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It is difficult for the Mullahs to rely solely on the IRGC to quell the protestors.
The top elements of the IRGC are ''BUSINESSMEN'' RUNNING A SHADOW MAFIA ECONOMY. UP TO 50% OF THE IRANIAN ECONOMY IS UNDER THEIR CONTROL, WHICH IS WHY THERE IS SUCH A HUGE MESS IN THE COUNTRY.
VOODOO ECONOMICS WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO SOCIAL COLLAPSE IN IRAN, REGARDLESS OF ''JADE HELM'' MILITARY EXERCISES TO MANAGE CROWDS.
BUT, NOBODY CAN TELL THE MULLAHS THAT THERE IS A HUGE PROBLEM IN THE COUNTRY. IN THEIR VIEW EVERYTHING IS PEACHY PERFECT!!!!
As the IRGC at the middle and lower ranks don't benefit from the proverbial TROUGH on the Mullah gravy train of massive corruption, misrule and embezzlement.
Also, the 290,000 IRGC live in Iran, with Iranian neighbours, people they interact with on a daily basis, with their families.
IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THESE 'HEROES OF THE STATE' TO RETURN HOME AFTER THEIR DAILY DIRTY WORK, AT AN EMOTIONAL LEVEL, TO THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD.
AT A PRACTICAL LEVEL, ALSO DIFFICULT GIVEN THAT THEY ARE BEING WATCHED AND SCRUTINISED BY THE IRANIAN UNDERGROUND.
So what you do as a mullah is you shut down the internet and bring in foreign fighters to do the dirty work. Which is precisely what happened after 8th January. Most of the 20,000-30,000 protestors killed were by foreign Shia militia, which the Quds brigade and the IRGC have trained in foreign lands.
What all this tells us is that FOR THE FIRST TIME (SIGNIFICANT), Iranian security forces are having problems securing the country, so they need foreign assistance. Which are far more vicious...sort of latter-day SS for the 21st century.
Numbers and Deployment
Total Numbers: Estimates vary, with reports citing between 800 and 5,000 foreign fighters brought into Iran.
Guise: Many entered under the guise of "religious pilgrimages" to Mashhad.
Deployment: They have been deployed to "sensitive areas" and cities, including Tehran, Mashhad, and the western city of Hamedan.
Method: These fighters are reported to be gathered at bases in Ahvaz before being sent to cities to crush protests.
Imported Militia Groups
The militias primarily belong to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF/Hashd al-Sha'abi), which are backed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Specific groups identified include:
The militias primarily belong to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF/Hashd al-Sha'abi), which are backed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Specific groups identified include:
Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH): A powerful Iraqi Shia militia.
Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HAN): A major Iraqi group active in Syria and Iraq.
Badr Organization: The oldest and most influential Iran-aligned Iraqi militia.
Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS): An Iraq-based militia.
Lebanese Hezbollah: Supporters and fighters associated with the Lebanese group.
Liwa Fatemiyoun: Afghan Shia fighters.
Context of Importation
The reliance on foreign, non-Persian speaking militias (who speak Arabic) is intended to create a more ruthless crackdown, as these fighters are less likely to hesitate to kill Iranian citizens compared to local security forces. This marks a significant, desperate escalation by the regime to survive the 2025-2026 unrest.
The Deployment of Foreign Shia Militias Against Iranian Protesters: A Strategic Analysis of Transnational Repression and Crimes Against Humanity
Executive Summary
Timeline showing the dramatic escalation of protester deaths in Iran, with the deadliest period occurring January 8-9, 2026, coinciding with the deployment of foreign Shia militias and an internet blackout
In an unprecedented escalation of state violence, the Islamic Republic of Iran has deployed thousands of foreign Shia militia fighters from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon to suppress nationwide protests that erupted in late December 2025. This transnational mobilization represents a profound departure from traditional domestic security operations, revealing both the regime's manpower crisis and its willingness to outsource the systematic killing of Iranian citizens to combat-hardened foreign proxies with no familial or communal ties to the Iranian population.
Between January 2-18, 2026, approximately 5,000 Iraqi militia fighters, alongside contingents from the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, Pakistani Zainebiyoun Brigade, and Lebanese Hezbollah, crossed into Iran under the guise of religious pilgrimages. These forces, coordinated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, played a central role in the deadliest 48-hour period of protest suppression in modern Iranian history. On January 8-9, 2026, an estimated 12,000-20,000 protesters were killed in a coordinated nationwide massacre, coinciding with the imposition of a near-total internet blackout designed to conceal the scale of atrocities from international scrutiny.
The reliance on foreign, non-Persian speaking militias (who speak Arabic) is intended to create a more ruthless crackdown, as these fighters are less likely to hesitate to kill Iranian citizens compared to local security forces. This marks a significant, desperate escalation by the regime to survive the 2025-2026 unrest.
___________________________________________________
EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The Deployment of Foreign Shia Militias Against Iranian Protesters: A Strategic Analysis of Transnational Repression and Crimes Against Humanity
Executive Summary
In an unprecedented escalation of state violence, the Islamic Republic of Iran has deployed thousands of foreign Shia militia fighters from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon to suppress nationwide protests that erupted in late December 2025. This transnational mobilization represents a profound departure from traditional domestic security operations, revealing both the regime's manpower crisis and its willingness to outsource the systematic killing of Iranian citizens to combat-hardened foreign proxies with no familial or communal ties to the Iranian population.
Between January 2-18, 2026, approximately 5,000 Iraqi militia fighters, alongside contingents from the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, Pakistani Zainebiyoun Brigade, and Lebanese Hezbollah, crossed into Iran under the guise of religious pilgrimages. These forces, coordinated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, played a central role in the deadliest 48-hour period of protest suppression in modern Iranian history. On January 8-9, 2026, an estimated 12,000-20,000 protesters were killed in a coordinated nationwide massacre, coinciding with the imposition of a near-total internet blackout designed to conceal the scale of atrocities from international scrutiny.
The deployment of foreign militias constitutes a calculated strategy to circumvent the reluctance of some Iranian security forces to fire on their fellow citizens. These foreign fighters, veterans of brutal counterinsurgency campaigns in Syria and Iraq, brought experience in mass casualty operations, sniper tactics, and psychological warfare. Their presence transformed peaceful protest suppression into what international legal experts and human rights organizations have classified as crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute, meeting the criteria for widespread and systematic attacks against civilian populations.
The human rights consequences are catastrophic and multidimensional: mass extrajudicial killings through live ammunition targeting heads and chests; systematic torture and sexual violence in detention facilities; enforced disappearances of thousands, including hundreds of children; hospital raids to arrest or kill wounded protesters; and the imminent threat of mass executions through expedited trials on capital charges of "moharebeh" (enmity against God).
This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the foreign militia deployment, documenting the specific units involved, their operational locations, command structures, and the severe human rights violations resulting from their presence, while situating these developments within the framework of international criminal law and Iran's historical pattern of deploying transnational proxy forces against civilian populations.
Timeline showing the dramatic escalation of protester deaths in Iran, with the deadliest period occurring January 8-9, 2026, coinciding with the deployment of foreign Shia militias and an internet blackout
I. Strategic Context: Why Iran Turned to Foreign Militias
The Manpower Crisis
The Iranian regime's decision to import foreign fighters stems from a fundamental crisis of capacity and legitimacy. Hassan Hashemian, an expert on Arab affairs, explained to Iran International that "the Islamic Republic is facing a shortage of forces, and the scope of Iran's national uprising was so wide that internal forces could not cover it". This assessment reflects several converging realities facing the regime in early 2026.
The protests that began on December 28, 2025, in Tehran's Grand Bazaar rapidly metastasized across all 31 provinces of Iran, with demonstrations documented in at least 585 locations across 186 cities by mid-January. The geographic breadth and sustained intensity of mobilization overwhelmed the traditional architecture of domestic repression—the Basij paramilitary forces, the Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA), and regular IRGC units.
HAZARA-SOLDIERS LEFT BEHIND BY GENGHIS KHAN 800 YEARS AGO
THE BEST SHIA MILITIAS IN THE PAY OF THE MULLAHS--WILL ENDURE ANY AMOUNT OF CASUALTIES, CANON FODDER OF THE QUDS FORCES SERVING IN SYRIA AND IRAQ AGAINST ISIS.
Reluctance Within Iranian Security Forces
Perhaps most alarming for the regime, credible reports emerged that some Iranian security personnel refused orders to fire on protesters and were subsequently arrested. The Kurdish rights group Hengaw documented instances of Iranian forces declining to shoot demonstrators, a development that signals potential fractures in the coercive consensus that has sustained authoritarian rule since 1979.
Former Iraqi army general Ibrahim al-Khayyat noted in an analysis for The Media Line that "Iranian soldiers are less powerful and brutal, but militia members have no familial or human ties. They are mercenaries paid for their services, and therefore, the participation of mercenaries in suppressing protests is common practice in repressive regimes". This observation captures the strategic logic underlying the militia deployment: foreign fighters eliminate the risk of solidarity between security forces and protesters, a phenomenon that has toppled authoritarian regimes throughout history.
Perhaps most alarming for the regime, credible reports emerged that some Iranian security personnel refused orders to fire on protesters and were subsequently arrested. The Kurdish rights group Hengaw documented instances of Iranian forces declining to shoot demonstrators, a development that signals potential fractures in the coercive consensus that has sustained authoritarian rule since 1979.
Former Iraqi army general Ibrahim al-Khayyat noted in an analysis for The Media Line that "Iranian soldiers are less powerful and brutal, but militia members have no familial or human ties. They are mercenaries paid for their services, and therefore, the participation of mercenaries in suppressing protests is common practice in repressive regimes". This observation captures the strategic logic underlying the militia deployment: foreign fighters eliminate the risk of solidarity between security forces and protesters, a phenomenon that has toppled authoritarian regimes throughout history.
A European military assessment seen by CNN characterized the deployment as part of "a clear security strategy: neutralising any possibility of fraternisation between the forces of repression and the demonstrators". This doctrinal approach treats the Iranian population as a hostile force requiring counterinsurgency operations rather than law enforcement.
Combat Experience and Willingness to Kill
The foreign militias brought capabilities that domestic security forces either lacked or were reluctant to employ. Hashemian assessed that "the fact that between 12,000 and 20,000 people were killed within two days shows these groups were deployed specifically to kill. They have prior experience from Iraq and Syria". This expertise in mass casualty operations derives from years of brutal combat in Middle Eastern war zones.
The Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, for instance, deployed over 50,000 militants to Syria between 2013 and 2019, suffering more than 5,000 deaths and 4,000 wounded in some of the war's fiercest battles, including the recapture of Palmyra and operations in Aleppo, Daraa, and Deir ez-Zor. The fighters were frequently used as "cannon fodder" in frontal assault roles, developing a tolerance for high-casualty operations and desensitization to violence.
Similarly, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) groups like Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and the Badr Organization gained experience fighting ISIS while simultaneously perpetrating documented human rights violations against Sunni civilian populations. Their track record includes systematic patterns of kidnapping, torture, unlawful killings, and destruction of villages in predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq.
The foreign militias brought capabilities that domestic security forces either lacked or were reluctant to employ. Hashemian assessed that "the fact that between 12,000 and 20,000 people were killed within two days shows these groups were deployed specifically to kill. They have prior experience from Iraq and Syria". This expertise in mass casualty operations derives from years of brutal combat in Middle Eastern war zones.
The Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, for instance, deployed over 50,000 militants to Syria between 2013 and 2019, suffering more than 5,000 deaths and 4,000 wounded in some of the war's fiercest battles, including the recapture of Palmyra and operations in Aleppo, Daraa, and Deir ez-Zor. The fighters were frequently used as "cannon fodder" in frontal assault roles, developing a tolerance for high-casualty operations and desensitization to violence.
Similarly, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) groups like Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and the Badr Organization gained experience fighting ISIS while simultaneously perpetrating documented human rights violations against Sunni civilian populations. Their track record includes systematic patterns of kidnapping, torture, unlawful killings, and destruction of villages in predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq.
The Pakistani Zainebiyoun Brigade, recruited from marginalized Shia Hazara communities and other Shia-populated areas in Pakistan, operated in Syria under Iranian Quds Force command, often alongside Hezbollah instructors who provided specialized training in reconnaissance, sniping, and urban warfare.
This accumulated combat experience translated into operational effectiveness in suppressing Iranian protesters. The militias brought proficiency in sniper operations, coordination of multi-axis attacks, and psychological warfare tactics honed in Syria's urban battlefields—capabilities that proved devastatingly effective when turned against unarmed civilians.
Historical Precedent: Qasem Soleimani and the 2019 Iraqi Protests
The deployment of Iranian-backed militias to suppress domestic dissent follows an established template. During Iraq's October 2019 protests, then-Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani personally traveled to Baghdad to coordinate the crackdown, telling Iraqi officials, "We in Iran know how to deal with protests. This happened in Iran and we got it under control". The day after Soleimani's visit, the death toll in Iraq soared past 100, with unidentified snipers shooting protesters in the head and chest—tactics now replicated in Iran.
Iraqi security sources revealed that Abu Zainab al-Lami, head of security for the PMF, was tasked by senior militia commanders with quashing the protests. The crackdown involved snipers positioned on rooftops, drone attacks, intimidation, illegal detentions, and internet blackouts—a comprehensive playbook for authoritarian repression that Iran has now imported to suppress its own population.
The deployment of Iranian-backed militias to suppress domestic dissent follows an established template. During Iraq's October 2019 protests, then-Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani personally traveled to Baghdad to coordinate the crackdown, telling Iraqi officials, "We in Iran know how to deal with protests. This happened in Iran and we got it under control". The day after Soleimani's visit, the death toll in Iraq soared past 100, with unidentified snipers shooting protesters in the head and chest—tactics now replicated in Iran.
Iraqi security sources revealed that Abu Zainab al-Lami, head of security for the PMF, was tasked by senior militia commanders with quashing the protests. The crackdown involved snipers positioned on rooftops, drone attacks, intimidation, illegal detentions, and internet blackouts—a comprehensive playbook for authoritarian repression that Iran has now imported to suppress its own population.
The 2019 Iraqi protests ultimately killed at least 200 demonstrators, with Iranian-backed militias bearing primary responsibility. Soleimani's role in orchestrating that violence demonstrated both Iran's willingness to deploy proxy forces against civilian protesters and the effectiveness of such strategies in maintaining authoritarian control.
II. The Foreign Militia Architecture: Units, Numbers, and Deployment
Estimated deployment numbers of foreign Shia militias brought into Iran to suppress protesters, with Iraqi forces comprising the largest contingent at approximately 5,000 fighters
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces
Estimated deployment numbers of foreign Shia militias brought into Iran to suppress protesters, with Iraqi forces comprising the largest contingent at approximately 5,000 fighters
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces
The largest contingent of foreign fighters deployed to Iran came from Iraqi Shia militias operating under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), known in Arabic as Hashd al-Shaabi. Initial reports on January 6-7, 2026, indicated that approximately 800 Iraqi fighters had entered Iran. However, subsequent intelligence assessments revealed far greater numbers.
A European military source confirmed to CNN that 800 Shiite fighters crossed from the Iraqi provinces of Diyala, Maysan, and Basra, traveling "under the pretence of religious pilgrimages". Yet an Iraqi security source provided a dramatically higher estimate, stating that "nearly 5,000 fighters" entered Iran through two southern border crossings—Shaib in Maysan province and Zurbatiya in Wasit province. This discrepancy reflects the inherent challenges in tracking clandestine military movements disguised as civilian religious travel, but multiple independent sources converged on estimates in the thousands.
Kataib Hezbollah
Kataib Hezbollah (KH), designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, functions as "the premier militia in Iraq, operating under Iran's direct command" and represents "the strongest individual faction in Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces". The group controls key PMF departments including chief of staff, security, intelligence, missiles, and anti-armor.
Founded in the mid-2000s with extensive IRGC support, KH was Iran's most favored militant group in Iraq until the January 2020 killing of its founder Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis alongside Qasem Soleimani. The militia's combat forces expanded massively during the anti-ISIS campaign, growing to approximately 10,000 fighters across PMF brigades 45, 46, and 47, plus an additional 2,500 fighters deployed to Syria.
KH has a documented history of human rights violations, including responsibility for killing hundreds of U.S. soldiers during the Iraq War and participation in the violent suppression of Iraqi protesters in 2019. The group's operational sophistication, access to Iranian-supplied weapons systems, and ideological commitment to defending the Islamic Republic made it a natural choice for deployment against Iranian protesters.
Harakat al-NUTJOB (Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba)
Harakat al-Nujaba, also known as the Nujaba Movement, operates as another key Iranian proxy within the PMF structure. The group has received extensive training, funding, logistic support, and weapons from the IRGC Quds Force. Like other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, Harakat al-Nujaba gained combat experience fighting ISIS while advancing Iran's strategic interests in Iraq and Syria.
The militia issued statements supporting the Iranian regime and condemning the protests, marking a departure from June 2025, when most Iraqi militias affirmed their noninvolvement in the Iran-Israel conflict. This shift reflected the militias' recognition that their survival depends on the Islamic Republic's continuation in power.
Badr Organization
The Badr Organization, described as "Iran's oldest proxy in Iraq," traces its origins to 1982 when it was formed by the IRGC as the military wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The Badr Brigade consisted of Iraqi exiles, refugees, and Iraqi Army defectors who fought alongside Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq War, under the direct leadership of Iranian officers.
After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Badr fighters and their Iranian commanders infiltrated the newly reconstituted Iraqi army, police, and Interior Ministry in significant numbers. The Iraqi Interior Minister at the time, Bayan Jabr, was a former Badr leader, facilitating the organization's entrenchment within state security apparatus.
Despite its deep ideological and operational ties to the IRGC, Badr has avoided U.S. sanctions by embedding itself within Iraq's democratic political processes and minimizing overt aggression against American forces. This political sophistication, combined with four decades of operational relationship with Tehran, made Badr a reliable partner for the Iranian regime's domestic repression operations.
Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada
Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (Brigade of the Master of Martyrs) represents another Iraqi PMF faction with extensive Iranian backing. The group fought alongside Afghan Fatemiyoun fighters in Syria during the early stages of Iranian military intervention, establishing operational relationships that facilitated coordinated deployment to Iran.
Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade
Afghanistan's Fatemiyoun Brigade (Liwa Fatemiyoun) played a documented role in the January 8-9, 2026, killings of Iranian protesters, according to intelligence obtained by Iran International. The brigade's origins trace to Afghan Shia militant groups that fought in the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s and against the Taliban in the 1990s, before being reconstituted in 2013 to fight in Syria under Quds Force commander Ali Reza Tavassoli.
The IRGC systematically recruited Afghan Hazara refugees living in Iran, exploiting their vulnerable legal status and economic desperation. Iran offered recruits monthly salaries of $500-700—nearly half of average Pakistani annual income—alongside promises of residency permits, education for children, and protection from deportation. The recruitment process frequently occurred under coercion, with refugees facing the choice between military service or imprisonment and deportation.
Between 2013 and 2019, over 50,000 Fatemiyoun militants fought in Syria, suffering a staggering casualty rate of over 5,000 deaths and 4,000 wounded. The group grew from its initial contingent of 22 volunteers to a division-strength force of approximately 10,000-20,000 fighters. Fatemiyoun forces participated in major battles including the recapture of Palmyra, the defense of Damascus, operations in Aleppo, Daraa, Hama, and Deir ez-Zor.
The fighters received minimal training—just a few weeks of instruction in tactical guerrilla tactics and basic weapons handling—before being deployed as shock troopers spearheading major offensives. Some received more specialized training in reconnaissance and sniping from Hezbollah instructors. This pattern of using Fatemiyoun as "cannon fodder" in the most dangerous operations produced veterans desensitized to extreme violence.
In November 2017, as conventional operations against ISIS concluded, Iran began downsizing Fatemiyoun, demobilizing the youngest, oldest, and most problematic fighters. However, the organization retained a deployed presence in eastern Syria near the Iraqi border and in Hama province, maintaining Iran's capacity to rapidly remobilize these forces for contingency operations—including, as events in January 2026 demonstrated, domestic repression.
Afghanistan's Fatemiyoun Brigade (Liwa Fatemiyoun) played a documented role in the January 8-9, 2026, killings of Iranian protesters, according to intelligence obtained by Iran International. The brigade's origins trace to Afghan Shia militant groups that fought in the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s and against the Taliban in the 1990s, before being reconstituted in 2013 to fight in Syria under Quds Force commander Ali Reza Tavassoli.
The IRGC systematically recruited Afghan Hazara refugees living in Iran, exploiting their vulnerable legal status and economic desperation. Iran offered recruits monthly salaries of $500-700—nearly half of average Pakistani annual income—alongside promises of residency permits, education for children, and protection from deportation. The recruitment process frequently occurred under coercion, with refugees facing the choice between military service or imprisonment and deportation.
Between 2013 and 2019, over 50,000 Fatemiyoun militants fought in Syria, suffering a staggering casualty rate of over 5,000 deaths and 4,000 wounded. The group grew from its initial contingent of 22 volunteers to a division-strength force of approximately 10,000-20,000 fighters. Fatemiyoun forces participated in major battles including the recapture of Palmyra, the defense of Damascus, operations in Aleppo, Daraa, Hama, and Deir ez-Zor.
The fighters received minimal training—just a few weeks of instruction in tactical guerrilla tactics and basic weapons handling—before being deployed as shock troopers spearheading major offensives. Some received more specialized training in reconnaissance and sniping from Hezbollah instructors. This pattern of using Fatemiyoun as "cannon fodder" in the most dangerous operations produced veterans desensitized to extreme violence.
In November 2017, as conventional operations against ISIS concluded, Iran began downsizing Fatemiyoun, demobilizing the youngest, oldest, and most problematic fighters. However, the organization retained a deployed presence in eastern Syria near the Iraqi border and in Hama province, maintaining Iran's capacity to rapidly remobilize these forces for contingency operations—including, as events in January 2026 demonstrated, domestic repression.
Pakistani Zainebiyoun Brigade
The Zainebiyoun Brigade (Liwa Zainabiyoun), also known as "Hezbollah Pakistan," has recruited thousands of Pakistani Shia men from areas including Parachinar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Karachi, Gilgit, and Quetta to fight in Iran's proxy wars. Former Pakistani senator Faisal Raza Abidi stated that out of 40,000 Hezbollah and Zainebiyoun fighters who reached the Middle East, 233 were Pakistanis from Parachinar.
The IRGC used Shia pilgrimages to Iran and Iraq as cover for recruitment, with a 2017 Pakistani intelligence report revealing that 4,000 Shia pilgrims who traveled to Iran between November 2016 and June 2017 never returned to Pakistan. In just six months during 2018, the brigade recruited more than 1,600 Pakistani fighters.
Pakistan banned the Zainebiyoun Brigade and designated it as a terrorist group on April 11, 2024, citing concerns that its fighters could be used by Iran to retaliate against Israeli targets or become active in Pakistan, complicating the country's security challenges. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the brigade in 2019 for supporting the Quds Force and engaging in human rights abuses, with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin charging that "the brutal Iranian regime exploits refugee communities in Iran, deprives them of access to basic services such as education, and uses them as human shields for the Syrian conflict".
Despite Pakistan's ban, Zainebiyoun fighters participated in the January 2026 crackdown on Iranian protesters, demonstrating the brigade's operational availability for Iranian regime priorities.
The Zainebiyoun Brigade (Liwa Zainabiyoun), also known as "Hezbollah Pakistan," has recruited thousands of Pakistani Shia men from areas including Parachinar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Karachi, Gilgit, and Quetta to fight in Iran's proxy wars. Former Pakistani senator Faisal Raza Abidi stated that out of 40,000 Hezbollah and Zainebiyoun fighters who reached the Middle East, 233 were Pakistanis from Parachinar.
The IRGC used Shia pilgrimages to Iran and Iraq as cover for recruitment, with a 2017 Pakistani intelligence report revealing that 4,000 Shia pilgrims who traveled to Iran between November 2016 and June 2017 never returned to Pakistan. In just six months during 2018, the brigade recruited more than 1,600 Pakistani fighters.
Pakistan banned the Zainebiyoun Brigade and designated it as a terrorist group on April 11, 2024, citing concerns that its fighters could be used by Iran to retaliate against Israeli targets or become active in Pakistan, complicating the country's security challenges. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the brigade in 2019 for supporting the Quds Force and engaging in human rights abuses, with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin charging that "the brutal Iranian regime exploits refugee communities in Iran, deprives them of access to basic services such as education, and uses them as human shields for the Syrian conflict".
Despite Pakistan's ban, Zainebiyoun fighters participated in the January 2026 crackdown on Iranian protesters, demonstrating the brigade's operational availability for Iranian regime priorities.
Lebanese Hezbollah
Members of Lebanese Hezbollah reportedly crossed into Iran alongside Iraqi militia fighters to bolster regime security forces. Fox News confirmed that roughly 850 Hezbollah, Iraqi militia, and Quds Force-linked fighters entered Iran, with independent sources verifying the movement.
Hezbollah's involvement represents a significant commitment given the organization's political standing in Lebanon and its recent military degradation during the 2024 conflict with Israel. The group's willingness to deploy personnel for Iranian domestic repression operations underscores both the depth of its ideological commitment to the Islamic Republic and its dependence on Iranian financial and military support.
The U.S. State Department expressed alarm at reports that the Iranian regime deployed "Hezbollah terrorists and Iraqi militants to suppress peaceful protests," stating that using such forces against Iranian citizens would constitute "yet another profound betrayal of the Iranian people".
IRGC Quds Force Coordination
The IRGC Quds Force played the central coordination role in mobilizing, deploying, and directing foreign militias against Iranian protesters. According to intelligence obtained by Iran International, "the Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force and its allied proxy forces in the region played a central role in the killing of Iranian protesters on January 8 and 9".
The Quds Force, responsible for the IRGC's extraterritorial operations, maintains command-and-control structures over proxy militias throughout the Middle East. This network includes training camps, weapons supply chains, financial disbursement systems, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and operational command channels that the Quds Force activated to rapidly mobilize forces for the Iranian crackdown.
III. Deployment Logistics: Routes, Methods, and Locations
Geographic distribution of foreign Shia militia deployments across Iran, with Ahvaz serving as the central staging base before fighters were dispatched to western provinces, Tehran, and Kurdish regions
Border Crossings and Entry Routes
Geographic distribution of foreign Shia militia deployments across Iran, with Ahvaz serving as the central staging base before fighters were dispatched to western provinces, Tehran, and Kurdish regions
Border Crossings and Entry Routes
Iraqi militia fighters entered Iran through at least five confirmed border crossings, all disguised as religious pilgrims traveling to holy Shia sites. The principal entry points included:
Shalamcheh (Basra-Khuzestan border): The primary crossing point between Iraq's Basra province and Iran's Khuzestan province. An Iraqi Interior Ministry employee working at Shalamcheh reported that more than 60 buses, each with capacity for 50 people, carrying young Iraqi men crossed the border by the evening of January 11. The men identified themselves as pilgrims to holy sites in Iran, but their appearance did not reflect religious pilgrimage.
Chazabeh/Chazzabeh: A secondary crossing point between Iraq and Khuzestan province.
Khosravi: Located on the Kermanshah-Ilam provincial border with Iraq, facilitating entry into western Iran.
Shaib (Maysan province): A crossing in Maysan province used by nearly 5,000 fighters according to Iraqi security sources.
Zurbatiya (Wasit province): Another entry point in Wasit province.
The fighters traveled in organized convoys, with at least 60 buses documented at Shalamcheh alone. Video footage posted by Abu Azrael, a senior commander in the Imam Ali Brigades (an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia), showed military vehicles bearing Iraqi government license plates and displaying PMF and Imam Ali Brigade flags departing from an Iraqi Interior Ministry camp. While independently verifiable confirmation that these specific vehicles reached Iran remains unavailable, the footage demonstrates official Iraqi government infrastructure being used to facilitate militia mobilization.
Iraqi government officials were aware of the mobilization, though Hussein Allawi, security advisor to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, publicly denied the reports as "misleading," claiming they aimed "to drag Iraq into a dangerous situation and to deceive international and regional public opinion". This denial followed the established pattern of plausible deniability while Iraqi state resources enabled militia operations.
The Cover Story: Religious Pilgrimage
The fighters entered Iran under the pretense of undertaking religious pilgrimage to the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad, one of Shia Islam's holiest sites. This cover story exploited the regular flow of millions of Shia pilgrims between Iraq and Iran, making it difficult for border authorities—or international observers—to distinguish between genuine religious travelers and militiamen.
One documented case involved Mohammed Iyad, a 37-year-old Iraqi recruited by the Iraqi Hezbollah group for $600 per month. His mother told The Media Line: "Despite our refusal, he insisted on going. He left on Tuesday, January 6, and said he went to Basra and then to the Iranian border via the Shalamcheh border crossing. We lost contact with him on Wednesday after the internet went down".
The fighters entered Iran under the pretense of undertaking religious pilgrimage to the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad, one of Shia Islam's holiest sites. This cover story exploited the regular flow of millions of Shia pilgrims between Iraq and Iran, making it difficult for border authorities—or international observers—to distinguish between genuine religious travelers and militiamen.
One documented case involved Mohammed Iyad, a 37-year-old Iraqi recruited by the Iraqi Hezbollah group for $600 per month. His mother told The Media Line: "Despite our refusal, he insisted on going. He left on Tuesday, January 6, and said he went to Basra and then to the Iranian border via the Shalamcheh border crossing. We lost contact with him on Wednesday after the internet went down".
The Ahvaz Staging Base
Upon entering Iran, militia fighters gathered at a military base linked to Supreme Leader Khamenei in Ahvaz, the capital of Khuzestan Province. This central staging point served as the coordination hub where foreign fighters received assignments before being dispatched to operational zones throughout Iran.
Canada-based lawyer Sadeq Bigdeli claimed that the Ahvaz base was emptied of Iranian soldiers days before the militia influx to accommodate the foreign forces. This logistical preparation indicates advance planning by the IRGC and Supreme Leader's office, rather than an improvised response to escalating protests.
The choice of Ahvaz as the staging base holds strategic significance. Khuzestan Province borders Iraq, facilitating direct overland transit from border crossings. The province also has a significant Arab Iranian population and a history of ethnic tensions with the central government, making it a region where the regime anticipated the need for overwhelming force. Positioning foreign fighters in Ahvaz allowed rapid deployment to both Khuzestan itself and to western provinces including Kermanshah, Lorestan, and Ilam, which witnessed some of the deadliest crackdown operations.
Upon entering Iran, militia fighters gathered at a military base linked to Supreme Leader Khamenei in Ahvaz, the capital of Khuzestan Province. This central staging point served as the coordination hub where foreign fighters received assignments before being dispatched to operational zones throughout Iran.
Canada-based lawyer Sadeq Bigdeli claimed that the Ahvaz base was emptied of Iranian soldiers days before the militia influx to accommodate the foreign forces. This logistical preparation indicates advance planning by the IRGC and Supreme Leader's office, rather than an improvised response to escalating protests.
The choice of Ahvaz as the staging base holds strategic significance. Khuzestan Province borders Iraq, facilitating direct overland transit from border crossings. The province also has a significant Arab Iranian population and a history of ethnic tensions with the central government, making it a region where the regime anticipated the need for overwhelming force. Positioning foreign fighters in Ahvaz allowed rapid deployment to both Khuzestan itself and to western provinces including Kermanshah, Lorestan, and Ilam, which witnessed some of the deadliest crackdown operations.
Operational Deployment Zones
From the Ahvaz staging base, foreign militia fighters were "dispatched to various regions to take part in the violent crackdown on demonstrations". Confirmed deployment locations include:
Tehran: The capital witnessed significant militia presence, with Arabic-speaking security personnel documented in Tehran Bazaar and multiple districts. Tehran experienced some of the highest casualty figures, with six hospitals in the capital recording 217 deaths of protesters on January 8 alone, mostly from gunshot wounds to the head and chest. CBS News verified video footage showing at least 366 and likely more than 400 bodies piled at a morgue in a Tehran suburb.
Hamedan: Western Iran saw confirmed militia deployment according to European military assessment. Protesters in Hamedan waved flags from the shah's era amid fires and demonstrations, indicating the intensity of anti-regime sentiment that prompted heavy foreign fighter deployment.
Kermanshah: This western Kurdish-majority province experienced severe repression. The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division, part of the IRGC Ground Forces, deployed to suppress protests in Kermanshah City on January 8. The combination of IRGC regulars and foreign militias created overwhelming force projection in this strategically sensitive border region.
Lorestan and Ilam Provinces: These western provinces witnessed the deadliest repressions according to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The provinces' Lur minority population and geographic proximity to Iraq made them priorities for foreign militia deployment. The January 4, 2026, siege of Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam, involving IRGC forces storming the facility with shotguns and tear gas to arrest injured protesters, exemplified the brutality of operations in these regions.
Marvdasht (Fars Province): Iranian activists confirmed Arabic-speaking personnel participated in suppressing demonstrations in Marvdasht.
Shiraz (Fars Province): The city experienced crisis-mode conditions in hospitals, with one facility lacking sufficient surgeons to treat injured protesters on January 8. State television broadcast images of a significant funeral gathering in Shiraz for security personnel.
Ahvaz and broader Khuzestan Province: Eyewitnesses reported individuals speaking Arabic with Iraqi accents among those suppressing demonstrations in Ahvaz. The province's Arab Iranian population and history of ethnic tension made it a focal point for security operations.
Kurdish Regions (Northwestern Iran): Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, and other Kurdish-majority areas experienced particularly severe violence. A regional Iranian official quoted by Reuters stated that some of the most intense confrontations and highest casualty figures occurred in Kurdish regions, where Kurdish separatists have been active and violence historically escalates during unrest periods. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented that Kurdish and Lur ethnic minorities faced the deadliest repressions.
From the Ahvaz staging base, foreign militia fighters were "dispatched to various regions to take part in the violent crackdown on demonstrations". Confirmed deployment locations include:
Tehran: The capital witnessed significant militia presence, with Arabic-speaking security personnel documented in Tehran Bazaar and multiple districts. Tehran experienced some of the highest casualty figures, with six hospitals in the capital recording 217 deaths of protesters on January 8 alone, mostly from gunshot wounds to the head and chest. CBS News verified video footage showing at least 366 and likely more than 400 bodies piled at a morgue in a Tehran suburb.
Hamedan: Western Iran saw confirmed militia deployment according to European military assessment. Protesters in Hamedan waved flags from the shah's era amid fires and demonstrations, indicating the intensity of anti-regime sentiment that prompted heavy foreign fighter deployment.
Kermanshah: This western Kurdish-majority province experienced severe repression. The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division, part of the IRGC Ground Forces, deployed to suppress protests in Kermanshah City on January 8. The combination of IRGC regulars and foreign militias created overwhelming force projection in this strategically sensitive border region.
Lorestan and Ilam Provinces: These western provinces witnessed the deadliest repressions according to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The provinces' Lur minority population and geographic proximity to Iraq made them priorities for foreign militia deployment. The January 4, 2026, siege of Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam, involving IRGC forces storming the facility with shotguns and tear gas to arrest injured protesters, exemplified the brutality of operations in these regions.
Marvdasht (Fars Province): Iranian activists confirmed Arabic-speaking personnel participated in suppressing demonstrations in Marvdasht.
Shiraz (Fars Province): The city experienced crisis-mode conditions in hospitals, with one facility lacking sufficient surgeons to treat injured protesters on January 8. State television broadcast images of a significant funeral gathering in Shiraz for security personnel.
Ahvaz and broader Khuzestan Province: Eyewitnesses reported individuals speaking Arabic with Iraqi accents among those suppressing demonstrations in Ahvaz. The province's Arab Iranian population and history of ethnic tension made it a focal point for security operations.
Kurdish Regions (Northwestern Iran): Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, and other Kurdish-majority areas experienced particularly severe violence. A regional Iranian official quoted by Reuters stated that some of the most intense confrontations and highest casualty figures occurred in Kurdish regions, where Kurdish separatists have been active and violence historically escalates during unrest periods. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented that Kurdish and Lur ethnic minorities faced the deadliest repressions.
Operational Tactics and Evidence of Foreign Presence
Multiple forms of evidence confirmed the presence and operational role of foreign militias:
Arabic Dialects: The Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights and Freedoms reported that Iranian activists inside Iran confirmed the presence of security personnel speaking Arabic during protest suppression. Activists noted that the Arabic dialects heard did not belong to Iranian Arab citizens, strengthening the conclusion that non-Iranian elements were participating. Eyewitnesses in Ahvaz reported individuals speaking Arabic with Iraqi accents among suppressors.
Deployment Patterns: Iranian opposition figure Mehdi Reza stated that "for more than a week, Iraqi militias have been involved in suppressing the demonstrations in various parts of Iran, but many of them have been deployed to guard official or military headquarters". This deployment pattern—using foreign fighters to secure strategic facilities while also engaging in protest suppression—reflects professional military planning rather than improvised response.
Coordination with IRGC Units: Foreign militias operated in coordination with regular IRGC forces, the Basij paramilitary, and Iran's police force (FARAJA). This integrated command structure, directed by the Quds Force, enabled synchronized operations across multiple provinces.
IV. The Massacre of January 8-9, 2026: Crimes Against Humanity
The Internet Blackout and Information Warfare
Multiple forms of evidence confirmed the presence and operational role of foreign militias:
Arabic Dialects: The Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights and Freedoms reported that Iranian activists inside Iran confirmed the presence of security personnel speaking Arabic during protest suppression. Activists noted that the Arabic dialects heard did not belong to Iranian Arab citizens, strengthening the conclusion that non-Iranian elements were participating. Eyewitnesses in Ahvaz reported individuals speaking Arabic with Iraqi accents among suppressors.
Deployment Patterns: Iranian opposition figure Mehdi Reza stated that "for more than a week, Iraqi militias have been involved in suppressing the demonstrations in various parts of Iran, but many of them have been deployed to guard official or military headquarters". This deployment pattern—using foreign fighters to secure strategic facilities while also engaging in protest suppression—reflects professional military planning rather than improvised response.
Coordination with IRGC Units: Foreign militias operated in coordination with regular IRGC forces, the Basij paramilitary, and Iran's police force (FARAJA). This integrated command structure, directed by the Quds Force, enabled synchronized operations across multiple provinces.
IV. The Massacre of January 8-9, 2026: Crimes Against Humanity
The Internet Blackout and Information Warfare
On the evening of January 8, 2026, Iranian authorities imposed a near-total internet blackout across the country, severely restricting communications and concealing the true scale of violence from international observers. This blackout represented a deliberate strategy to create what human rights organizations characterized as a "kill zone"—an environment where security forces could engage in mass killings while "blinding the world to guarantee impunity".
The timing of the blackout coincided precisely with the escalation of violence. UN Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee noted that "popular protests" rapidly escalated into widespread turmoil on January 8, leading to "considerable loss of life". The internet shutdown hampered efforts to corroborate unlawful killings and other violations, with Human Rights Watch emphasizing that "the ongoing internet shutdown has severely hampered efforts to corroborate unlawful killings and other violations".
Iranian authorities also severed telecommunication lines in prisons nationwide on January 9, creating incommunicado detention conditions that served as a "precursor to a humanitarian catastrophe behind prison walls". This comprehensive communications blackout extended the regime's information control from the streets into detention facilities.
The blackout's effectiveness in concealing atrocities is evident in the wide variance of death toll estimates. While human rights organizations with sources inside Iran provided estimates ranging from 12,000 to 20,000 killed, official Iranian acknowledgments remained far lower, with one regional Iranian official stating on January 18 that authorities had verified at least 5,000 deaths. The true toll may never be fully documented due to the systematic obstruction of information flows.
The 48-Hour Killing Operation
The concentrated violence of January 8-9, 2026, represents what multiple human rights organizations, legal tribunals, and international experts have classified as crimes against humanity. The scale, coordination, and lethality of operations during this 48-hour period distinguish it from routine protest suppression, elevating it to the realm of mass atrocities under international criminal law.
Iran International's multi-stage investigation, based on government sources, eyewitness accounts, field reports, hospital data, and testimonies from Iranian doctors and nurses, ascertained that at least 12,000 civilians were killed during January 8-9. Hassan Hashemian, the Arab affairs expert, assessed that "the fact that between 12,000 and 20,000 people were killed within two days shows these groups were deployed specifically to kill. They have prior experience from Iraq and Syria".
CBS News reported that activist groups working to compile the full death toll, based on reports from medical officials across the country, believed the toll was at least 12,000 and possibly as high as 20,000. The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) confirmed 2,403 protester deaths by January 16, with an additional 4,382 cases still under investigation. Iran HRM (Iran Human Rights Monitor) documentation from hospitals, cemeteries, and credible sources in 195 cities confirmed that the death toll from December 28 to January 11 surpassed 3,000.
By January 18, a report compiled by doctors inside Iran estimated that at least 16,500 protesters had been killed and approximately 330,000 injured. A regional Iranian official confirmed to Reuters that the government had verified at least 5,000 fatalities, including around 500 security force members.
The variance in these figures reflects both the fog of war created by the internet blackout and the regime's systematic efforts to conceal casualties by confiscating bodies, preventing hospital documentation, and threatening medical personnel. What remains beyond dispute is that thousands of Iranian civilians were killed in a coordinated, nationwide operation during a 48-hour period—a scale of lethality that definitionally constitutes mass killing.
The concentrated violence of January 8-9, 2026, represents what multiple human rights organizations, legal tribunals, and international experts have classified as crimes against humanity. The scale, coordination, and lethality of operations during this 48-hour period distinguish it from routine protest suppression, elevating it to the realm of mass atrocities under international criminal law.
Iran International's multi-stage investigation, based on government sources, eyewitness accounts, field reports, hospital data, and testimonies from Iranian doctors and nurses, ascertained that at least 12,000 civilians were killed during January 8-9. Hassan Hashemian, the Arab affairs expert, assessed that "the fact that between 12,000 and 20,000 people were killed within two days shows these groups were deployed specifically to kill. They have prior experience from Iraq and Syria".
CBS News reported that activist groups working to compile the full death toll, based on reports from medical officials across the country, believed the toll was at least 12,000 and possibly as high as 20,000. The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) confirmed 2,403 protester deaths by January 16, with an additional 4,382 cases still under investigation. Iran HRM (Iran Human Rights Monitor) documentation from hospitals, cemeteries, and credible sources in 195 cities confirmed that the death toll from December 28 to January 11 surpassed 3,000.
By January 18, a report compiled by doctors inside Iran estimated that at least 16,500 protesters had been killed and approximately 330,000 injured. A regional Iranian official confirmed to Reuters that the government had verified at least 5,000 fatalities, including around 500 security force members.
The variance in these figures reflects both the fog of war created by the internet blackout and the regime's systematic efforts to conceal casualties by confiscating bodies, preventing hospital documentation, and threatening medical personnel. What remains beyond dispute is that thousands of Iranian civilians were killed in a coordinated, nationwide operation during a 48-hour period—a scale of lethality that definitionally constitutes mass killing.
Targeting Patterns and Methods of Killing
Evidence gathered by human rights organizations reveals systematic patterns in how protesters were killed, demonstrating coordinated orders rather than spontaneous violence by individual security personnel.
Headshots and Torso Shots: Human Rights Watch reviewed evidence showing that "many protesters were killed or injured by gunshot wounds to their heads and torsos". Tehran doctors told The Times of Israel that security forces were "intentionally firing at protesters' eyes and heads," with hundreds of eye injuries documented at hospitals in the capital. The deliberate targeting of vital areas indicates shoot-to-kill orders.
Sniper Operations: Multiple sources documented snipers positioned on rooftops to kill civilians. The Aban Tribunal's investigation of November 2019 protests found evidence that snipers were systematically deployed—tactics replicated in January 2026. The use of designated marksmen against unarmed protesters constitutes extrajudicial execution.
Metal Pellet Shotguns: Security forces deployed shotguns loaded with metal pellets, causing extensive injuries to protesters' heads and eyes. The use of these weapons at close range transformed crowd control tools into instruments of mutilation and death. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights accused Iranian authorities of seeking to intimidate protesters with "mutilating injuries to the face and genitals".
"Finishing Shots": Witnesses in Karaj reported that security forces shot wounded protesters who could not move, firing "finishing shots" at those left behind in hospitals. This practice of executing the wounded constitutes a war crime under the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute.
Hospital Attacks: Security forces entered medical centers, removed injured protesters to undisclosed locations, and killed wounded demonstrators, with witnesses describing "bodies and wounded being loaded onto trucks without separation". The systematic targeting of medical facilities violates the fundamental principle of medical neutrality and constitutes grave breaches of international humanitarian law.
Command Authority and Direct Orders
The mass killings occurred pursuant to explicit orders from Iran's highest authorities, establishing criminal liability under the doctrine of command responsibility.
On January 3, 2026, following the deaths of at least 28 protesters, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated that "rioters should be dealt with decisively". The same day, the IRGC command in Lorestan province announced that the period of "tolerance" had ended, committing to target "rioters, organizers, and leaders of anti-security movements … without mercy".
Immediately following Khamenei's January 3 directive, Chief of the Judiciary Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei ordered judges to "issue deterrent sentences and the harshest punishments with maximum decisiveness, without observing any legal leniency". This judicial directive effectively suspended due process protections and authorized summary punishment.
On January 9, the Supreme National Security Council issued a statement declaring that "security forces and the judiciary will show no tolerance whatsoever toward saboteurs". The escalating rhetoric and explicit removal of restraints on security forces created the permissive environment for mass killings.
These directives established a clear chain of command from Supreme Leader Khamenei through the IRGC, Quds Force, judiciary, and deployed foreign militias. The coordination of this command structure across multiple institutions and geographic areas demonstrates the systematic nature of the attacks, a key element for establishing crimes against humanity under international law.
The Role of Foreign Militias in the Massacre
Kahrizak morgue
The January 8-9 killings coincided precisely with the peak deployment of foreign militias. According to Iran International, "Afghanistan's Fatemiyoun Brigade, Pakistan's Zainebiyoun Brigade and Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces carried out a significant part of the killings". This assessment, based on intelligence sources, directly implicates foreign fighters in the deadliest operations.
The foreign militias' combat experience from Syria and Iraq proved devastatingly effective when applied to urban protest suppression. Veterans of the Syrian civil war brought proficiency in urban warfare, sniper operations, coordinated multi-axis attacks, and psychological operations designed to terrorize civilian populations into submission.
Dr. Behnam Taleblu, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, assessed that "from the Basij and Revolutionary Guard, which were built to crush internal dissent under the banner of defending the revolution, to today's deployment of foreign proxies like Hezbollah and Iraqi Popular Mobilization units, the regime is signaling once again that it treats its own population the way it has long treated regional battlefields. The message is clear: The mullahs don't care about the Iranian people. They are willing to go to any extent to blur the line between domestic policing and transnational militancy to preserve their grip on power".
V. Human Rights Violations and Atrocities
Hospital Attacks and Medical Neutrality Violations
The systematic targeting of medical facilities represents one of the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law during the Iranian crackdown. Security forces raided hospitals, used tear gas and shotguns inside medical facilities, arrested injured protesters, confiscated bodies of the deceased, and threatened medical personnel—transforming spaces of healing into zones of terror.
Imam Khomeini Hospital, Ilam (January 4, 2026): Iranian security forces, including IRGC special units, laid siege to Imam Khomeini Hospital for over 24 hours beginning January 3-4. Shirin, a nurse at the hospital, described the assault: "The agents utilized shotguns, tear gas, and fired inside the facility. They shattered the entrance glass doors and invaded the wards".
IRGC personnel assaulted patients, injured protesters, staff, and families with batons, launching tear gas canisters into the building. Many patients and civilians suffered serious injuries, with children in the pediatric ward experiencing severe respiratory problems from tear gas exposure. Shirin recounted that agents "acted with savage brutality. They unleashed sexual and ethnic insults, humiliating everyone. The atmosphere was filled with screams. The scene resembled a war zone more than a hospital".
Within minutes, 11 injured protesters were taken away by the IRGC to undisclosed locations, while five others remained in critical care, restrained to their beds. Some were interrogated on-site, while those with less severe injuries escaped through a rear exit. The siege occurred after security forces shot at peaceful protesters outside a Basij base in nearby Malekshahi, killing at least three instantly and wounding others who were transported to the hospital.
Karaj Hospitals (January 2026): Armed security forces surrounded hospitals in Karaj after deadly clashes, shooting wounded protesters who could not move. Witnesses and medical workers reported that security personnel entered medical centers, removed injured protesters for undisclosed locations, and fired "finishing shots" at some left behind. The accounts described "scenes of bodies and wounded being loaded onto trucks without separation".
Tehran Hospitals: Six hospitals in Tehran recorded 217 deaths of protesters on January 8, with facilities operating in crisis mode. A doctor described treating injured protesters outside in the hospital grounds despite freezing temperatures, as there was no space left in the wards. Security forces occasionally entered medical centers to arrest injured protesters, forcing medical staff to treat patients in exposed outdoor locations.
Threat to Medical Personnel: A source inside Iran told CBS News that "security forces were visiting the many private hospitals across Tehran, threatening staff to hand over the names and addresses of those being treated for injuries sustained in the protests". This systematic intimidation of healthcare workers violated medical ethics, endangered patients, and deterred injured protesters from seeking necessary treatment, raising their risk of death.
The targeting of hospitals served multiple strategic objectives for the regime: preventing documentation of the scale of violence, apprehending protesters who could provide witness testimony, intimidating the medical community into silence, and terrorizing the broader population by eliminating even the sanctuary of medical care. These actions constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions' protections for medical facilities and personnel.
Hospital Attacks and Medical Neutrality Violations
The systematic targeting of medical facilities represents one of the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law during the Iranian crackdown. Security forces raided hospitals, used tear gas and shotguns inside medical facilities, arrested injured protesters, confiscated bodies of the deceased, and threatened medical personnel—transforming spaces of healing into zones of terror.
Imam Khomeini Hospital, Ilam (January 4, 2026): Iranian security forces, including IRGC special units, laid siege to Imam Khomeini Hospital for over 24 hours beginning January 3-4. Shirin, a nurse at the hospital, described the assault: "The agents utilized shotguns, tear gas, and fired inside the facility. They shattered the entrance glass doors and invaded the wards".
IRGC personnel assaulted patients, injured protesters, staff, and families with batons, launching tear gas canisters into the building. Many patients and civilians suffered serious injuries, with children in the pediatric ward experiencing severe respiratory problems from tear gas exposure. Shirin recounted that agents "acted with savage brutality. They unleashed sexual and ethnic insults, humiliating everyone. The atmosphere was filled with screams. The scene resembled a war zone more than a hospital".
Within minutes, 11 injured protesters were taken away by the IRGC to undisclosed locations, while five others remained in critical care, restrained to their beds. Some were interrogated on-site, while those with less severe injuries escaped through a rear exit. The siege occurred after security forces shot at peaceful protesters outside a Basij base in nearby Malekshahi, killing at least three instantly and wounding others who were transported to the hospital.
Karaj Hospitals (January 2026): Armed security forces surrounded hospitals in Karaj after deadly clashes, shooting wounded protesters who could not move. Witnesses and medical workers reported that security personnel entered medical centers, removed injured protesters for undisclosed locations, and fired "finishing shots" at some left behind. The accounts described "scenes of bodies and wounded being loaded onto trucks without separation".
Tehran Hospitals: Six hospitals in Tehran recorded 217 deaths of protesters on January 8, with facilities operating in crisis mode. A doctor described treating injured protesters outside in the hospital grounds despite freezing temperatures, as there was no space left in the wards. Security forces occasionally entered medical centers to arrest injured protesters, forcing medical staff to treat patients in exposed outdoor locations.
Threat to Medical Personnel: A source inside Iran told CBS News that "security forces were visiting the many private hospitals across Tehran, threatening staff to hand over the names and addresses of those being treated for injuries sustained in the protests". This systematic intimidation of healthcare workers violated medical ethics, endangered patients, and deterred injured protesters from seeking necessary treatment, raising their risk of death.
The targeting of hospitals served multiple strategic objectives for the regime: preventing documentation of the scale of violence, apprehending protesters who could provide witness testimony, intimidating the medical community into silence, and terrorizing the broader population by eliminating even the sanctuary of medical care. These actions constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions' protections for medical facilities and personnel.
Arbitrary Detention and Enforced Disappearances
Security forces arbitrarily arrested thousands of protesters, including hundreds of children as young as 14, during protest dispersals, nightly raids on homes, and seizures from hospitals. The regime subjected many to enforced disappearance and incommunicado detention, placing them at heightened risk of torture, sexual violence, and extrajudicial execution.
By mid-January 2026, human rights organizations estimated over 18,000 detainees, though the UN acknowledged inability to confirm these numbers due to the information blackout. HRANA verified over 24,000 arrests by January 18. Iran HRM documented more than 3,000 detained across 195 cities, with many transferred to secret detention centers and security warehouses in conditions of enforced disappearance.
Children and Adolescents: Hundreds of children and adolescents under 18 were arrested during the protests in actions that human rights organizations characterized as "a clear violation of international law and a serious threat to the future of society". The arrests violated the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Iran is a party.
The province of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, particularly the city of Yasuj, recorded the highest number of child arrests, with at least 81 adolescents detained. Of these, 70 were transferred to the Yasuj Reform and Training Center, while 11 were held in security detention centers without transparent information about their status. The list of detained children included both boys and girls, with names such as Mohammad Mehdi Alipour, Amir Mohammad Bakhtiari, Farid Alizadeh, Mohaddeseh Mohammadi, and Shahla Ansarian.
According to published statistics, child arrests by province included: Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad (46 children), Tehran (18), Alborz (17), Mazandaran (12), Gilan (5), Razavi Khorasan (3), East Azerbaijan (3), and between 1-2 children in provinces including Isfahan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Fars, Kerman, Hamadan, and Qom. The geographic spread demonstrates the nationwide scope of repression targeting minors.
An Iranian lawmaker confirmed the arrests but claimed the judiciary would "deal with them based on the rights of children, teenagers and young people in the Islamic Republic"—a hollow assurance given the judiciary's simultaneous orders for "harshest punishments" without leniency. The whereabouts of many detained children remained unknown, with families reporting intimidation by authorities and lack of information regarding their children's legal status.
Enforced Disappearances: The Islamic Republic employed a systematic pattern of "enforced disappearance" to suppress protests. Many detainees, instead of being transferred to official prisons, were taken to secret IRGC detention centers and Ward 240 of Evin Prison (controlled by security interrogators). Dozens of young detainees from Izeh were transferred to prisons in Ahvaz under heavy security to break local solidarity.
Iran HRM documented specific cases of enforced disappearance, including 15-year-old Kourosh Nouri from Malekshahi held in IRGC detention, Amir Mehdi Razm from Behesheh whose location remained unknown, Sepehr Salehi from Dehloran transferred to Ilam, and Nemat Heydari from Izeh transferred to Ahvaz. These represent a small fraction of the thousands whose families have no information about their location or condition.
Security forces arbitrarily arrested thousands of protesters, including hundreds of children as young as 14, during protest dispersals, nightly raids on homes, and seizures from hospitals. The regime subjected many to enforced disappearance and incommunicado detention, placing them at heightened risk of torture, sexual violence, and extrajudicial execution.
By mid-January 2026, human rights organizations estimated over 18,000 detainees, though the UN acknowledged inability to confirm these numbers due to the information blackout. HRANA verified over 24,000 arrests by January 18. Iran HRM documented more than 3,000 detained across 195 cities, with many transferred to secret detention centers and security warehouses in conditions of enforced disappearance.
Children and Adolescents: Hundreds of children and adolescents under 18 were arrested during the protests in actions that human rights organizations characterized as "a clear violation of international law and a serious threat to the future of society". The arrests violated the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Iran is a party.
The province of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, particularly the city of Yasuj, recorded the highest number of child arrests, with at least 81 adolescents detained. Of these, 70 were transferred to the Yasuj Reform and Training Center, while 11 were held in security detention centers without transparent information about their status. The list of detained children included both boys and girls, with names such as Mohammad Mehdi Alipour, Amir Mohammad Bakhtiari, Farid Alizadeh, Mohaddeseh Mohammadi, and Shahla Ansarian.
According to published statistics, child arrests by province included: Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad (46 children), Tehran (18), Alborz (17), Mazandaran (12), Gilan (5), Razavi Khorasan (3), East Azerbaijan (3), and between 1-2 children in provinces including Isfahan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Fars, Kerman, Hamadan, and Qom. The geographic spread demonstrates the nationwide scope of repression targeting minors.
An Iranian lawmaker confirmed the arrests but claimed the judiciary would "deal with them based on the rights of children, teenagers and young people in the Islamic Republic"—a hollow assurance given the judiciary's simultaneous orders for "harshest punishments" without leniency. The whereabouts of many detained children remained unknown, with families reporting intimidation by authorities and lack of information regarding their children's legal status.
Enforced Disappearances: The Islamic Republic employed a systematic pattern of "enforced disappearance" to suppress protests. Many detainees, instead of being transferred to official prisons, were taken to secret IRGC detention centers and Ward 240 of Evin Prison (controlled by security interrogators). Dozens of young detainees from Izeh were transferred to prisons in Ahvaz under heavy security to break local solidarity.
Iran HRM documented specific cases of enforced disappearance, including 15-year-old Kourosh Nouri from Malekshahi held in IRGC detention, Amir Mehdi Razm from Behesheh whose location remained unknown, Sepehr Salehi from Dehloran transferred to Ilam, and Nemat Heydari from Izeh transferred to Ahvaz. These represent a small fraction of the thousands whose families have no information about their location or condition.
Torture and Sexual Violence in Detention
Detainees faced systematic torture and sexual violence in detention facilities, continuing a pattern of abuse documented during previous protest waves. Multiple accounts revealed severe physical and psychological violence at interrogation centers, with methods including rear-handcuffing, "body-locking," flogging the soles of feet (falaka), heavy instrument strikes, and direct blows to the face and body aimed at coercing confessions.
Soroush Detention Center: Interrogations at Soroush involved systematic torture, with detainees suffering fractures, severe bruises, and neurological disorders. Security forces conducted interrogations in specialized rooms while detainees were blindfolded, forcing them to confess to crimes they denied committing using pre-written scripts for memorization and recording. Failure to comply resulted in further beatings.
Detainees reported severe anxiety, insomnia, and nervous breakdowns from psychological pressure. Security forces distributed psychotropic drugs to control certain detainees' behavior. Many were held in security wards and "super-max" wings with long histories of torture, psychological pressure, and forced confessions.
Sexual Violence: Iran's security forces have weaponized sexual violence as a systematic method of repression. Human Rights Watch's 2024 investigation documented that Iranian security forces raped, tortured, and sexually assaulted detainees during the 2022-2023 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests. While specific documentation of sexual violence during the January 2026 crackdown remains limited due to the internet blackout and stigma preventing survivors from coming forward, the pattern of abuse established during previous protests strongly suggests similar violations occurred.
During 2022 protests, detainees described being raped by security forces, with some witnessing rapes of other detainees. In seven documented cases, security forces tortured detainees to coerce confessions. A Kurdish woman reported that two men from security forces raped her while a female agent held her down and facilitated the assault. A 24-year-old Kurdish man was severely tortured and raped with a baton by intelligence agency forces in a secret detention center. A 30-year-old man was blindfolded, beaten, and gang-raped with another man by security forces in a van.
A university student from Sistan and Baluchistan described being detained with approximately 20 other women after protesting, with security forces beating all the women so severely that one lost consciousness. During approximately 50 days of detention, she was raped three times, mostly during the first days of arrest, and was not given medicine or hygienic supplies. She reported that nearly 20 other women aged 20-26 were detained with her, and she was aware that two others were sexually assaulted and raped.
Former prisoner Zahra Shariatmadari, testifying before international audiences, described systematic abuse in detention centers including "beatings, transfers to prisons without separation based on the type of offense and the deliberate incitement of other inmates to harass and abuse us". She recounted a traumatic interrogation experience: "I was ordered to remove my clothes and remain completely naked for a body search while cameras were present. I knew that men were watching me, and I could hear their voices".
The use of sexual violence serves multiple functions in the Iranian repression apparatus: extracting false confessions, punishing dissent, terrorizing communities (particularly women and ethnic minorities), and stigmatizing survivors to prevent them from continuing activism. Nahid Naghshbandi, acting Iran researcher at Human Rights Watch, assessed that "Iranian security forces' brutality against detained protesters, including rape and torture, are not only egregious crimes, but a weapon of injustice wielded against detainees to coerce them into false confessions. These methods are also a twisted and despicable means of further stigmatizing and repressing marginalized ethnic minorities".
Detainees faced systematic torture and sexual violence in detention facilities, continuing a pattern of abuse documented during previous protest waves. Multiple accounts revealed severe physical and psychological violence at interrogation centers, with methods including rear-handcuffing, "body-locking," flogging the soles of feet (falaka), heavy instrument strikes, and direct blows to the face and body aimed at coercing confessions.
Soroush Detention Center: Interrogations at Soroush involved systematic torture, with detainees suffering fractures, severe bruises, and neurological disorders. Security forces conducted interrogations in specialized rooms while detainees were blindfolded, forcing them to confess to crimes they denied committing using pre-written scripts for memorization and recording. Failure to comply resulted in further beatings.
Detainees reported severe anxiety, insomnia, and nervous breakdowns from psychological pressure. Security forces distributed psychotropic drugs to control certain detainees' behavior. Many were held in security wards and "super-max" wings with long histories of torture, psychological pressure, and forced confessions.
Sexual Violence: Iran's security forces have weaponized sexual violence as a systematic method of repression. Human Rights Watch's 2024 investigation documented that Iranian security forces raped, tortured, and sexually assaulted detainees during the 2022-2023 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests. While specific documentation of sexual violence during the January 2026 crackdown remains limited due to the internet blackout and stigma preventing survivors from coming forward, the pattern of abuse established during previous protests strongly suggests similar violations occurred.
During 2022 protests, detainees described being raped by security forces, with some witnessing rapes of other detainees. In seven documented cases, security forces tortured detainees to coerce confessions. A Kurdish woman reported that two men from security forces raped her while a female agent held her down and facilitated the assault. A 24-year-old Kurdish man was severely tortured and raped with a baton by intelligence agency forces in a secret detention center. A 30-year-old man was blindfolded, beaten, and gang-raped with another man by security forces in a van.
A university student from Sistan and Baluchistan described being detained with approximately 20 other women after protesting, with security forces beating all the women so severely that one lost consciousness. During approximately 50 days of detention, she was raped three times, mostly during the first days of arrest, and was not given medicine or hygienic supplies. She reported that nearly 20 other women aged 20-26 were detained with her, and she was aware that two others were sexually assaulted and raped.
Former prisoner Zahra Shariatmadari, testifying before international audiences, described systematic abuse in detention centers including "beatings, transfers to prisons without separation based on the type of offense and the deliberate incitement of other inmates to harass and abuse us". She recounted a traumatic interrogation experience: "I was ordered to remove my clothes and remain completely naked for a body search while cameras were present. I knew that men were watching me, and I could hear their voices".
The use of sexual violence serves multiple functions in the Iranian repression apparatus: extracting false confessions, punishing dissent, terrorizing communities (particularly women and ethnic minorities), and stigmatizing survivors to prevent them from continuing activism. Nahid Naghshbandi, acting Iran researcher at Human Rights Watch, assessed that "Iranian security forces' brutality against detained protesters, including rape and torture, are not only egregious crimes, but a weapon of injustice wielded against detainees to coerce them into false confessions. These methods are also a twisted and despicable means of further stigmatizing and repressing marginalized ethnic minorities".
Coerced Confessions and State Media Propaganda
Iranian state media aired at least 97 coerced confessions from protesters since demonstrations began on December 28, according to the U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency. The confessions, broadcast with dramatic background music interspersed with clips appearing to show protesters attacking security forces, featured handcuffed subjects with blurred faces expressing remorse for their actions.
Based on testimony from prior detainees, HRANA assessed that the confessions often came after psychological or physical torture and can have serious consequences, including the death penalty. On January 5, 2026, Tasnim News (affiliated with the IRGC) aired "confessions" of an 18-year-old woman and 16-year-old girl, accusing them of "leading riots". The practice of broadcasting forced confessions of minors violates detainees' due process rights and Iran's obligations under international law, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The coerced confession process follows a systematic protocol: security forces torture detainees to break their will, present pre-written scripts for memorization, record "confessions" in staged settings, and broadcast the videos on state television to discredit the protest movement and intimidate potential demonstrators. Some confessions showcase gruesome homemade weapons that authorities claim were used in attacks, while others highlight suspects in grainy security footage appearing to set fires or destroy property.
This propaganda apparatus serves the dual purpose of justifying the regime's violent response and delegitimizing legitimate grievances by portraying protesters as terrorists, foreign agents, or violent criminals rather than citizens exercising fundamental rights.
Iranian state media aired at least 97 coerced confessions from protesters since demonstrations began on December 28, according to the U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency. The confessions, broadcast with dramatic background music interspersed with clips appearing to show protesters attacking security forces, featured handcuffed subjects with blurred faces expressing remorse for their actions.
Based on testimony from prior detainees, HRANA assessed that the confessions often came after psychological or physical torture and can have serious consequences, including the death penalty. On January 5, 2026, Tasnim News (affiliated with the IRGC) aired "confessions" of an 18-year-old woman and 16-year-old girl, accusing them of "leading riots". The practice of broadcasting forced confessions of minors violates detainees' due process rights and Iran's obligations under international law, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The coerced confession process follows a systematic protocol: security forces torture detainees to break their will, present pre-written scripts for memorization, record "confessions" in staged settings, and broadcast the videos on state television to discredit the protest movement and intimidate potential demonstrators. Some confessions showcase gruesome homemade weapons that authorities claim were used in attacks, while others highlight suspects in grainy security footage appearing to set fires or destroy property.
This propaganda apparatus serves the dual purpose of justifying the regime's violent response and delegitimizing legitimate grievances by portraying protesters as terrorists, foreign agents, or violent criminals rather than citizens exercising fundamental rights.
Death Penalty Threats and Imminent Executions
Iranian authorities announced intentions to bring capital charges of "moharebeh" (waging war against God) against protesters, with prosecutors stating that "several rioters whose actions align with moharebeh will soon be brought before the court". Chief of the Judiciary Mohseni-Ejei ordered judges to expedite trials and show "no leniency" to protesters, effectively suspending fair trial guarantees.
The charge of moharebeh, along with "efsad-fel-arz" (corruption on earth), carries the death penalty under Iran's Islamic Penal Code. Human rights organizations expressed grave concern that the Islamic Republic was "aiming to conduct swift trials without adhering to fair trial standards for those detained during the protests". UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk expressed "deep concern regarding public remarks from certain judicial officials suggesting that the death penalty might be applied to protesters through expedited legal processes".
During the 2022-2023 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests, twelve individuals were executed following similar charges. The precedent established during that crackdown demonstrates that the regime's death penalty threats are not rhetorical but operational.
Iran HRM warned that with over 3,000 detainees held across 195 cities, many in secret detention centers subject to torture and enforced disappearance, the regime had entered a phase of potential mass executions. According to investigations by Iran HRM, the number of detainees facing potential execution had reached 50,000 across 144 cities. The Chief of the Judiciary's explicit order for "mass and rapid" processing of death sentences represented "an explicit order for summary executions".
Between January 5-14, 2026, Iran carried out at least 52 executions of prisoners with prior non-political convictions (murder and drug-related offenses) during the protest period. HRANA reported these executions occurred in at least 42 prisons across multiple provinces. The timing suggested the regime was accelerating its execution apparatus, creating capacity and establishing precedent for potential mass executions of protesters.
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Tehran had halted 800 executions slated for January following warnings from President Trump, though this claim could not be independently verified. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Fox News that Tehran had "no plan to execute protesters", a statement contradicted by the judiciary's public orders for capital charges and expedited trials.
The threat of mass executions represents the culmination of the regime's strategy of political genocide—the physical elimination of the protest generation to prevent future mobilization. Iran HRM warned that hundreds of children and adolescents were at "imminent risk of execution" given Ejei's mandate to issue death sentences without leniency.
VI. International Legal Framework: Crimes Against Humanity
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity Under the Rome Statute
The violence perpetrated against Iranian protesters during January 2026 meets the definitional criteria for crimes against humanity as codified in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as criminal acts "when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack".
Four basic elements must be present to establish crimes against humanity:
A. Attack: The coordinated operations by Iranian security forces and foreign militias constitute an "attack" within the legal meaning. The term encompasses any course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence against a civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy. The January 8-9 massacre, combined with systematic arrests, torture, hospital raids, and death penalty proceedings, constitutes such an attack.
B. Civilians as the Target: The protesters targeted by security forces were overwhelmingly civilians exercising fundamental rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented that security forces used lethal force against "largely peaceful protesters". While isolated incidents of protester violence occurred, the vast majority of demonstrators were unarmed civilians.
C. Widespread and Systematic Character: The attacks were both widespread (large-scale, affecting a high number of victims across extensive geography) and systematic (organized, following a pattern pursuant to policy or plan).
Widespread: The violence occurred across all 31 provinces of Iran, with protests documented in 585 locations across 186 cities. Death toll estimates ranging from 12,000 to 20,000 during a 48-hour period, with total casualties including 330,000 injured and over 24,000 arrested, unquestionably meets the threshold of "large-scale".
Systematic: The crackdown followed explicit orders from Supreme Leader Khamenei ("rioters should be dealt with decisively") and Chief of the Judiciary Mohseni-Ejei ("harshest punishments... without observing any legal leniency"). The coordinated deployment of foreign militias through the Quds Force command structure, synchronized across multiple provinces, demonstrates organization pursuant to policy rather than spontaneous violence.
D. Knowledge of the Attack: Iranian authorities at the highest levels possessed full knowledge of the attack and actively directed its execution. Khamenei's public statements, Mohseni-Ejei's judicial directives, and the Supreme National Security Council's pronouncements establish that leadership knew of and intended the systematic assault on protesters.
Specific Prohibited Acts
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute enumerates specific acts that constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack. The Iranian crackdown involved at least the following prohibited acts:
Murder: The deliberate killing of at least 12,000-20,000 protesters through gunshot wounds to heads and chests, sniper fire, and "finishing shots" on wounded demonstrators constitutes murder on a massive scale.
Extermination: The scale of killings during January 8-9—potentially 12,000-20,000 deaths in 48 hours—meets the threshold for extermination, defined as the intentional infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. Hengaw Organization argued that the massacres constituted the crime of "extermination" under customary international law and the Rome Statute.
Torture: The systematic use of severe physical and psychological violence against detainees, including beatings, falaka, body-locking, sexual violence, and forced confessions, constitutes torture.
Persecution: The targeting of ethnic minorities (Kurds, Lurs, Baluch, Arab Iranians), women, and political dissidents based on their identity and peaceful exercise of rights constitutes persecution on political, ethnic, and gender grounds.
Enforced Disappearance: The systematic practice of arresting protesters and transferring them to secret detention centers where they are held incommunicado without acknowledgment of their detention or disclosure of their fate constitutes enforced disappearance.
Other Inhumane Acts: Hospital attacks, confiscation of bodies, threats against medical personnel, coerced confessions, and preventing families from burying loved ones all constitute "other inhumane acts" causing great suffering or serious injury to physical or mental health.
Iranian authorities announced intentions to bring capital charges of "moharebeh" (waging war against God) against protesters, with prosecutors stating that "several rioters whose actions align with moharebeh will soon be brought before the court". Chief of the Judiciary Mohseni-Ejei ordered judges to expedite trials and show "no leniency" to protesters, effectively suspending fair trial guarantees.
The charge of moharebeh, along with "efsad-fel-arz" (corruption on earth), carries the death penalty under Iran's Islamic Penal Code. Human rights organizations expressed grave concern that the Islamic Republic was "aiming to conduct swift trials without adhering to fair trial standards for those detained during the protests". UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk expressed "deep concern regarding public remarks from certain judicial officials suggesting that the death penalty might be applied to protesters through expedited legal processes".
During the 2022-2023 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests, twelve individuals were executed following similar charges. The precedent established during that crackdown demonstrates that the regime's death penalty threats are not rhetorical but operational.
Iran HRM warned that with over 3,000 detainees held across 195 cities, many in secret detention centers subject to torture and enforced disappearance, the regime had entered a phase of potential mass executions. According to investigations by Iran HRM, the number of detainees facing potential execution had reached 50,000 across 144 cities. The Chief of the Judiciary's explicit order for "mass and rapid" processing of death sentences represented "an explicit order for summary executions".
Between January 5-14, 2026, Iran carried out at least 52 executions of prisoners with prior non-political convictions (murder and drug-related offenses) during the protest period. HRANA reported these executions occurred in at least 42 prisons across multiple provinces. The timing suggested the regime was accelerating its execution apparatus, creating capacity and establishing precedent for potential mass executions of protesters.
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Tehran had halted 800 executions slated for January following warnings from President Trump, though this claim could not be independently verified. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Fox News that Tehran had "no plan to execute protesters", a statement contradicted by the judiciary's public orders for capital charges and expedited trials.
The threat of mass executions represents the culmination of the regime's strategy of political genocide—the physical elimination of the protest generation to prevent future mobilization. Iran HRM warned that hundreds of children and adolescents were at "imminent risk of execution" given Ejei's mandate to issue death sentences without leniency.
VI. International Legal Framework: Crimes Against Humanity
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity Under the Rome Statute
The violence perpetrated against Iranian protesters during January 2026 meets the definitional criteria for crimes against humanity as codified in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as criminal acts "when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack".
Four basic elements must be present to establish crimes against humanity:
A. Attack: The coordinated operations by Iranian security forces and foreign militias constitute an "attack" within the legal meaning. The term encompasses any course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence against a civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy. The January 8-9 massacre, combined with systematic arrests, torture, hospital raids, and death penalty proceedings, constitutes such an attack.
B. Civilians as the Target: The protesters targeted by security forces were overwhelmingly civilians exercising fundamental rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented that security forces used lethal force against "largely peaceful protesters". While isolated incidents of protester violence occurred, the vast majority of demonstrators were unarmed civilians.
C. Widespread and Systematic Character: The attacks were both widespread (large-scale, affecting a high number of victims across extensive geography) and systematic (organized, following a pattern pursuant to policy or plan).
Widespread: The violence occurred across all 31 provinces of Iran, with protests documented in 585 locations across 186 cities. Death toll estimates ranging from 12,000 to 20,000 during a 48-hour period, with total casualties including 330,000 injured and over 24,000 arrested, unquestionably meets the threshold of "large-scale".
Systematic: The crackdown followed explicit orders from Supreme Leader Khamenei ("rioters should be dealt with decisively") and Chief of the Judiciary Mohseni-Ejei ("harshest punishments... without observing any legal leniency"). The coordinated deployment of foreign militias through the Quds Force command structure, synchronized across multiple provinces, demonstrates organization pursuant to policy rather than spontaneous violence.
D. Knowledge of the Attack: Iranian authorities at the highest levels possessed full knowledge of the attack and actively directed its execution. Khamenei's public statements, Mohseni-Ejei's judicial directives, and the Supreme National Security Council's pronouncements establish that leadership knew of and intended the systematic assault on protesters.
Specific Prohibited Acts
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute enumerates specific acts that constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack. The Iranian crackdown involved at least the following prohibited acts:
Murder: The deliberate killing of at least 12,000-20,000 protesters through gunshot wounds to heads and chests, sniper fire, and "finishing shots" on wounded demonstrators constitutes murder on a massive scale.
Extermination: The scale of killings during January 8-9—potentially 12,000-20,000 deaths in 48 hours—meets the threshold for extermination, defined as the intentional infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. Hengaw Organization argued that the massacres constituted the crime of "extermination" under customary international law and the Rome Statute.
Torture: The systematic use of severe physical and psychological violence against detainees, including beatings, falaka, body-locking, sexual violence, and forced confessions, constitutes torture.
Persecution: The targeting of ethnic minorities (Kurds, Lurs, Baluch, Arab Iranians), women, and political dissidents based on their identity and peaceful exercise of rights constitutes persecution on political, ethnic, and gender grounds.
Enforced Disappearance: The systematic practice of arresting protesters and transferring them to secret detention centers where they are held incommunicado without acknowledgment of their detention or disclosure of their fate constitutes enforced disappearance.
Other Inhumane Acts: Hospital attacks, confiscation of bodies, threats against medical personnel, coerced confessions, and preventing families from burying loved ones all constitute "other inhumane acts" causing great suffering or serious injury to physical or mental health.
The Aban Tribunal Precedent
The Aban Tribunal, an independent people's tribunal examining Iran's November 2019 protests, established critical precedent for prosecuting Iranian officials for crimes against humanity. The tribunal's judgment, issued after hearing extensive witness testimony and reviewing documentary evidence, found that the Islamic Republic of Iran and its security forces committed crimes against humanity during the 2019 crackdown.
The tribunal found numerous human rights violations and determined that "the unlawful acts were systematic, widespread in nature, and carried out in a planned manner to eliminate protests". Evidence revealed that snipers were stationed on rooftops to kill civilians, and weapons were used in violation of international law. At least 1,500 people died, with 7,000 detentions, disappearances, torture, and sexual abuse, including of minors.
The Aban Tribunal found that security forces' actions were part of a larger strategy designed to suppress protests, with arbitrary detentions and killings recorded in at least 20 of 31 provinces following a similar pattern across the country. The panel traced these actions back to government orders through insider witness testimony. The tribunal concluded that Iran committed crimes against humanity because attacks on civilians were widespread in nature and systematic.
The 2026 crackdown replicates and exceeds the scale of violence documented in 2019, following virtually identical patterns: sniper deployment, hospital raids, arbitrary arrests, torture, forced confessions, internet blackouts, and direct orders from Khamenei to suppress "rioters" decisively. The Aban Tribunal's findings establish that this represents not isolated incidents but a systematic state policy of crimes against humanity.
The Aban Tribunal, an independent people's tribunal examining Iran's November 2019 protests, established critical precedent for prosecuting Iranian officials for crimes against humanity. The tribunal's judgment, issued after hearing extensive witness testimony and reviewing documentary evidence, found that the Islamic Republic of Iran and its security forces committed crimes against humanity during the 2019 crackdown.
The tribunal found numerous human rights violations and determined that "the unlawful acts were systematic, widespread in nature, and carried out in a planned manner to eliminate protests". Evidence revealed that snipers were stationed on rooftops to kill civilians, and weapons were used in violation of international law. At least 1,500 people died, with 7,000 detentions, disappearances, torture, and sexual abuse, including of minors.
The Aban Tribunal found that security forces' actions were part of a larger strategy designed to suppress protests, with arbitrary detentions and killings recorded in at least 20 of 31 provinces following a similar pattern across the country. The panel traced these actions back to government orders through insider witness testimony. The tribunal concluded that Iran committed crimes against humanity because attacks on civilians were widespread in nature and systematic.
The 2026 crackdown replicates and exceeds the scale of violence documented in 2019, following virtually identical patterns: sniper deployment, hospital raids, arbitrary arrests, torture, forced confessions, internet blackouts, and direct orders from Khamenei to suppress "rioters" decisively. The Aban Tribunal's findings establish that this represents not isolated incidents but a systematic state policy of crimes against humanity.
Command Responsibility and Individual Criminal Liability
Under international criminal law, individuals can be held criminally responsible for crimes against humanity through direct perpetration, ordering, inducing, aiding and abetting, or command responsibility. The chain of command for the January 2026 massacres is well-established:
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei: As commander-in-chief of all armed forces and holder of ultimate authority in the Islamic Republic, Khamenei bears command responsibility for crimes committed by forces under his effective control. His January 3 directive that "rioters should be dealt with decisively" constitutes a direct order that predictably and foreseeably led to mass killings.
Chief of Judiciary Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei: Ejei's order to judges to "issue deterrent sentences and the harshest punishments with maximum decisiveness, without observing any legal leniency" directly facilitated crimes against humanity by suspending due process protections and authorizing summary punishment. His explicit mandate for expedited trials and death sentences places him within the chain of criminal responsibility.
IRGC Commanders and Quds Force Leadership: The commanders who coordinated the deployment of foreign militias and directed the January 8-9 operations bear direct responsibility for ordering and overseeing the massacre. The current Quds Force commander (Soleimani's successor Esmail Ghaani) and senior IRGC leadership exercised command and control over the operations.
Foreign Militia Commanders: The leaders of Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Badr Organization, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainebiyoun Brigade, and Hezbollah units that deployed to Iran bear criminal responsibility for their forces' participation in crimes against humanity.
The doctrine of command responsibility holds superiors criminally liable when they knew or should have known that subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes, and they failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish such conduct. Given the explicit orders from Khamenei and Ejei, the widespread media coverage, and the scale of killing, no superior in the Iranian command structure can credibly claim ignorance.
Under international criminal law, individuals can be held criminally responsible for crimes against humanity through direct perpetration, ordering, inducing, aiding and abetting, or command responsibility. The chain of command for the January 2026 massacres is well-established:
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei: As commander-in-chief of all armed forces and holder of ultimate authority in the Islamic Republic, Khamenei bears command responsibility for crimes committed by forces under his effective control. His January 3 directive that "rioters should be dealt with decisively" constitutes a direct order that predictably and foreseeably led to mass killings.
Chief of Judiciary Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei: Ejei's order to judges to "issue deterrent sentences and the harshest punishments with maximum decisiveness, without observing any legal leniency" directly facilitated crimes against humanity by suspending due process protections and authorizing summary punishment. His explicit mandate for expedited trials and death sentences places him within the chain of criminal responsibility.
IRGC Commanders and Quds Force Leadership: The commanders who coordinated the deployment of foreign militias and directed the January 8-9 operations bear direct responsibility for ordering and overseeing the massacre. The current Quds Force commander (Soleimani's successor Esmail Ghaani) and senior IRGC leadership exercised command and control over the operations.
Foreign Militia Commanders: The leaders of Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Badr Organization, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainebiyoun Brigade, and Hezbollah units that deployed to Iran bear criminal responsibility for their forces' participation in crimes against humanity.
The doctrine of command responsibility holds superiors criminally liable when they knew or should have known that subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes, and they failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish such conduct. Given the explicit orders from Khamenei and Ejei, the widespread media coverage, and the scale of killing, no superior in the Iranian command structure can credibly claim ignorance.
ICC Jurisdiction Challenges and Potential Pathways
Iran is not a party to the Rome Statute and does not recognize the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction. This creates significant obstacles to ICC prosecution, but potential pathways exist:
UN Security Council Referral: Under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council can refer a situation to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation and prosecution. This mechanism was used to refer the situations in Libya and Sudan to the ICC despite those states not being parties to the Rome Statute. However, geopolitical realities make a Security Council referral unlikely, as Russia and China—both permanent members with veto power—maintain strategic relationships with Iran and have historically blocked strong accountability measures.
State Party Referral or Proprio Motu Investigation: If any ICC member state has jurisdiction over Iranian nationals or if crimes were committed on the territory of a state party, the ICC could potentially exercise jurisdiction. Additionally, the ICC Prosecutor can initiate investigations proprio motu (on their own initiative) if there is reasonable basis to believe crimes within the Court's jurisdiction have been committed.
Article 12(3) Declaration: Non-member states can accept the ICC's jurisdiction under Article 12(3) with respect to a specific situation. While Iran accepting ICC jurisdiction voluntarily is extremely unlikely, this mechanism theoretically provides a pathway.
Universal Jurisdiction: Many countries exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, allowing domestic courts to prosecute perpetrators regardless of where crimes occurred or the nationality of victims. European countries including Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden have active universal jurisdiction mechanisms. Iranian officials traveling internationally could face arrest and prosecution under universal jurisdiction principles.
The Aban Tribunal recommended that the UN Security Council refer the Iranian situation to the ICC and that concerned governments pursue universal jurisdiction prosecutions. These recommendations apply with even greater urgency to the 2026 massacres given their larger scale.
VII. International Response and Accountability Mechanisms
United Nations Security Council Emergency Session
On January 15-16, 2026, the UN Security Council convened an emergency session to address the deadly protests in Iran, at the request of the United States. The meeting provided a forum for international condemnation but produced no binding resolution or concrete enforcement mechanism—a familiar pattern reflecting the geopolitical constraints on Security Council action regarding Iran.
US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz condemned the Iranian government's handling of protests, emphasizing that the ongoing internet blackout hampered assessment of the true scope of authorities' response. Waltz stated that "the citizens of Iran are demanding their freedom more than ever during the harsh history of the Islamic Republic," and that the government's characterization of protests as "foreign conspiracy" indicated the regime's fear of its own populace. Controversially, Waltz threatened military force, stating that "all options are on the table".
Iranian Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Gholamhossein Darzi responded that Iran "seeks neither escalation nor confrontation. However, any act of aggression, direct or indirect, will be met with a decisive, proportionate, and lawful response under Article 51 of the (UN) Charter". He accused the United States of playing a "direct role in inciting unrest within Iran".
UN Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee provided an update noting that "popular protests" rapidly escalated into widespread turmoil leading to considerable loss of life since December 28, 2025. She reported that human rights watchdogs estimated over 18,000 detainees by mid-January, though the UN could not confirm these numbers. Pobee urged Iran to ensure humane treatment of detainees, cease executions connected to protests, and conduct prompt, independent, transparent investigations into all fatalities.
Iranian-American journalist and critic Masih Alinejad addressed the council, urging immediate and tangible action to deliver justice for the massacres, personally telling Iranian representatives: "You have attempted to kill me three times… My crime? Simply voicing the plight of innocent people whom you murder".
The Security Council session raised international attention but achieved no binding accountability measures. Russia and China's positions as permanent members with veto power, combined with their strategic interests in maintaining relations with Iran, prevented any resolution mandating consequences for the regime's actions.
Iran is not a party to the Rome Statute and does not recognize the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction. This creates significant obstacles to ICC prosecution, but potential pathways exist:
UN Security Council Referral: Under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council can refer a situation to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation and prosecution. This mechanism was used to refer the situations in Libya and Sudan to the ICC despite those states not being parties to the Rome Statute. However, geopolitical realities make a Security Council referral unlikely, as Russia and China—both permanent members with veto power—maintain strategic relationships with Iran and have historically blocked strong accountability measures.
State Party Referral or Proprio Motu Investigation: If any ICC member state has jurisdiction over Iranian nationals or if crimes were committed on the territory of a state party, the ICC could potentially exercise jurisdiction. Additionally, the ICC Prosecutor can initiate investigations proprio motu (on their own initiative) if there is reasonable basis to believe crimes within the Court's jurisdiction have been committed.
Article 12(3) Declaration: Non-member states can accept the ICC's jurisdiction under Article 12(3) with respect to a specific situation. While Iran accepting ICC jurisdiction voluntarily is extremely unlikely, this mechanism theoretically provides a pathway.
Universal Jurisdiction: Many countries exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, allowing domestic courts to prosecute perpetrators regardless of where crimes occurred or the nationality of victims. European countries including Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden have active universal jurisdiction mechanisms. Iranian officials traveling internationally could face arrest and prosecution under universal jurisdiction principles.
The Aban Tribunal recommended that the UN Security Council refer the Iranian situation to the ICC and that concerned governments pursue universal jurisdiction prosecutions. These recommendations apply with even greater urgency to the 2026 massacres given their larger scale.
VII. International Response and Accountability Mechanisms
United Nations Security Council Emergency Session
On January 15-16, 2026, the UN Security Council convened an emergency session to address the deadly protests in Iran, at the request of the United States. The meeting provided a forum for international condemnation but produced no binding resolution or concrete enforcement mechanism—a familiar pattern reflecting the geopolitical constraints on Security Council action regarding Iran.
US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz condemned the Iranian government's handling of protests, emphasizing that the ongoing internet blackout hampered assessment of the true scope of authorities' response. Waltz stated that "the citizens of Iran are demanding their freedom more than ever during the harsh history of the Islamic Republic," and that the government's characterization of protests as "foreign conspiracy" indicated the regime's fear of its own populace. Controversially, Waltz threatened military force, stating that "all options are on the table".
Iranian Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Gholamhossein Darzi responded that Iran "seeks neither escalation nor confrontation. However, any act of aggression, direct or indirect, will be met with a decisive, proportionate, and lawful response under Article 51 of the (UN) Charter". He accused the United States of playing a "direct role in inciting unrest within Iran".
UN Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee provided an update noting that "popular protests" rapidly escalated into widespread turmoil leading to considerable loss of life since December 28, 2025. She reported that human rights watchdogs estimated over 18,000 detainees by mid-January, though the UN could not confirm these numbers. Pobee urged Iran to ensure humane treatment of detainees, cease executions connected to protests, and conduct prompt, independent, transparent investigations into all fatalities.
Iranian-American journalist and critic Masih Alinejad addressed the council, urging immediate and tangible action to deliver justice for the massacres, personally telling Iranian representatives: "You have attempted to kill me three times… My crime? Simply voicing the plight of innocent people whom you murder".
The Security Council session raised international attention but achieved no binding accountability measures. Russia and China's positions as permanent members with veto power, combined with their strategic interests in maintaining relations with Iran, prevented any resolution mandating consequences for the regime's actions.
UN Human Rights Council Special Session Calls
Multiple UN member states and civil society organizations urgently called for the Human Rights Council to convene a special session to address the unprecedented escalation in mass unlawful killings of protesters. On January 16, Britain, Germany, Iceland, Moldova, and North Macedonia submitted a formal letter to the council president requesting an emergency session, citing "credible reports of alarming violence, crackdowns on protesters and violations of international human rights law across the country".
The request required backing from at least one-third of the Human Rights Council's 47 members to proceed. Civil society organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and dozens of other groups signed joint letters urging member states to support the special session.
The proposed special session aimed to: (1) extend the mandate of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran to enable continued investigations into the lethal repression, (2) renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, (3) ensure the Fact-Finding Mission had adequate resources to carry out urgent inquiries, and (4) affirm the rights of Iranians to freedoms of opinion, expression, association, and peaceful assembly.
Civil society organizations emphasized that "the repeated commission of grave human rights violations and crimes under international law, including during successive waves of protests in Iran, has been made possible by the entrenched and systemic impunity for those responsible for these crimes". They argued that "the lack of criminal accountability has emboldened Iranian officials to persist in their criminal conduct and deliberately turn to mass killings of protesters demanding human rights and dignity".
The calls for a special session reflected growing recognition that only sustained international pressure, documentation, and accountability mechanisms could potentially deter future atrocities and preserve evidence for eventual prosecution.
European Response: Sanctions and Diplomatic Pressure
European nations mounted a coordinated diplomatic response, with multiple countries summoning Iranian ambassadors to demand accountability and respect for fundamental rights.
United Kingdom: Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper summoned the Iranian ambassador to demand Tehran "answer for the horrific reports" about violence and killings. She announced plans to enforce "full and further sanctions" against Iran targeting finance, energy, transport, software, and other sectors. Cooper condemned "in the strongest terms the horrific and brutal killings of Iranian protesters" and demanded Iranian authorities uphold fundamental rights.
France, Germany, and Joint E3 Statement: France, the United Kingdom, and Germany issued a joint leaders' declaration on January 9, 2026, expressing deep concern about violence by Iranian security forces and strongly condemning the killing of protesters. The three countries stated: "The Iranian authorities have the responsibility to protect their own population and must allow for the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly without fear of reprisal. We urge the Iranian authorities to exercise restraint, to refrain from violence, and to uphold the fundamental rights of Iran's citizens".
Germany summoned the Iranian ambassador to protest the violent crackdown, with Chancellor Friedrich Merz predicting that the regime was living through its "final days and weeks".
France summoned the Iranian envoy, with the Foreign Ministry condemning "in the strongest terms the state violence inflicted indiscriminately on peaceful demonstrators".
Italy: Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani summoned Iranian ambassador Mohammad Reza Sabouri, stating that the "extremely high price" in blood being paid by protesters was "absolutely unacceptable".
European Union: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the rising casualties were "horrifying," unequivocally condemning "the excessive use of force and continued restriction of freedom". EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas announced she would swiftly propose additional sanctions on those responsible for repression.
The proposed EU sanctions would fall under the bloc's human rights sanctions regime against Iran, adding to extensive travel bans and asset freezes already in place. The EU had previously sanctioned Iran over serious human rights violations, nuclear proliferation activities, and military support for Russia.
Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Finland, Belgium: Additional European nations summoned Iranian envoys to express shock and demand accountability.
The coordinated European response demonstrated diplomatic unity but faced inherent limitations. Economic sanctions, while symbolically significant, have limited practical impact on a regime already facing extensive international isolation. The inability to compel behavioral change through sanctions alone underscores the need for complementary accountability mechanisms including criminal prosecutions.
Multiple UN member states and civil society organizations urgently called for the Human Rights Council to convene a special session to address the unprecedented escalation in mass unlawful killings of protesters. On January 16, Britain, Germany, Iceland, Moldova, and North Macedonia submitted a formal letter to the council president requesting an emergency session, citing "credible reports of alarming violence, crackdowns on protesters and violations of international human rights law across the country".
The request required backing from at least one-third of the Human Rights Council's 47 members to proceed. Civil society organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and dozens of other groups signed joint letters urging member states to support the special session.
The proposed special session aimed to: (1) extend the mandate of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran to enable continued investigations into the lethal repression, (2) renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, (3) ensure the Fact-Finding Mission had adequate resources to carry out urgent inquiries, and (4) affirm the rights of Iranians to freedoms of opinion, expression, association, and peaceful assembly.
Civil society organizations emphasized that "the repeated commission of grave human rights violations and crimes under international law, including during successive waves of protests in Iran, has been made possible by the entrenched and systemic impunity for those responsible for these crimes". They argued that "the lack of criminal accountability has emboldened Iranian officials to persist in their criminal conduct and deliberately turn to mass killings of protesters demanding human rights and dignity".
The calls for a special session reflected growing recognition that only sustained international pressure, documentation, and accountability mechanisms could potentially deter future atrocities and preserve evidence for eventual prosecution.
European Response: Sanctions and Diplomatic Pressure
European nations mounted a coordinated diplomatic response, with multiple countries summoning Iranian ambassadors to demand accountability and respect for fundamental rights.
United Kingdom: Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper summoned the Iranian ambassador to demand Tehran "answer for the horrific reports" about violence and killings. She announced plans to enforce "full and further sanctions" against Iran targeting finance, energy, transport, software, and other sectors. Cooper condemned "in the strongest terms the horrific and brutal killings of Iranian protesters" and demanded Iranian authorities uphold fundamental rights.
France, Germany, and Joint E3 Statement: France, the United Kingdom, and Germany issued a joint leaders' declaration on January 9, 2026, expressing deep concern about violence by Iranian security forces and strongly condemning the killing of protesters. The three countries stated: "The Iranian authorities have the responsibility to protect their own population and must allow for the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly without fear of reprisal. We urge the Iranian authorities to exercise restraint, to refrain from violence, and to uphold the fundamental rights of Iran's citizens".
Germany summoned the Iranian ambassador to protest the violent crackdown, with Chancellor Friedrich Merz predicting that the regime was living through its "final days and weeks".
France summoned the Iranian envoy, with the Foreign Ministry condemning "in the strongest terms the state violence inflicted indiscriminately on peaceful demonstrators".
Italy: Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani summoned Iranian ambassador Mohammad Reza Sabouri, stating that the "extremely high price" in blood being paid by protesters was "absolutely unacceptable".
European Union: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the rising casualties were "horrifying," unequivocally condemning "the excessive use of force and continued restriction of freedom". EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas announced she would swiftly propose additional sanctions on those responsible for repression.
The proposed EU sanctions would fall under the bloc's human rights sanctions regime against Iran, adding to extensive travel bans and asset freezes already in place. The EU had previously sanctioned Iran over serious human rights violations, nuclear proliferation activities, and military support for Russia.
Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Finland, Belgium: Additional European nations summoned Iranian envoys to express shock and demand accountability.
The coordinated European response demonstrated diplomatic unity but faced inherent limitations. Economic sanctions, while symbolically significant, have limited practical impact on a regime already facing extensive international isolation. The inability to compel behavioral change through sanctions alone underscores the need for complementary accountability mechanisms including criminal prosecutions.
United States Sanctions and Policy
The United States imposed sanctions on Iranian officials including an aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and others deemed responsible for the crackdown. The sanctions were part of a broader package targeting senior Iranian officials and entities accused of involvement in violent suppression.
President Donald Trump made controversial statements regarding potential military intervention, initially warning Iran and stating "help is on the way" to protesters. Trump later claimed, citing unspecified sources, that plans for executions in Iran had stopped and that he had it "on good authority" that the killing of protesters had ceased. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Tehran had halted 800 executions slated after warnings from Trump, though these claims could not be independently verified and contradicted available evidence of ongoing repression.
The U.S. State Department's Persian-language account expressed alarm at reports that the Islamic Republic regime deployed "Hezbollah terrorists and Iraqi militants to suppress peaceful protests," stating that "this regime has spent billions of dollars belonging to the Iranian people on terrorist proxy forces. Deploying those forces against its own citizens would be yet another profound betrayal of the Iranian people".
Trump also announced a 25% import tariff on countries conducting business with Iran, seeking to escalate economic pressure.
The United States imposed sanctions on Iranian officials including an aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and others deemed responsible for the crackdown. The sanctions were part of a broader package targeting senior Iranian officials and entities accused of involvement in violent suppression.
President Donald Trump made controversial statements regarding potential military intervention, initially warning Iran and stating "help is on the way" to protesters. Trump later claimed, citing unspecified sources, that plans for executions in Iran had stopped and that he had it "on good authority" that the killing of protesters had ceased. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Tehran had halted 800 executions slated after warnings from Trump, though these claims could not be independently verified and contradicted available evidence of ongoing repression.
The U.S. State Department's Persian-language account expressed alarm at reports that the Islamic Republic regime deployed "Hezbollah terrorists and Iraqi militants to suppress peaceful protests," stating that "this regime has spent billions of dollars belonging to the Iranian people on terrorist proxy forces. Deploying those forces against its own citizens would be yet another profound betrayal of the Iranian people".
Trump also announced a 25% import tariff on countries conducting business with Iran, seeking to escalate economic pressure.
Documentation and Evidence Preservation
International human rights organizations undertook critical work documenting violations and preserving evidence for future accountability proceedings:
Human Rights Watch reviewed video evidence, verified footage from morgues and hospitals, collected witness accounts, and published detailed reports on the lethal crackdown. The organization's methodical documentation provides critical evidentiary foundation for potential criminal prosecutions.
Amnesty International gathered verified videos and credible information from eyewitnesses, analyzed patterns of violence, and issued urgent calls for global diplomatic action. Amnesty's video verification capabilities helped establish facts despite the internet blackout.
Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) maintained running tallies of confirmed deaths, arrests, and human rights violations despite severe restrictions on information. As of January 18, HRANA confirmed 3,308 deaths with an additional 4,382 cases under investigation.
Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) documented 3,428 total protester deaths from December 28 to January 12, most under age 30. The organization worked to verify the higher estimates of 12,000-20,000 deaths reported by Iran International and CBS News.
Iran Human Rights Monitor (Iran HRM) compiled evidence from hospitals, cemeteries, and credible sources in 195 cities, confirming death toll surpassing 3,000 by January 11. The organization provided detailed analysis of the legal framework for classifying violations as crimes against humanity.
Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Iran: The UN-established mission continued investigations into ongoing repression, providing official UN documentation of violations. Civil society organizations called for extending the mission's mandate and ensuring adequate resources.
This documentation work serves multiple functions: establishing factual record despite regime obfuscation, providing evidentiary basis for international advocacy, creating accountability through transparency, and preserving evidence for future criminal proceedings under universal jurisdiction or potential ICC investigation.
International human rights organizations undertook critical work documenting violations and preserving evidence for future accountability proceedings:
Human Rights Watch reviewed video evidence, verified footage from morgues and hospitals, collected witness accounts, and published detailed reports on the lethal crackdown. The organization's methodical documentation provides critical evidentiary foundation for potential criminal prosecutions.
Amnesty International gathered verified videos and credible information from eyewitnesses, analyzed patterns of violence, and issued urgent calls for global diplomatic action. Amnesty's video verification capabilities helped establish facts despite the internet blackout.
Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) maintained running tallies of confirmed deaths, arrests, and human rights violations despite severe restrictions on information. As of January 18, HRANA confirmed 3,308 deaths with an additional 4,382 cases under investigation.
Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) documented 3,428 total protester deaths from December 28 to January 12, most under age 30. The organization worked to verify the higher estimates of 12,000-20,000 deaths reported by Iran International and CBS News.
Iran Human Rights Monitor (Iran HRM) compiled evidence from hospitals, cemeteries, and credible sources in 195 cities, confirming death toll surpassing 3,000 by January 11. The organization provided detailed analysis of the legal framework for classifying violations as crimes against humanity.
Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Iran: The UN-established mission continued investigations into ongoing repression, providing official UN documentation of violations. Civil society organizations called for extending the mission's mandate and ensuring adequate resources.
This documentation work serves multiple functions: establishing factual record despite regime obfuscation, providing evidentiary basis for international advocacy, creating accountability through transparency, and preserving evidence for future criminal proceedings under universal jurisdiction or potential ICC investigation.
VIII. Conclusion: Strategic Implications and Long-Term Consequences
The Normalization of Transnational Repression
The deployment of foreign militias to suppress Iranian protesters represents a dangerous precedent with implications extending far beyond Iran's borders. By demonstrating that authoritarian regimes can effectively outsource domestic repression to foreign proxy forces, the Islamic Republic has provided a template that other embattled governments may seek to replicate.
This model offers several advantages for regimes facing legitimacy crises: it circumvents domestic security forces' potential reluctance to kill fellow citizens; it provides combat-experienced fighters desensitized to violence; it maintains plausible deniability through the use of non-state actors; and it leverages ideological networks (in this case, Shia religious solidarity) to mobilize fighters willing to suppress foreign populations.
The Iraqi militia infrastructure Iran has cultivated over four decades—initially for external power projection in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—has now been turned inward against the Iranian people themselves. This represents the ultimate betrayal of the "Axis of Resistance" ideology, revealing that the network exists primarily to preserve clerical rule in Tehran rather than to advance any broader emancipatory project.
The willingness of Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani, and Lebanese fighters to kill Iranian civilians for modest financial compensation demonstrates the commodification of violence in the region. With monthly payments of approximately $600, the regime purchased the services of thousands willing to commit mass atrocities. This mercenary dimension of the repression apparatus creates a self-sustaining cycle where economically marginalized populations provide manpower for authoritarian violence, which in turn perpetuates the regional instability that generates refugee flows and economic desperation.
The Normalization of Transnational Repression
The deployment of foreign militias to suppress Iranian protesters represents a dangerous precedent with implications extending far beyond Iran's borders. By demonstrating that authoritarian regimes can effectively outsource domestic repression to foreign proxy forces, the Islamic Republic has provided a template that other embattled governments may seek to replicate.
This model offers several advantages for regimes facing legitimacy crises: it circumvents domestic security forces' potential reluctance to kill fellow citizens; it provides combat-experienced fighters desensitized to violence; it maintains plausible deniability through the use of non-state actors; and it leverages ideological networks (in this case, Shia religious solidarity) to mobilize fighters willing to suppress foreign populations.
The Iraqi militia infrastructure Iran has cultivated over four decades—initially for external power projection in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—has now been turned inward against the Iranian people themselves. This represents the ultimate betrayal of the "Axis of Resistance" ideology, revealing that the network exists primarily to preserve clerical rule in Tehran rather than to advance any broader emancipatory project.
The willingness of Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani, and Lebanese fighters to kill Iranian civilians for modest financial compensation demonstrates the commodification of violence in the region. With monthly payments of approximately $600, the regime purchased the services of thousands willing to commit mass atrocities. This mercenary dimension of the repression apparatus creates a self-sustaining cycle where economically marginalized populations provide manpower for authoritarian violence, which in turn perpetuates the regional instability that generates refugee flows and economic desperation.
Fractures in the Repression Architecture
The very fact that Iran felt compelled to import foreign fighters reveals profound vulnerabilities in the regime's domestic control mechanisms. Reports of Iranian security personnel refusing orders to fire on protesters and subsequently being arrested indicate that the regime can no longer fully rely on its own forces. This represents a potentially fatal crack in the authoritarian consensus.
Historically, authoritarian regimes collapse when security forces defect en masse or refuse orders to shoot civilians. The Romanian Revolution of 1989, the Philippine People Power Revolution of 1986, and the Tunisian Revolution of 2011 all featured decisive moments when security forces declined to fire on protesters or actively switched sides. The Iranian regime's resort to foreign militias suggests awareness of this vulnerability and an attempt to insulate against it by employing fighters with no stakes in Iranian society.
However, this strategy carries its own risks. The presence of Arabic-speaking foreign fighters killing Iranians has inflamed nationalist sentiment and may ultimately accelerate rather than prevent regime collapse. The cognitive dissonance of a government claiming to represent Islamic and Iranian values while using Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani forces to slaughter its own population undermines residual legitimacy.
Moreover, the operational deployment of foreign militias creates dependencies that the regime cannot easily reverse. Having demonstrated reliance on external forces for internal security, the regime signals weakness to domestic audiences, regional adversaries, and potential defectors within its own ranks. The Iraqi militias, for their part, have gained leverage over Tehran, with their leaders understanding that the Islamic Republic's survival may depend on continued militia support—a dynamic that could be exploited for political concessions.
The very fact that Iran felt compelled to import foreign fighters reveals profound vulnerabilities in the regime's domestic control mechanisms. Reports of Iranian security personnel refusing orders to fire on protesters and subsequently being arrested indicate that the regime can no longer fully rely on its own forces. This represents a potentially fatal crack in the authoritarian consensus.
Historically, authoritarian regimes collapse when security forces defect en masse or refuse orders to shoot civilians. The Romanian Revolution of 1989, the Philippine People Power Revolution of 1986, and the Tunisian Revolution of 2011 all featured decisive moments when security forces declined to fire on protesters or actively switched sides. The Iranian regime's resort to foreign militias suggests awareness of this vulnerability and an attempt to insulate against it by employing fighters with no stakes in Iranian society.
However, this strategy carries its own risks. The presence of Arabic-speaking foreign fighters killing Iranians has inflamed nationalist sentiment and may ultimately accelerate rather than prevent regime collapse. The cognitive dissonance of a government claiming to represent Islamic and Iranian values while using Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani forces to slaughter its own population undermines residual legitimacy.
Moreover, the operational deployment of foreign militias creates dependencies that the regime cannot easily reverse. Having demonstrated reliance on external forces for internal security, the regime signals weakness to domestic audiences, regional adversaries, and potential defectors within its own ranks. The Iraqi militias, for their part, have gained leverage over Tehran, with their leaders understanding that the Islamic Republic's survival may depend on continued militia support—a dynamic that could be exploited for political concessions.
The Humanitarian Catastrophe and Generational Trauma
The scale of violence perpetrated during January 2026 will produce cascading humanitarian consequences for decades. With estimates of 12,000-20,000 killed, 330,000 injured, and over 24,000 arrested, an entire generation of Iranians has experienced or witnessed atrocities that will shape political consciousness for decades.
The psychological trauma extends beyond direct victims to encompass families, communities, and the broader society. Every person killed represents dozens of family members and friends traumatized by loss. Every person tortured carries physical and psychological scars that affect their capacity for normal functioning. Every person who witnessed violence experiences secondary trauma.
The arrest and torture of hundreds of children—some as young as 14—represents a particularly cruel dimension of the repression. These children face lifelong consequences including interrupted education, developmental trauma, stigmatization, and elevated risks of mental health disorders. The regime's willingness to systematically arrest, torture, and threaten execution of minors demonstrates a complete abandonment of civilizational norms.
The medical community has been traumatized by hospital attacks, threats against healthcare workers, and the moral injury of being unable to provide care to injured protesters. Doctors and nurses who witnessed security forces killing wounded patients or who were forced to surrender injured protesters will carry these experiences indefinitely.
The scale of violence perpetrated during January 2026 will produce cascading humanitarian consequences for decades. With estimates of 12,000-20,000 killed, 330,000 injured, and over 24,000 arrested, an entire generation of Iranians has experienced or witnessed atrocities that will shape political consciousness for decades.
The psychological trauma extends beyond direct victims to encompass families, communities, and the broader society. Every person killed represents dozens of family members and friends traumatized by loss. Every person tortured carries physical and psychological scars that affect their capacity for normal functioning. Every person who witnessed violence experiences secondary trauma.
The arrest and torture of hundreds of children—some as young as 14—represents a particularly cruel dimension of the repression. These children face lifelong consequences including interrupted education, developmental trauma, stigmatization, and elevated risks of mental health disorders. The regime's willingness to systematically arrest, torture, and threaten execution of minors demonstrates a complete abandonment of civilizational norms.
The medical community has been traumatized by hospital attacks, threats against healthcare workers, and the moral injury of being unable to provide care to injured protesters. Doctors and nurses who witnessed security forces killing wounded patients or who were forced to surrender injured protesters will carry these experiences indefinitely.
The Failure of International Accountability
The international community's response to the January 2026 massacres—strongly worded statements, modest sanctions, emergency meetings producing no binding outcomes—exemplifies the structural failures of the international system in preventing or punishing mass atrocities. The pattern is depressingly familiar: authoritarian regimes commit crimes against humanity; international organizations condemn the violence; diplomatic processes stall in the face of geopolitical vetoes; and perpetrators face no meaningful consequences.
The UN Security Council's emergency session achieved nothing beyond raising attention, with no resolution, no enforcement mechanism, and no accountability mandate. Russia and China's willingness to shield Iran from consequences reflects a broader erosion of the post-World War II international legal order designed to prevent such atrocities.
The calls for a Human Rights Council special session, while important for documentation and maintaining pressure, similarly face limitations. Even if convened, such a session would produce recommendations and documentation but no binding enforcement, leaving the regime free to continue repression with impunity.
Economic sanctions, the primary tool of Western response, have demonstrable limits. Decades of sanctions against Iran have failed to compel behavioral change on nuclear issues, regional proxy activities, or human rights violations. Additional sanctions may impose marginal costs but will not fundamentally alter regime calculations, particularly when the regime's survival depends on maintaining power through violence.
The ICC's inability to exercise jurisdiction over Iran due to its non-party status exemplifies the court's structural limitations. Without Security Council referral (impossible due to Russian and Chinese vetoes) or Iranian acceptance of jurisdiction (inconceivable), the court cannot investigate or prosecute, no matter how egregious the crimes.
This accountability deficit creates moral hazard, signaling to authoritarian regimes that mass killings of civilians entail minimal international consequences. The Islamic Republic observed that its November 2019 massacre of 1,500 protesters produced no meaningful punishment. The 2026 massacres, involving an order of magnitude more deaths, similarly appear likely to result in impunity for perpetrators.
The international community's response to the January 2026 massacres—strongly worded statements, modest sanctions, emergency meetings producing no binding outcomes—exemplifies the structural failures of the international system in preventing or punishing mass atrocities. The pattern is depressingly familiar: authoritarian regimes commit crimes against humanity; international organizations condemn the violence; diplomatic processes stall in the face of geopolitical vetoes; and perpetrators face no meaningful consequences.
The UN Security Council's emergency session achieved nothing beyond raising attention, with no resolution, no enforcement mechanism, and no accountability mandate. Russia and China's willingness to shield Iran from consequences reflects a broader erosion of the post-World War II international legal order designed to prevent such atrocities.
The calls for a Human Rights Council special session, while important for documentation and maintaining pressure, similarly face limitations. Even if convened, such a session would produce recommendations and documentation but no binding enforcement, leaving the regime free to continue repression with impunity.
Economic sanctions, the primary tool of Western response, have demonstrable limits. Decades of sanctions against Iran have failed to compel behavioral change on nuclear issues, regional proxy activities, or human rights violations. Additional sanctions may impose marginal costs but will not fundamentally alter regime calculations, particularly when the regime's survival depends on maintaining power through violence.
The ICC's inability to exercise jurisdiction over Iran due to its non-party status exemplifies the court's structural limitations. Without Security Council referral (impossible due to Russian and Chinese vetoes) or Iranian acceptance of jurisdiction (inconceivable), the court cannot investigate or prosecute, no matter how egregious the crimes.
This accountability deficit creates moral hazard, signaling to authoritarian regimes that mass killings of civilians entail minimal international consequences. The Islamic Republic observed that its November 2019 massacre of 1,500 protesters produced no meaningful punishment. The 2026 massacres, involving an order of magnitude more deaths, similarly appear likely to result in impunity for perpetrators.
Potential Pathways to Justice
Despite systemic obstacles, several mechanisms could potentially deliver accountability:
Universal Jurisdiction Prosecutions: European countries with robust universal jurisdiction frameworks could issue arrest warrants and prosecute Iranian officials if they travel internationally. This approach has achieved limited success in other contexts, including prosecutions of Syrian regime officials in Germany. Targeted prosecutions of specific perpetrators, while not addressing the full scale of criminality, could chip away at impunity.
Documentation for Future Justice: The meticulous work by human rights organizations to document violations, preserve evidence, and catalog perpetrators creates an evidentiary foundation that could support prosecutions if political circumstances change. Historical precedent shows that even when immediate justice is impossible, preserved evidence can enable accountability decades later—as occurred with prosecutions of Khmer Rouge leaders 30 years after Cambodia's genocide.
Domestic Transitional Justice: If Iran eventually transitions to democratic governance, a future government could establish domestic tribunals, truth commissions, or reparations programs to address the January 2026 massacres. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Argentina's trials of junta members, and Tunisia's transitional justice mechanisms provide models. The challenge is maintaining evidence and documentation over potentially long periods before political transition occurs.
Targeted Sanctions on Specific Perpetrators: While comprehensive sanctions have limited effectiveness, targeted sanctions on specific individuals responsible for massacres—freezing assets, travel bans, diplomatic isolation—can impose personal consequences and stigmatize perpetrators. The EU and U.S. should identify and sanction every Iraqi militia commander, IRGC officer, and Quds Force operative involved in the January 8-9 operations.
International Isolation of Militia Groups: The Iraqi PMF factions that deployed to Iran should face comprehensive international sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and designation as terrorist organizations. Kataib Hezbollah already holds such designation, but Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Badr Organization have escaped similar treatment. Comprehensive designations would raise the costs of participating in transnational repression.
Despite systemic obstacles, several mechanisms could potentially deliver accountability:
Universal Jurisdiction Prosecutions: European countries with robust universal jurisdiction frameworks could issue arrest warrants and prosecute Iranian officials if they travel internationally. This approach has achieved limited success in other contexts, including prosecutions of Syrian regime officials in Germany. Targeted prosecutions of specific perpetrators, while not addressing the full scale of criminality, could chip away at impunity.
Documentation for Future Justice: The meticulous work by human rights organizations to document violations, preserve evidence, and catalog perpetrators creates an evidentiary foundation that could support prosecutions if political circumstances change. Historical precedent shows that even when immediate justice is impossible, preserved evidence can enable accountability decades later—as occurred with prosecutions of Khmer Rouge leaders 30 years after Cambodia's genocide.
Domestic Transitional Justice: If Iran eventually transitions to democratic governance, a future government could establish domestic tribunals, truth commissions, or reparations programs to address the January 2026 massacres. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Argentina's trials of junta members, and Tunisia's transitional justice mechanisms provide models. The challenge is maintaining evidence and documentation over potentially long periods before political transition occurs.
Targeted Sanctions on Specific Perpetrators: While comprehensive sanctions have limited effectiveness, targeted sanctions on specific individuals responsible for massacres—freezing assets, travel bans, diplomatic isolation—can impose personal consequences and stigmatize perpetrators. The EU and U.S. should identify and sanction every Iraqi militia commander, IRGC officer, and Quds Force operative involved in the January 8-9 operations.
International Isolation of Militia Groups: The Iraqi PMF factions that deployed to Iran should face comprehensive international sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and designation as terrorist organizations. Kataib Hezbollah already holds such designation, but Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Badr Organization have escaped similar treatment. Comprehensive designations would raise the costs of participating in transnational repression.
The Endgame: Regime Vulnerability and Potential Collapse
Despite the immediate success of brutal repression in temporarily suppressing protests, the Islamic Republic's deployment of foreign militias reveals fundamental vulnerability. Regimes that must kill their own citizens by the thousands to maintain power have lost legitimacy and operate on borrowed time.
The protests that began on December 28, 2025, stemmed from economic grievances—inflation, currency collapse, deteriorating living conditions. These structural problems have not been solved by killing protesters; if anything, the economic costs of the crackdown, combined with international sanctions and capital flight, will exacerbate the underlying conditions that sparked demonstrations.
The regime faces a deepening crisis of legitimacy across multiple dimensions: economic failure as oil revenues decline and mismanagement continues; social alienation as younger generations reject clerical rule; ethnic tensions as minorities face systematic repression; gender conflict as women resist mandatory hijab and patriarchal restrictions; and geopolitical isolation as regional influence contracts following military losses to Israel.
The deployment of foreign militias, rather than solving these problems, compounds them by adding nationalist grievance to the existing catalogue of complaints. The image of Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani fighters killing Iranians on Iranian soil for money will resonate in political discourse for generations, further delegitimizing the regime's claim to represent Iranian interests.
Demographic trends favor regime opponents. Approximately 70% of Iran's population is under age 40, having no memory of the 1979 revolution that brought clerics to power. This generation has grown up under economic stagnation, political repression, and international isolation, giving them no stake in the system's preservation. The arrests and killings of thousands from this generation will radicalize rather than intimidate their peers.
The question is not whether the Islamic Republic will eventually fall—the trajectory of legitimacy erosion, economic decline, and social alienation points toward inevitable collapse. The question is how long the regime can sustain itself through violence, what costs will be imposed on the Iranian people during this terminal period, and whether the international community will provide meaningful support for transition or continue its pattern of passive observation.
Despite the immediate success of brutal repression in temporarily suppressing protests, the Islamic Republic's deployment of foreign militias reveals fundamental vulnerability. Regimes that must kill their own citizens by the thousands to maintain power have lost legitimacy and operate on borrowed time.
The protests that began on December 28, 2025, stemmed from economic grievances—inflation, currency collapse, deteriorating living conditions. These structural problems have not been solved by killing protesters; if anything, the economic costs of the crackdown, combined with international sanctions and capital flight, will exacerbate the underlying conditions that sparked demonstrations.
The regime faces a deepening crisis of legitimacy across multiple dimensions: economic failure as oil revenues decline and mismanagement continues; social alienation as younger generations reject clerical rule; ethnic tensions as minorities face systematic repression; gender conflict as women resist mandatory hijab and patriarchal restrictions; and geopolitical isolation as regional influence contracts following military losses to Israel.
The deployment of foreign militias, rather than solving these problems, compounds them by adding nationalist grievance to the existing catalogue of complaints. The image of Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani fighters killing Iranians on Iranian soil for money will resonate in political discourse for generations, further delegitimizing the regime's claim to represent Iranian interests.
Demographic trends favor regime opponents. Approximately 70% of Iran's population is under age 40, having no memory of the 1979 revolution that brought clerics to power. This generation has grown up under economic stagnation, political repression, and international isolation, giving them no stake in the system's preservation. The arrests and killings of thousands from this generation will radicalize rather than intimidate their peers.
The question is not whether the Islamic Republic will eventually fall—the trajectory of legitimacy erosion, economic decline, and social alienation points toward inevitable collapse. The question is how long the regime can sustain itself through violence, what costs will be imposed on the Iranian people during this terminal period, and whether the international community will provide meaningful support for transition or continue its pattern of passive observation.
Moral Reckoning
The deployment of foreign Shia militias to massacre Iranian protesters represents one of the most severe betrayals of human dignity in recent history. That thousands of people—teenagers, mothers, workers, students—were shot in the head by foreign fighters imported specifically to kill them because their own government believed domestic security forces might refuse to do so, defies moral comprehension.
The world's failure to prevent or even adequately respond to this atrocity implicates not just the direct perpetrators but the international system that proves incapable of protecting vulnerable populations from state violence. The phrase "never again," repeated after each historical atrocity, rings hollow when contemporary massacres proceed with impunity.
For the Iranian people, the message is clear: you are on your own. No cavalry is coming. The United Nations will hold meetings. Western governments will issue statements. Human rights organizations will document your suffering. But when your government imports foreign militias to shoot you in the head for demanding basic rights, the international community will watch, condemn, and do nothing effective to stop it.
This reality does not counsel despair but rather clearer strategic thinking. Accountability, when it comes, will come from Iranians themselves—through sustained resistance, strategic organizing, and the eventual collapse of a regime that has exhausted its legitimacy. The role of the international community should be to support that process, preserve evidence, maintain pressure, and prepare for the day when the Iranian people achieve the democratic transition they have sacrificed thousands of lives pursuing.
The deployment of foreign Shia militias to massacre Iranian protesters represents one of the most severe betrayals of human dignity in recent history. That thousands of people—teenagers, mothers, workers, students—were shot in the head by foreign fighters imported specifically to kill them because their own government believed domestic security forces might refuse to do so, defies moral comprehension.
The world's failure to prevent or even adequately respond to this atrocity implicates not just the direct perpetrators but the international system that proves incapable of protecting vulnerable populations from state violence. The phrase "never again," repeated after each historical atrocity, rings hollow when contemporary massacres proceed with impunity.
For the Iranian people, the message is clear: you are on your own. No cavalry is coming. The United Nations will hold meetings. Western governments will issue statements. Human rights organizations will document your suffering. But when your government imports foreign militias to shoot you in the head for demanding basic rights, the international community will watch, condemn, and do nothing effective to stop it.
This reality does not counsel despair but rather clearer strategic thinking. Accountability, when it comes, will come from Iranians themselves—through sustained resistance, strategic organizing, and the eventual collapse of a regime that has exhausted its legitimacy. The role of the international community should be to support that process, preserve evidence, maintain pressure, and prepare for the day when the Iranian people achieve the democratic transition they have sacrificed thousands of lives pursuing.
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