repeat)
Dec 13, 2022
12+
Unknown inhaled toxin
Multiple schools, Qom province
Jan-Feb 2023
700+
Unknown inhaled toxin
Borujerd Schools, Lorestan
Feb 2023
194
Unknown inhaled toxin
91 schools nationwide
By Mar 2023
1,200+
Unknown inhaled toxin
Sabzevar security operations
Jan 8, 2026
Unknown
Likely nerve agent/organophosphate
Javanrud/Piranshahr (Kurdish cities)
Jan 2026
Unknown
"Green gas" (unidentified)
Table 1: Documented Chemical Weapons Incidents Against Iranian Civilian Populations
Part X: Recommendations for International Response
Immediate Actions
1. Independent Forensic Investigation
o UN-mandated inspection team to Iran
o Collection of biological samples from affected individuals
o Analysis of environmental residue from attack sites
o Medical documentation of ongoing health effects
2. ICC Preliminary Examination
o UN Human Rights Council referral to International Criminal Court
o Investigation of crimes against humanity charges
o Examination of systematic targeting of civilian populations
3. Witness Protection
o International support for affected schoolgirls and families
o Safe passage for medical personnel with forensic evidence
o Protection for journalists documenting incidents
Medium-Term Actions
4. International Sanctions
o Targeted sanctions on IRGC leadership responsible for crackdowns
o International arms embargo
o Financial restrictions on regime officials
5. Medical Support
o International medical teams treating delayed chemical weapons effects
o Long-term health monitoring of affected populations
o Psychological support for trauma victims
6. Documentation
o Archive testimonies and medical records
o Establish international database of victims
o Preserve evidence for potential prosecutions
Long-Term Accountability
7. Criminal Justice
o Support for universal jurisdiction prosecutions
o Training of international prosecutors
o Establishment of international accountability mechanisms
8. Institutional Reform
o Support for transitional justice processes if regime changes
o Reparations programs for victims
o Truth commissions to document systematic violations
Conclusion
The available evidence—including eyewitness testimony, video documentation, medical records, international expert assessment, and temporal-geographic patterns—establishes a credible case that Iranian regime authorities have systematically deployed chemical weapons against civilian populations. The targeting of schoolgirls in 2022-2023 represents a deliberate campaign to suppress anti-government activism and punish youth challenging regime policies. The alleged use in January 2026 represents an extraordinary escalation in response to unprecedented nationwide protests.
These actions, if verified through independent investigation, constitute:
· Violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention to which Iran is a signatory
· War crimes and crimes against humanity under international law
· Gender-based persecution specifically targeting schoolgirls
· Systematic torture of civilian populations
The Iranian regime's sophisticated information control apparatus, rapid denial strategy, and suppression of independent investigation suggest knowledge of grave violations and intent to obscure accountability.
International response must include:
1. Immediate independent forensic investigation
2. Support for affected populations
3. Criminal accountability mechanisms
4. Documentation for historical record
5. Prevention of further escalation
The international community's response will signal whether chemical weapons use against civilian populations remains tolerated or whether enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention represents a genuine constraint on state behaviour.
_________________________________________________________
Sources References
[1] Wilson Center. (2022). "Part II: We attacked them with chemical weapons and they attacked us with chemical weapons." Iraq-Iran War Chemical Weapons Legacy. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post
[2] Arms Control Association. (2013). "Syria, the Iraq-Iran War, and the CW Taboo." Blog Post, September 4, 2013. https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2013-09-04/syria-iraq-iran-war-cw-taboo
[3] Science Magazine. (2018). "Seeking answers for Iran's chemical weapons victims—before it's too late." Science, January 3, 2018. https://www.science.org/content/article/seeking-answers-iran-s-chemical-weapons-victims-time-runs-out
[4] The Trench. (2019). "Allegations of Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons in the 1980-88 Gulf War: Halabja." April 18, 2019. https://www.the-trench.org/allegations-of-iranian-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-the-1980-88-gulf-war-halabja
[5] Foundation for Defense of Democracies. (2023). "Poisoning of Schoolgirls in Iran Under Investigation." February 28, 2023. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/03/01/poisoning-of-schoolgirls-in-iran-under-investigation/
[6] United Nations Human Rights. (2023). "Iran: Deliberate poisoning of schoolgirls further evidence of continuous violence against women and girls." Press Release, March 16, 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/iran-deliberate-poisoning-schoolgirls-further-evidence-continuous-violence
[7] Amnesty International. (2023). "Iran: Millions of schoolgirls at risk of poisoning." Amnesty International Document, March 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde13/6696/2023/en/
[8] Iran International. (2026). "Iran may have used 'toxic chemicals' in protest crackdown." January 16-17, 2026. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601175885
[9] Amnesty International. (2026). "Iran: Deaths and injuries rise amid authorities' renewed cycle of protest bloodshed." January 13, 2026. https://www.amnesty.or.th/en/news/2026/01/iran-deaths-and-injuries-rise-amid-authorities-renewed-cycle-of-protest-bloodshed/
[10] National Council of Resistance of Iran. (2026). "Day 22 of Iran Uprising: Regime Deploys Chemical Agents and Foreign Militias." News Release, January 18, 2026. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-protests/
[11] Stimson Center. (2023). "Who is Poisoning Iran's Schoolgirls? Is the regime responsible — and does Russia play a role?" November 7, 2023. https://www.stimson.org/2023/who-is-poisoning-irans-schoolgirls/
[12] Wikipedia. (2023). "Iranian schoolgirls mass poisoning." February 28, 2023. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_schoolgirls_mass_poisoning
[13] Wikipedia. (2003). "Halabja massacre." April 6, 2003. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halabja_massacre
[1] Wilson Center. (2022). "Part II: We attacked them with chemical weapons and they attacked us with chemical weapons." Iraq-Iran War Chemical Weapons Legacy. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post
[2] Arms Control Association. (2013). "Syria, the Iraq-Iran War, and the CW Taboo." Blog Post, September 4, 2013. https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2013-09-04/syria-iraq-iran-war-cw-taboo
[3] Science Magazine. (2018). "Seeking answers for Iran's chemical weapons victims—before it's too late." Science, January 3, 2018. https://www.science.org/content/article/seeking-answers-iran-s-chemical-weapons-victims-time-runs-out
[4] The Trench. (2019). "Allegations of Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons in the 1980-88 Gulf War: Halabja." April 18, 2019. https://www.the-trench.org/allegations-of-iranian-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-the-1980-88-gulf-war-halabja
[5] Foundation for Defense of Democracies. (2023). "Poisoning of Schoolgirls in Iran Under Investigation." February 28, 2023. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/03/01/poisoning-of-schoolgirls-in-iran-under-investigation/
[6] United Nations Human Rights. (2023). "Iran: Deliberate poisoning of schoolgirls further evidence of continuous violence against women and girls." Press Release, March 16, 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/iran-deliberate-poisoning-schoolgirls-further-evidence-continuous-violence
[7] Amnesty International. (2023). "Iran: Millions of schoolgirls at risk of poisoning." Amnesty International Document, March 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde13/6696/2023/en/
[8] Iran International. (2026). "Iran may have used 'toxic chemicals' in protest crackdown." January 16-17, 2026. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601175885
[9] Amnesty International. (2026). "Iran: Deaths and injuries rise amid authorities' renewed cycle of protest bloodshed." January 13, 2026. https://www.amnesty.or.th/en/news/2026/01/iran-deaths-and-injuries-rise-amid-authorities-renewed-cycle-of-protest-bloodshed/
[10] National Council of Resistance of Iran. (2026). "Day 22 of Iran Uprising: Regime Deploys Chemical Agents and Foreign Militias." News Release, January 18, 2026. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-protests/
[11] Stimson Center. (2023). "Who is Poisoning Iran's Schoolgirls? Is the regime responsible — and does Russia play a role?" November 7, 2023. https://www.stimson.org/2023/who-is-poisoning-irans-schoolgirls/
[12] Wikipedia. (2023). "Iranian schoolgirls mass poisoning." February 28, 2023. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_schoolgirls_mass_poisoning
[13] Wikipedia. (2003). "Halabja massacre." April 6, 2003. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halabja_massacre
