.
.
.
.
The objective is not to develop a WW2 style obsession with the IRGC as some kind of reincarnation of the SS, which must be totally obliterated, but that the key IRGC infrastructure in Tehran is neutralised, making the theocracy vulnerable, whilst simultaneously HELPING THE PEOPLE OF IRAN RISE UP AGAINST THE CURRENT REGIME.
HELP THE COMMON PEOPLE SIEZE THE GOVERNMENT OFFICES.
Not a general attack on IRAN.
No Isreali participation.
No attacks against the Artesh.
Let the IRGC know that they cannot butcher ordinary protesting Iranians.
Let the IRGC know that Ali Khamenei once captured will be taken to the Hague to face War Crimes charges.
For giving out illegal orders to the IRGC.
The primary command and control centre for the security of the Tehran area is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) Tharallah Headquarters (also spelt Sarallah or Thar-Allah). This facility is considered the nerve centre for the regime's repression and is located in Tehran.Key Locations in Northern Tehran
Specific IRGC and military facilities in Northern Tehran identified in intelligence reports include: the Mohammad Rasulullah Corps main staff base. This critical IRGC force for Tehran operates a main staff base on Niayesh Highway in northern Tehran.
Quds Sub-Headquarters: This sub-headquarters, subordinate to the Tharallah Headquarters, oversees suppression operations in North and Northwestern Tehran.
Imam Ali Academy: This facility, located on Alborz Street in the Tajrish, Saad Abad district in Northern Tehran (north of Saad Abad Palace), is used for theoretical training of IRGC personnel and foreign mercenaries. It was previously a Qods Force training directorate.
Function and Oversight
The Tharallah Headquarters has territorial responsibilities for Tehran and Alborz provinces, overseeing all IRGC and Basij bases within its area of command. It coordinates military and police operations and is responsible for protecting key government institutions and thwarting threats to the capital.
__________________________________________________________
IRGC Installation Architecture in Greater Tehran: A Comprehensive Intelligence Assessment
Executive Summary
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains an extensive, multilayered military and security infrastructure across Greater Tehran designed to protect the Iranian regime, suppress internal dissent, and project military power.
This architecture comprises centralized command headquarters, regional operational bases, provincial corps, specialized security brigades, and a pervasive paramilitary network embedded within Tehran's 22 municipal districts.
Recent intelligence disclosures in January 2026 have revealed the precise locations and coordinates of 50 high-value IRGC targets within the capital region, providing unprecedented insight into the regime's apparatus of repression.[1][2][3]
The Thar-Allah Headquarters functions as the nerve center of this security architecture, coordinating suppression operations through four regional sub-headquarters that divide Tehran into operational zones. Supporting this command structure are 23 IRGC-Basij regional bases, two elite security brigades specializing in urban warfare, and multiple operational divisions capable of deploying thousands of personnel within hours. This infrastructure has been extensively utilized to crush protests, conduct surveillance, and maintain regime control over Iran's capital and its surrounding metropolitan area.[2][4][3][5][6][1]
The Thar-Allah Headquarters functions as the nerve center of this security architecture, coordinating suppression operations through four regional sub-headquarters that divide Tehran into operational zones. Supporting this command structure are 23 IRGC-Basij regional bases, two elite security brigades specializing in urban warfare, and multiple operational divisions capable of deploying thousands of personnel within hours. This infrastructure has been extensively utilized to crush protests, conduct surveillance, and maintain regime control over Iran's capital and its surrounding metropolitan area.[2][4][3][5][6][1]
With reserves numbering 290,000 backed by Basij of about 640,000
There is absolutely no point in trying to destroy all of this.
Strategic Context and Organizational Framework
Command Hierarchy and Control Structure
The IRGC's Greater Tehran installations operate under direct control of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who maintains operational authority over all IRGC activities through the organization's Commander-in-Chief. This command relationship ensures the regime's most powerful military force remains loyal to the supreme leadership rather than the elected government, serving as a praetorian guard for the Islamic Republic's theocratic structure.[7][8][9][10]
IRGC Command Structure in Greater Tehran - showing the hierarchical organization from the Supreme Leader down through regional headquarters, sub-headquarters, provincial corps, and operational units.
Within Greater Tehran, the IRGC operates through a dual command structure that separates territorial security functions from conventional military operations. The Thar-Allah Headquarters handles security, intelligence, and suppression operations specifically for the Tehran metropolitan area, while the Sar-Allah Headquarters manages IRGC Ground Forces units across Tehran and Alborz provinces with broader territorial defense responsibilities.[11][7][12][13]
Thar-Allah Headquarters: The Security Nerve Center
Established in 1995 by order of Iran's Supreme Council of National Security, Thar-Allah Headquarters represents the most critical IRGC installation in Iran. The name translates to "Allah will revenge Hussein's blood," invoking the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at the Battle of Karbala—a foundational narrative of Shia Islam that the regime exploits to legitimize violent suppression of dissent.[7][12][13]
Officially commanded by the IRGC Commander-in-Chief, day-to-day operations are supervised by a deputy commander who serves as the effective operational leader. Since 2020, Brigadier General Hossein Nejat has held this position, bringing extensive experience from previous roles including Deputy Chief of Joint Staff, Vice Commander-in-Chief for Cultural and Social Affairs, and Deputy Chief of the IRGC Intelligence Organization. Nejat is a close associate of Supreme Leader Khamenei and was sanctioned by the European Union in 2023 for his role in suppressing protests.[12][13][14][7]
The Thar-Allah Headquarters gained particular notoriety for its central role in crushing the 1999 student protests, the 2009 Green Movement following disputed presidential elections, the 2019-2020 protests triggered by fuel price increases, and the massive Mahsa Amini protests of 2022-2023. International human rights organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and United Nations bodies have documented Thar-Allah's involvement in serious human rights violations, including mass arrests, torture, direct shootings at protesters, and actions potentially constituting crimes against humanity.[13][12]
A January 2026 intelligence dossier compiled by United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and delivered to the Trump administration identified the exact coordinates of the Thar-Allah Headquarters, describing it as "the nerve center of the brutal crackdown on protesters" that "effectively functions as the military's nerve center, holding operational control over police forces". While these specific coordinates have been reported to U.S. officials, they remain classified in open sources.[1][3][15]
Four Regional Sub-Headquarters: Operational Zones
Thar-Allah divides Tehran into four operational zones, each controlled by a dedicated sub-headquarters responsible for suppression operations, intelligence gathering, and coordination of security forces within their respective sectors:[1][4][3][16][13][5]
Quds Sub-Headquarters controls northern and northwestern Tehran, overseeing some of the capital's most affluent neighborhoods including areas around Vali Asr Street, northern Pasdaran, and districts extending toward the Alborz mountain foothills. This zone includes many government offices, foreign embassies, and residences of regime officials, making it strategically critical.[4][3][16][5]
Fath Sub-Headquarters manages southwestern Tehran, an area encompassing working-class neighborhoods, industrial zones, and approaches to Mehrabad Airport. This sub-headquarters coordinates with local Basij units to monitor and suppress dissent in densely populated residential areas.[3][16][5][4]
Nasr Sub-Headquarters oversees northeastern Tehran, including the Lavizan area, portions of Shahid Babaei Highway, and approaches to the Tehran-Damavand freeway. The Nasr unit played a pivotal role in suppressing the 1999 and 2009 protests and serves as a primary security unit responsible for maintaining order in Tehran during crises.[16][5][14][4][3]
Ghadr Sub-Headquarters controls southeastern and central Tehran, managing security across the capital's historic core, bazaar district, and densely populated southern neighborhoods. This zone faces particular challenges from lower-income areas where anti-regime sentiment has historically been strongest.[5][4][3][16]
According to the UANI report, "By identifying these specific facilities and structures, the U.S. military would now possess a complete blueprint of the IRGC's capabilities to coordinate the violent suppression of demonstrations". These four sub-headquarters function as the primary command network coordinating intelligence, policing, and psychological operations across the capital.[1][3][5]
Ground Forces, Infrastructure and Provincial Corps
Sar-Allah Headquarters
Distinct from but closely coordinated with Thar-Allah, the Sar-Allah Headquarters serves as the IRGC Ground Forces regional command for Tehran and Alborz provinces. Also commanded by Brigadier General Hossein Nejat, Sar-Allah maintains operational control over major mechanized and infantry divisions while doubling as the territorial headquarters with security responsibilities.[17][11][7][18][19]
The headquarters oversees two major operational divisions: the 10th Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Division based in Karaj, Alborz Province, and the 27th Mohammad Rasoul Allah Operational Division in Tehran City. These units represent the IRGC's conventional military capability in the capital region and can be rapidly augmented with Basij militia battalions during crises or large-scale operations.[11][18][13][20][21][19]
During the 2008 reorganization implementing the IRGC's "Mosaic Doctrine," Sar-Allah was merged with Basij territorial structures to create an integrated command capable of both conventional military operations and internal security missions. This restructuring divided responsibility between the Sepah-e Muhammad Rasoul Allah (Muhammad Rasoul Allah Corps) covering Tehran City and Shemiranat, and the Sepah-e Sayyed al-Shohada (Seyyed-al-Shohada Corps) covering smaller towns and villages throughout Tehran Province.[7][13][20][22][23][11]
27th Mohammad Rasoul Allah Division
The 27th Division traces its origins to the Iran-Iraq War when it was established as a brigade by commanders Hossein Qajeyi, Ahmad Motevasselian, and Mohammad Ebrahim Hemmat before being expanded to divisional strength just before Operation Jerusalem. Former IRGC Commander-in-Chief Mohsen Rezaee praised the 27th as one of four elite divisions that Iraqi forces were unable to resist during the war.[20]
The division is based near Pasdaran Avenue in north-central Tehran, with historical ties to the Vali Asr Garrison. As a mechanized infantry formation, the division maintains a cadre structure of four battalions that can be rapidly expanded for combat operations by augmentation with 24 Basij Imam Hussein battalions and four Sabirin quick-reaction units. These Basij battalions are staffed with full-time, salaried personnel distinct from volunteer militia members.[24][20]
The 27th Division performs both military missions and internal security functions. During the 2009 post-election protests, the Supreme National Security Council assigned the Mohammad Rasoul-Allah Corps responsibility for suppressing demonstrations across the capital, a mission executed with extensive use of force.[7][22]
10th Seyyed ol Shohada Division
Based in Karaj, the capital of Alborz Province located approximately 40 kilometers west of Tehran, the 10th Division serves as the primary IRGC Ground Forces unit for the western approaches to the capital region. Commanded by Colonel Rostam Ali Rafiei Atani as of September 2019, the division operates under Sar-Allah Headquarters and can coordinate rapidly with the 27th Division for operations in Greater Tehran.[11][25][21][26][19]
The 10th Division's location in Karaj provides strategic depth for defending Tehran from western threats while also positioning the unit to control this major industrial and residential city of over 1.9 million people. Like the 27th Division, it maintains the capability to be reinforced by Basij battalions and can deploy quickly along the Tehran-Karaj highway corridor.[27]
Security Brigades and Specialized Units
Supporting the divisional structures are several specialized security brigades tasked with counterterrorism, urban warfare, and suppression operations:
Aaleh-e Mohammad Security Brigade, located in northeast Tehran, represents one of two key operational units leading violent crackdowns on protesters identified in the UANI report. The brigade specializes in security operations and coordinates closely with the Nasr Sub-Headquarters in its operational zone.[1][6][28]
Al-Zahra Security Brigade, positioned in southeast Tehran, serves as the second primary suppression unit, working in coordination with the Ghadr Sub-Headquarters. The Al-Zahra name references Fatimah al-Zahra, daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, reflecting the IRGC's practice of using religious symbolism to sanctify its security operations.[29][6][28][1]
Al-Ahmad Security Brigade operates from a base at the end of Shahid Babaei Highway in northeastern Tehran. This unit specializes in counterterrorism matters, counterinsurgency, hostage rescue, and urban warfare. In 2016, the Al-Ahmad Brigade conducted joint training exercises with police forces to demonstrate "field coordination in addressing protests," though footage of these exercises was never officially released, possibly due to the eruption of subsequent protests.[14]
The 20th Ramezan Independent Armored Brigade is based in Hassanabad, Tehran Province, providing armored support capabilities to security operations.[13]
Major IRGC Installations in Greater Tehran - Key facilities with location data and operational roles
Command Hierarchy and Control Structure
The IRGC's Greater Tehran installations operate under direct control of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who maintains operational authority over all IRGC activities through the organization's Commander-in-Chief. This command relationship ensures the regime's most powerful military force remains loyal to the supreme leadership rather than the elected government, serving as a praetorian guard for the Islamic Republic's theocratic structure.[7][8][9][10]
IRGC Command Structure in Greater Tehran - showing the hierarchical organization from the Supreme Leader down through regional headquarters, sub-headquarters, provincial corps, and operational units.
Within Greater Tehran, the IRGC operates through a dual command structure that separates territorial security functions from conventional military operations. The Thar-Allah Headquarters handles security, intelligence, and suppression operations specifically for the Tehran metropolitan area, while the Sar-Allah Headquarters manages IRGC Ground Forces units across Tehran and Alborz provinces with broader territorial defense responsibilities.[11][7][12][13]
Thar-Allah Headquarters: The Security Nerve Center
Established in 1995 by order of Iran's Supreme Council of National Security, Thar-Allah Headquarters represents the most critical IRGC installation in Iran. The name translates to "Allah will revenge Hussein's blood," invoking the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at the Battle of Karbala—a foundational narrative of Shia Islam that the regime exploits to legitimize violent suppression of dissent.[7][12][13]
Officially commanded by the IRGC Commander-in-Chief, day-to-day operations are supervised by a deputy commander who serves as the effective operational leader. Since 2020, Brigadier General Hossein Nejat has held this position, bringing extensive experience from previous roles including Deputy Chief of Joint Staff, Vice Commander-in-Chief for Cultural and Social Affairs, and Deputy Chief of the IRGC Intelligence Organization. Nejat is a close associate of Supreme Leader Khamenei and was sanctioned by the European Union in 2023 for his role in suppressing protests.[12][13][14][7]
The Thar-Allah Headquarters gained particular notoriety for its central role in crushing the 1999 student protests, the 2009 Green Movement following disputed presidential elections, the 2019-2020 protests triggered by fuel price increases, and the massive Mahsa Amini protests of 2022-2023. International human rights organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and United Nations bodies have documented Thar-Allah's involvement in serious human rights violations, including mass arrests, torture, direct shootings at protesters, and actions potentially constituting crimes against humanity.[13][12]
A January 2026 intelligence dossier compiled by United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and delivered to the Trump administration identified the exact coordinates of the Thar-Allah Headquarters, describing it as "the nerve center of the brutal crackdown on protesters" that "effectively functions as the military's nerve center, holding operational control over police forces". While these specific coordinates have been reported to U.S. officials, they remain classified in open sources.[1][3][15]
Four Regional Sub-Headquarters: Operational Zones
Thar-Allah divides Tehran into four operational zones, each controlled by a dedicated sub-headquarters responsible for suppression operations, intelligence gathering, and coordination of security forces within their respective sectors:[1][4][3][16][13][5]
Quds Sub-Headquarters controls northern and northwestern Tehran, overseeing some of the capital's most affluent neighborhoods including areas around Vali Asr Street, northern Pasdaran, and districts extending toward the Alborz mountain foothills. This zone includes many government offices, foreign embassies, and residences of regime officials, making it strategically critical.[4][3][16][5]
Fath Sub-Headquarters manages southwestern Tehran, an area encompassing working-class neighborhoods, industrial zones, and approaches to Mehrabad Airport. This sub-headquarters coordinates with local Basij units to monitor and suppress dissent in densely populated residential areas.[3][16][5][4]
Nasr Sub-Headquarters oversees northeastern Tehran, including the Lavizan area, portions of Shahid Babaei Highway, and approaches to the Tehran-Damavand freeway. The Nasr unit played a pivotal role in suppressing the 1999 and 2009 protests and serves as a primary security unit responsible for maintaining order in Tehran during crises.[16][5][14][4][3]
Ghadr Sub-Headquarters controls southeastern and central Tehran, managing security across the capital's historic core, bazaar district, and densely populated southern neighborhoods. This zone faces particular challenges from lower-income areas where anti-regime sentiment has historically been strongest.[5][4][3][16]
According to the UANI report, "By identifying these specific facilities and structures, the U.S. military would now possess a complete blueprint of the IRGC's capabilities to coordinate the violent suppression of demonstrations". These four sub-headquarters function as the primary command network coordinating intelligence, policing, and psychological operations across the capital.[1][3][5]
Ground Forces, Infrastructure and Provincial Corps
Sar-Allah Headquarters
Distinct from but closely coordinated with Thar-Allah, the Sar-Allah Headquarters serves as the IRGC Ground Forces regional command for Tehran and Alborz provinces. Also commanded by Brigadier General Hossein Nejat, Sar-Allah maintains operational control over major mechanized and infantry divisions while doubling as the territorial headquarters with security responsibilities.[17][11][7][18][19]
The headquarters oversees two major operational divisions: the 10th Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Division based in Karaj, Alborz Province, and the 27th Mohammad Rasoul Allah Operational Division in Tehran City. These units represent the IRGC's conventional military capability in the capital region and can be rapidly augmented with Basij militia battalions during crises or large-scale operations.[11][18][13][20][21][19]
During the 2008 reorganization implementing the IRGC's "Mosaic Doctrine," Sar-Allah was merged with Basij territorial structures to create an integrated command capable of both conventional military operations and internal security missions. This restructuring divided responsibility between the Sepah-e Muhammad Rasoul Allah (Muhammad Rasoul Allah Corps) covering Tehran City and Shemiranat, and the Sepah-e Sayyed al-Shohada (Seyyed-al-Shohada Corps) covering smaller towns and villages throughout Tehran Province.[7][13][20][22][23][11]
27th Mohammad Rasoul Allah Division
The 27th Division traces its origins to the Iran-Iraq War when it was established as a brigade by commanders Hossein Qajeyi, Ahmad Motevasselian, and Mohammad Ebrahim Hemmat before being expanded to divisional strength just before Operation Jerusalem. Former IRGC Commander-in-Chief Mohsen Rezaee praised the 27th as one of four elite divisions that Iraqi forces were unable to resist during the war.[20]
The division is based near Pasdaran Avenue in north-central Tehran, with historical ties to the Vali Asr Garrison. As a mechanized infantry formation, the division maintains a cadre structure of four battalions that can be rapidly expanded for combat operations by augmentation with 24 Basij Imam Hussein battalions and four Sabirin quick-reaction units. These Basij battalions are staffed with full-time, salaried personnel distinct from volunteer militia members.[24][20]
The 27th Division performs both military missions and internal security functions. During the 2009 post-election protests, the Supreme National Security Council assigned the Mohammad Rasoul-Allah Corps responsibility for suppressing demonstrations across the capital, a mission executed with extensive use of force.[7][22]
10th Seyyed ol Shohada Division
Based in Karaj, the capital of Alborz Province located approximately 40 kilometers west of Tehran, the 10th Division serves as the primary IRGC Ground Forces unit for the western approaches to the capital region. Commanded by Colonel Rostam Ali Rafiei Atani as of September 2019, the division operates under Sar-Allah Headquarters and can coordinate rapidly with the 27th Division for operations in Greater Tehran.[11][25][21][26][19]
The 10th Division's location in Karaj provides strategic depth for defending Tehran from western threats while also positioning the unit to control this major industrial and residential city of over 1.9 million people. Like the 27th Division, it maintains the capability to be reinforced by Basij battalions and can deploy quickly along the Tehran-Karaj highway corridor.[27]
Security Brigades and Specialized Units
Supporting the divisional structures are several specialized security brigades tasked with counterterrorism, urban warfare, and suppression operations:
Aaleh-e Mohammad Security Brigade, located in northeast Tehran, represents one of two key operational units leading violent crackdowns on protesters identified in the UANI report. The brigade specializes in security operations and coordinates closely with the Nasr Sub-Headquarters in its operational zone.[1][6][28]
Al-Zahra Security Brigade, positioned in southeast Tehran, serves as the second primary suppression unit, working in coordination with the Ghadr Sub-Headquarters. The Al-Zahra name references Fatimah al-Zahra, daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, reflecting the IRGC's practice of using religious symbolism to sanctify its security operations.[29][6][28][1]
Al-Ahmad Security Brigade operates from a base at the end of Shahid Babaei Highway in northeastern Tehran. This unit specializes in counterterrorism matters, counterinsurgency, hostage rescue, and urban warfare. In 2016, the Al-Ahmad Brigade conducted joint training exercises with police forces to demonstrate "field coordination in addressing protests," though footage of these exercises was never officially released, possibly due to the eruption of subsequent protests.[14]
The 20th Ramezan Independent Armored Brigade is based in Hassanabad, Tehran Province, providing armored support capabilities to security operations.[13]
Major IRGC Installations in Greater Tehran - Key facilities with location data and operational roles
Basij Paramilitary Infrastructure
Organizational Structure and Territorial Coverage
The Basij Resistance Force, formally subordinate to the IRGC, represents the regime's most pervasive internal security apparatus with an estimated 40,000-54,000 bases nationwide as of 2020. In Greater Tehran, the Basij organizational structure creates a comprehensive network for surveillance, social control, and rapid mobilization of loyalist forces.[30]
According to the UANI intelligence dossier, Greater Tehran contains 23 IRGC-Basij Regional Bases distributed across Tehran's 22 municipal districts, with the additional base accounting for the division of responsibilities between Tehran City and Tehran Province. Each Regional Base operates under Thar-Allah Headquarters command and serves as the foundation for the regime's "Mosaic Doctrine" approach to layered defense against internal threats.[1][11][2][3][13][5][31]
The Basij structure divides each city into hierarchical layers: resistance areas subdivided into resistance zones, which are further divided into resistance bases, and finally into neighborhood-level groups. In Tehran, this creates two primary resistance areas—Tehran Province (subdivided into three resistance zones: Shemiran, Rey, and Eslamshahr) and Tehran City (subdivided into four resistance zones: northwest Qods, southwest Abouzar, northeast Shahid Beheshti, and the Pupil's Basij Zone with independent command).[32][33]
District-Level Control Mechanisms
Tehran's 22 municipal districts each host a Basij Resistance District (BRD) that controls one Imam Ali Battalion specifically tasked with riot control and suppression. These districts are further subdivided into Basij Resistance Precincts (BRPs), with an average of 11 BRPs per district, each containing approximately 12 Basij Resistance Bases (BRBs) scattered throughout neighborhoods in mosques, ministries, schools, and other sites.[20][23]
The metropolitan Basij forces operate under four citywide IRGC security units—Valiasr, Hazrat-e Mojtaba, Imam Hadi, and Imam Reza—which report to the Hazrat-e Zahra and All-e Muhammad quick-response security brigades attached to Tehran's Muhammad-Rasul-Allah Corps. This layered structure enables rapid mobilization of forces from neighborhood bases through district commands to citywide brigades for coordinated suppression operations.[23]
Tehran Municipal Districts and Basij Infrastructure - Showing the 22 administrative districts and their associated paramilitary control structures
Tehran's district distribution spans the full geography of the capital:[34][35]
Northern districts (1-3) cover affluent neighborhoods including Farmaniyeh, Evin, Niavaran, Tajrish, Elahieh, Darband (District 1); Saadat Abad, Shahrak-e Gharb, Gisha (District 2); and Darus, Vanak, Jordan (District 3). These areas house government officials, foreign embassies, and wealthy residents, requiring sophisticated surveillance rather than overt force.
Eastern districts (4, 8, 13-15) encompass Pasdaran, Lavizan, Tehranpars, Narmak, and working-class neighborhoods where Basij forces maintain visible presence and conduct regular patrols.
Central districts (5-7, 10-12) include the historic core, bazaar, government ministries, and mixed commercial-residential areas requiring constant monitoring.
Southern districts (16-17, 19-20) cover lower-income neighborhoods including Javadiyeh, Nazi Abad, Rey, and areas with historically higher anti-regime sentiment, necessitating stronger Basij presence.
Western districts (9, 18, 21-22) extend from Mehrabad Airport to Chitgar and the city's expanding periphery, including District 18 which was specifically targeted for evacuation warnings by Israel during June 2025 airstrikes.[36][37]
Operational Capabilities and Performance
The Basij's primary operational roles include assisting IRGC and Law Enforcement Forces with security, conducting morals policing, organizing pro-regime demonstrations, and suppressing anti-government protests. During major unrest, the Basij can mobilize thousands of members from across districts and even from other provinces to reinforce Tehran forces.[8][32][33]
However, the Basij's operational performance has been mixed. While generally effective at suppressing protests in smaller cities with assistance from local police, maintaining order in Tehran has proven more challenging. During the June 2009 election protests, Basij members shot and killed protesters at Azadi Square who were forcing their way into a local militia station, generating significant backlash. The December 2009 Ashura Day protests proved catastrophic for the Basij in Tehran, forcing mobilization of militia members from the capital's outskirts and other provinces to suppress unrest.[32][33]
Following these setbacks, the regime integrated the Basij more formally into IRGC Ground Forces structures in October 2009, replacing the Basij chief and implementing more rigorous training and command protocols. Since 2010, the Basij has focused significant attention on cyber operations, with thousands of members educated in blogging and filtering dissident websites.[33][38]
Aerospace, Intelligence, and Specialized Commands
IRGC Aerospace Force
The IRGC Aerospace Force maintains its headquarters in Chitgar, in western Tehran (District 22), overseeing Iran's ballistic missile arsenal, cruise missiles, air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and space program. Commanded by Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh since October 2009, the Aerospace Force represents Iran's primary strategic deterrent capability.[39][40]
The force's structure includes four military subunits: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, air defense systems (coordinated with the Army's Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Headquarters), and drones. The Aerospace Force operates what it describes as "missile cities"—underground facilities constructed within mountainsides at depths of 500 meters, containing missiles of varying ranges mounted on launchers capable of launch within seconds. While three such facilities have been publicly identified, IRGC commanders claim additional undisclosed missile cities exist.[40]
Alternative sources indicate IRGC Aerospace Force facilities along the Damavand Tehran Highway in Tehran Province. The force maintains various aircraft at Tehran Mehrabad Airport and other locations across Iran.[41][42]
Intelligence Organization of the IRGC
Established in 2009 on Supreme Leader Khamenei's initiative, the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IO-IRGC) has emerged as potentially more powerful than Iran's Ministry of Intelligence, serving as a "more ideological counterpart" that "often overrules" the ministry. The organization is known for conducting internal surveillance, suppressing dissent, and maintaining a vast network of ideological informants throughout Iranian society.[9][10][43]
The IO-IRGC systematically employs what human rights organizations describe as "white torture" (psychological torture through isolation, sensory deprivation, and threats) and rape threats against dissidents. The organization operates the notorious "2A" ward at Evin Prison, where political prisoners are held under IRGC control.[43][9]
Current commander Majid Khademi assumed leadership in 2025 following the death of Mohammad Kazemi in an Israeli airstrike in June 2025. Previous commanders include Hossein Taeb (2009-2022), who led the organization during the brutal suppression of the 2009 Green Movement and subsequent protests.[10][9][43]
The IO-IRGC maintains coordination with Basij informant networks, creating comprehensive surveillance capabilities across Tehran and throughout Iran. This integration of formal intelligence structures with grassroots paramilitary informants enables the regime to identify and neutralize dissent at neighborhood levels before it can coalesce into organized opposition.[9]
IRGC Cyber Command
Founded in 2006 with formal command establishment in 2015, the IRGC Cyber Security Command conducts cyber warfare, cyber security, and extensive monitoring of internal dissent. Previously operating as the "Center of Organized Crime Inspection," the Cyber Command has evolved into a sophisticated apparatus capable of infrastructure attacks, surveillance of dissidents, and coordination with contracted hackers to breach accounts of regime opponents.[44]
The organization's stated mission includes countering cultural and social media impact, lifestyle changes, Western espionage, security threats, cyber attacks, internet censorship circumvention tools, and supporting digital diplomacy. During the 2009-2010 protests and the 2022-2023 protests, the Cyber Command solicited tips from loyalists to identify dissidents online.[44]
The British and U.S. governments have sanctioned the IRGC Cyber Command for human rights repression and election interference. In 2022, identities of Cyber Command members were hacked and leaked, revealing the extent of the organization's targeting of Iranian dissidents, activists, and journalists.[44]
Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters Complex
The Khatam al-Anbiya organization operates through multiple entities in Tehran, creating potential confusion in open-source intelligence. The Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters serves as an IRGC-owned conglomerate of companies acting as prime contractor for Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear programs while also conducting large-scale civil and military construction projects. This entity is located at coordinates 35.76269°N, 51.35722°E, with the address listed as No. 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678.[45][46]
Separately, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters functions as the unified combatant command headquarters of the Iranian Armed Forces under direct command of the General Staff. Located at coordinates 35.70778°N, 51.44028°E, this facility was separated from the General Staff in 2016 as an independent standing command responsible for operational command and control (C2) of joint military operations. The headquarters coordinates activities across IRGC and regular Army (Artesh) forces through regional and thematic subordinate headquarters.[47][48][49]
Major General Gholam Ali Rashid commanded the Central Headquarters from 2016 until his death in an Israeli airstrike on June 13, 2025. His successor, Brigadier General Ali Shadmani, was killed just four days later in another Israeli strike on June 17, 2025, highlighting the vulnerability of even the most senior Iranian military commanders during the intense conflict period.[48]
Critical Infrastructure and Strategic Facilities
Evin Prison
Located at coordinates 35.7960°N, 51.3840°E (35°47'46"N, 51°23'3"E) in the Evin neighborhood of northwestern Tehran, Evin Prison represents the Islamic Republic's most infamous detention facility. Situated at the foot of the Alborz mountains next to the Saadat Abad district, the prison is located in a residential and commercial area with a popular upscale teahouse and restaurant immediately adjacent—a jarring juxtaposition of normalcy and repression.[50][51][52][53]
Established in 1972 under the Shah's regime to house 320 inmates, Evin was expanded to hold over 1,500 prisoners by 1977. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the facility became the regime's primary site for incarcerating political prisoners, journalists, academics, human rights activists, dual nationals, and foreign citizens accused of espionage or propaganda offenses.[52]
The IRGC operates Ward 2A at Evin, where the Intelligence Organization holds political prisoners and conducts interrogations. Conditions in this ward have been documented by international human rights organizations as involving torture, extended solitary confinement, and severe psychological abuse.[12][9][43]
During Israeli airstrikes in June 2025, the IDF specifically targeted Evin Prison, with an Israeli Army Radio correspondent reporting that strikes hit the prison's entrances to facilitate the escape of regime dissidents. This unprecedented targeting of a civilian detention facility reflected Israel's strategy of undermining the regime's internal security infrastructure during the broader Iran-Israel conflict.[19][36]
Photography in front of and around Evin Prison is forbidden, and the site remains heavily guarded. Plans exist to eventually transfer prisoners from Evin to the Central Prison of Tehran (also known as Fashafaviye or Fashafoyeh), though this relocation has been repeatedly delayed.[50][52]
Lavizan Underground Bunker Complex
Located in northeastern Tehran at kilometer 3 of Army Boulevard (formerly Lashkarak highway), the Lavizan complex includes underground bunkers reported to house Supreme Leader Khamenei during security crises. Multiple sources confirmed that during Israeli airstrikes beginning June 13, 2025, Khamenei was moved to "a heavily fortified underground bunker in Lavizan" along with his son Mojtaba and other family members.[54][55][36][56][57]
The Lavizan area has a controversial history, with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) previously revealing details of the "Lavizan-3" site as a secret nuclear facility. The broader Lavizan district encompasses military bases, research facilities, and secure compounds hidden within northeastern Tehran's expanding suburbs.[58][55][57]
Western intelligence officials told Iran International that Khamenei's "deteriorating psychological state had led military commanders to conceal the full scope of the war's toll from him" during his time in the bunker. The complex reportedly provides protection against conventional airstrikes through deep underground construction, though the specific depth and configuration remain classified.[55]
The Lavizan area is accessible via Shahid Babaei Highway, a 17-kilometer expressway in northeastern Tehran connecting the Imam Ali Highway to the Tehran-Damavand freeway. Important neighborhoods adjacent to this highway include Shahid Chamran town, Lavizan, Lavizan Forest, Shahid Fallahi town, Seyed Al-Shohada town, Tehranpars, and Hakimieh—many bearing names that honor IRGC martyrs or religious figures.[59][58]
Strategic Thoroughfares and Geographic Nodes
Vali Asr Street, stretching 17 kilometers from Tehran's railway station (elevation 1,117 meters) in the south to Tajrish Square (elevation 1,612 meters) in the north, serves as the longest street in the Middle East and divides Tehran into eastern and western halves. Built during Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign in the 1920s-1930s and originally called Pahlavi Street, it was renamed Vali Asr (after the 12th Shia Imam) following the Islamic Revolution. The street serves as a critical artery for military movement and connects key government facilities, the Marble Palace governmental compound, and the Sa'dabad Complex.[60][61][62]
Pasdaran Avenue and the surrounding Pasdaran District (coordinates 35°45'56"N, 51°27'12"E) represents a major commercial and residential area in northern Tehran that houses IRGC facilities and personnel. The area was renamed "Pasdaran" (meaning "guardians") after the 1979 revolution, having previously been known as Saltanat Abad ("built by the monarchy"). The 27th Mohammad Rasoul Allah Division maintains historical ties to the Vali Asr Garrison in this vicinity.[24][63]
Palestine Square (also called Felestin Square), located at the intersection of Felestin Street and Talaghani Street in central Tehran, serves as a symbolic center for anti-Israeli demonstrations and pro-Palestinian propaganda. The square features a bronze-and-cement monument to the Palestinian struggle designed by Nader Qashghaie and inaugurated in 1990. During the 1990s and continuing to the present, the square hosts regular anti-Israeli demonstrations, particularly on Quds Day (the last Friday of Ramadan). The square lies within District 6 of Tehran.[34][64][65]
⁂
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Organizational Structure and Territorial Coverage
The Basij Resistance Force, formally subordinate to the IRGC, represents the regime's most pervasive internal security apparatus with an estimated 40,000-54,000 bases nationwide as of 2020. In Greater Tehran, the Basij organizational structure creates a comprehensive network for surveillance, social control, and rapid mobilization of loyalist forces.[30]
According to the UANI intelligence dossier, Greater Tehran contains 23 IRGC-Basij Regional Bases distributed across Tehran's 22 municipal districts, with the additional base accounting for the division of responsibilities between Tehran City and Tehran Province. Each Regional Base operates under Thar-Allah Headquarters command and serves as the foundation for the regime's "Mosaic Doctrine" approach to layered defense against internal threats.[1][11][2][3][13][5][31]
The Basij structure divides each city into hierarchical layers: resistance areas subdivided into resistance zones, which are further divided into resistance bases, and finally into neighborhood-level groups. In Tehran, this creates two primary resistance areas—Tehran Province (subdivided into three resistance zones: Shemiran, Rey, and Eslamshahr) and Tehran City (subdivided into four resistance zones: northwest Qods, southwest Abouzar, northeast Shahid Beheshti, and the Pupil's Basij Zone with independent command).[32][33]
District-Level Control Mechanisms
Tehran's 22 municipal districts each host a Basij Resistance District (BRD) that controls one Imam Ali Battalion specifically tasked with riot control and suppression. These districts are further subdivided into Basij Resistance Precincts (BRPs), with an average of 11 BRPs per district, each containing approximately 12 Basij Resistance Bases (BRBs) scattered throughout neighborhoods in mosques, ministries, schools, and other sites.[20][23]
The metropolitan Basij forces operate under four citywide IRGC security units—Valiasr, Hazrat-e Mojtaba, Imam Hadi, and Imam Reza—which report to the Hazrat-e Zahra and All-e Muhammad quick-response security brigades attached to Tehran's Muhammad-Rasul-Allah Corps. This layered structure enables rapid mobilization of forces from neighborhood bases through district commands to citywide brigades for coordinated suppression operations.[23]
Tehran Municipal Districts and Basij Infrastructure - Showing the 22 administrative districts and their associated paramilitary control structures
Tehran's district distribution spans the full geography of the capital:[34][35]
Northern districts (1-3) cover affluent neighborhoods including Farmaniyeh, Evin, Niavaran, Tajrish, Elahieh, Darband (District 1); Saadat Abad, Shahrak-e Gharb, Gisha (District 2); and Darus, Vanak, Jordan (District 3). These areas house government officials, foreign embassies, and wealthy residents, requiring sophisticated surveillance rather than overt force.
Eastern districts (4, 8, 13-15) encompass Pasdaran, Lavizan, Tehranpars, Narmak, and working-class neighborhoods where Basij forces maintain visible presence and conduct regular patrols.
Central districts (5-7, 10-12) include the historic core, bazaar, government ministries, and mixed commercial-residential areas requiring constant monitoring.
Southern districts (16-17, 19-20) cover lower-income neighborhoods including Javadiyeh, Nazi Abad, Rey, and areas with historically higher anti-regime sentiment, necessitating stronger Basij presence.
Western districts (9, 18, 21-22) extend from Mehrabad Airport to Chitgar and the city's expanding periphery, including District 18 which was specifically targeted for evacuation warnings by Israel during June 2025 airstrikes.[36][37]
Operational Capabilities and Performance
The Basij's primary operational roles include assisting IRGC and Law Enforcement Forces with security, conducting morals policing, organizing pro-regime demonstrations, and suppressing anti-government protests. During major unrest, the Basij can mobilize thousands of members from across districts and even from other provinces to reinforce Tehran forces.[8][32][33]
However, the Basij's operational performance has been mixed. While generally effective at suppressing protests in smaller cities with assistance from local police, maintaining order in Tehran has proven more challenging. During the June 2009 election protests, Basij members shot and killed protesters at Azadi Square who were forcing their way into a local militia station, generating significant backlash. The December 2009 Ashura Day protests proved catastrophic for the Basij in Tehran, forcing mobilization of militia members from the capital's outskirts and other provinces to suppress unrest.[32][33]
Following these setbacks, the regime integrated the Basij more formally into IRGC Ground Forces structures in October 2009, replacing the Basij chief and implementing more rigorous training and command protocols. Since 2010, the Basij has focused significant attention on cyber operations, with thousands of members educated in blogging and filtering dissident websites.[33][38]
Aerospace, Intelligence, and Specialized Commands
IRGC Aerospace Force
The IRGC Aerospace Force maintains its headquarters in Chitgar, in western Tehran (District 22), overseeing Iran's ballistic missile arsenal, cruise missiles, air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and space program. Commanded by Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh since October 2009, the Aerospace Force represents Iran's primary strategic deterrent capability.[39][40]
The force's structure includes four military subunits: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, air defense systems (coordinated with the Army's Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Headquarters), and drones. The Aerospace Force operates what it describes as "missile cities"—underground facilities constructed within mountainsides at depths of 500 meters, containing missiles of varying ranges mounted on launchers capable of launch within seconds. While three such facilities have been publicly identified, IRGC commanders claim additional undisclosed missile cities exist.[40]
Alternative sources indicate IRGC Aerospace Force facilities along the Damavand Tehran Highway in Tehran Province. The force maintains various aircraft at Tehran Mehrabad Airport and other locations across Iran.[41][42]
Intelligence Organization of the IRGC
Established in 2009 on Supreme Leader Khamenei's initiative, the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IO-IRGC) has emerged as potentially more powerful than Iran's Ministry of Intelligence, serving as a "more ideological counterpart" that "often overrules" the ministry. The organization is known for conducting internal surveillance, suppressing dissent, and maintaining a vast network of ideological informants throughout Iranian society.[9][10][43]
The IO-IRGC systematically employs what human rights organizations describe as "white torture" (psychological torture through isolation, sensory deprivation, and threats) and rape threats against dissidents. The organization operates the notorious "2A" ward at Evin Prison, where political prisoners are held under IRGC control.[43][9]
Current commander Majid Khademi assumed leadership in 2025 following the death of Mohammad Kazemi in an Israeli airstrike in June 2025. Previous commanders include Hossein Taeb (2009-2022), who led the organization during the brutal suppression of the 2009 Green Movement and subsequent protests.[10][9][43]
The IO-IRGC maintains coordination with Basij informant networks, creating comprehensive surveillance capabilities across Tehran and throughout Iran. This integration of formal intelligence structures with grassroots paramilitary informants enables the regime to identify and neutralize dissent at neighborhood levels before it can coalesce into organized opposition.[9]
IRGC Cyber Command
Founded in 2006 with formal command establishment in 2015, the IRGC Cyber Security Command conducts cyber warfare, cyber security, and extensive monitoring of internal dissent. Previously operating as the "Center of Organized Crime Inspection," the Cyber Command has evolved into a sophisticated apparatus capable of infrastructure attacks, surveillance of dissidents, and coordination with contracted hackers to breach accounts of regime opponents.[44]
The organization's stated mission includes countering cultural and social media impact, lifestyle changes, Western espionage, security threats, cyber attacks, internet censorship circumvention tools, and supporting digital diplomacy. During the 2009-2010 protests and the 2022-2023 protests, the Cyber Command solicited tips from loyalists to identify dissidents online.[44]
The British and U.S. governments have sanctioned the IRGC Cyber Command for human rights repression and election interference. In 2022, identities of Cyber Command members were hacked and leaked, revealing the extent of the organization's targeting of Iranian dissidents, activists, and journalists.[44]
Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters Complex
The Khatam al-Anbiya organization operates through multiple entities in Tehran, creating potential confusion in open-source intelligence. The Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters serves as an IRGC-owned conglomerate of companies acting as prime contractor for Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear programs while also conducting large-scale civil and military construction projects. This entity is located at coordinates 35.76269°N, 51.35722°E, with the address listed as No. 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678.[45][46]
Separately, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters functions as the unified combatant command headquarters of the Iranian Armed Forces under direct command of the General Staff. Located at coordinates 35.70778°N, 51.44028°E, this facility was separated from the General Staff in 2016 as an independent standing command responsible for operational command and control (C2) of joint military operations. The headquarters coordinates activities across IRGC and regular Army (Artesh) forces through regional and thematic subordinate headquarters.[47][48][49]
Major General Gholam Ali Rashid commanded the Central Headquarters from 2016 until his death in an Israeli airstrike on June 13, 2025. His successor, Brigadier General Ali Shadmani, was killed just four days later in another Israeli strike on June 17, 2025, highlighting the vulnerability of even the most senior Iranian military commanders during the intense conflict period.[48]
Critical Infrastructure and Strategic Facilities
Evin Prison
Located at coordinates 35.7960°N, 51.3840°E (35°47'46"N, 51°23'3"E) in the Evin neighborhood of northwestern Tehran, Evin Prison represents the Islamic Republic's most infamous detention facility. Situated at the foot of the Alborz mountains next to the Saadat Abad district, the prison is located in a residential and commercial area with a popular upscale teahouse and restaurant immediately adjacent—a jarring juxtaposition of normalcy and repression.[50][51][52][53]
Established in 1972 under the Shah's regime to house 320 inmates, Evin was expanded to hold over 1,500 prisoners by 1977. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the facility became the regime's primary site for incarcerating political prisoners, journalists, academics, human rights activists, dual nationals, and foreign citizens accused of espionage or propaganda offenses.[52]
The IRGC operates Ward 2A at Evin, where the Intelligence Organization holds political prisoners and conducts interrogations. Conditions in this ward have been documented by international human rights organizations as involving torture, extended solitary confinement, and severe psychological abuse.[12][9][43]
During Israeli airstrikes in June 2025, the IDF specifically targeted Evin Prison, with an Israeli Army Radio correspondent reporting that strikes hit the prison's entrances to facilitate the escape of regime dissidents. This unprecedented targeting of a civilian detention facility reflected Israel's strategy of undermining the regime's internal security infrastructure during the broader Iran-Israel conflict.[19][36]
Photography in front of and around Evin Prison is forbidden, and the site remains heavily guarded. Plans exist to eventually transfer prisoners from Evin to the Central Prison of Tehran (also known as Fashafaviye or Fashafoyeh), though this relocation has been repeatedly delayed.[50][52]
Lavizan Underground Bunker Complex
Located in northeastern Tehran at kilometer 3 of Army Boulevard (formerly Lashkarak highway), the Lavizan complex includes underground bunkers reported to house Supreme Leader Khamenei during security crises. Multiple sources confirmed that during Israeli airstrikes beginning June 13, 2025, Khamenei was moved to "a heavily fortified underground bunker in Lavizan" along with his son Mojtaba and other family members.[54][55][36][56][57]
The Lavizan area has a controversial history, with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) previously revealing details of the "Lavizan-3" site as a secret nuclear facility. The broader Lavizan district encompasses military bases, research facilities, and secure compounds hidden within northeastern Tehran's expanding suburbs.[58][55][57]
Western intelligence officials told Iran International that Khamenei's "deteriorating psychological state had led military commanders to conceal the full scope of the war's toll from him" during his time in the bunker. The complex reportedly provides protection against conventional airstrikes through deep underground construction, though the specific depth and configuration remain classified.[55]
The Lavizan area is accessible via Shahid Babaei Highway, a 17-kilometer expressway in northeastern Tehran connecting the Imam Ali Highway to the Tehran-Damavand freeway. Important neighborhoods adjacent to this highway include Shahid Chamran town, Lavizan, Lavizan Forest, Shahid Fallahi town, Seyed Al-Shohada town, Tehranpars, and Hakimieh—many bearing names that honor IRGC martyrs or religious figures.[59][58]
Strategic Thoroughfares and Geographic Nodes
Vali Asr Street, stretching 17 kilometers from Tehran's railway station (elevation 1,117 meters) in the south to Tajrish Square (elevation 1,612 meters) in the north, serves as the longest street in the Middle East and divides Tehran into eastern and western halves. Built during Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign in the 1920s-1930s and originally called Pahlavi Street, it was renamed Vali Asr (after the 12th Shia Imam) following the Islamic Revolution. The street serves as a critical artery for military movement and connects key government facilities, the Marble Palace governmental compound, and the Sa'dabad Complex.[60][61][62]
Pasdaran Avenue and the surrounding Pasdaran District (coordinates 35°45'56"N, 51°27'12"E) represents a major commercial and residential area in northern Tehran that houses IRGC facilities and personnel. The area was renamed "Pasdaran" (meaning "guardians") after the 1979 revolution, having previously been known as Saltanat Abad ("built by the monarchy"). The 27th Mohammad Rasoul Allah Division maintains historical ties to the Vali Asr Garrison in this vicinity.[24][63]
Palestine Square (also called Felestin Square), located at the intersection of Felestin Street and Talaghani Street in central Tehran, serves as a symbolic center for anti-Israeli demonstrations and pro-Palestinian propaganda. The square features a bronze-and-cement monument to the Palestinian struggle designed by Nader Qashghaie and inaugurated in 1990. During the 1990s and continuing to the present, the square hosts regular anti-Israeli demonstrations, particularly on Quds Day (the last Friday of Ramadan). The square lies within District 6 of Tehran.[34][64][65]
Geographic Distribution and Coordinate Summary
Greater Tehran Metropolitan Boundaries
Greater Tehran extends beyond the city limits of Tehran proper to encompass the central part of Tehran Province and the eastern part of Alborz Province. The metropolitan area includes several major municipalities: Karaj (population 1,592,492), Tehran (8,693,706), Eslamshahr, Shahriar, Qods, Malard, Pakdasht, Qarchak, Parand, Pardis, and Fardis.[34][66][27]
Tehran itself is divided into 22 municipal districts, with 20 located in Tehran County's Central District, while District 1 is in Shemiranat County and District 20 is in Ray County. This administrative complexity reflects the capital's expansion beyond its historical boundaries to absorb formerly independent towns and villages.[34]
Key Coordinate Reference Points
Central Tehran: 35.6944°N, 51.4215°E serves as the general reference point for the capital.[67][68][69]
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction HQ: 35.76269°N, 51.35722°E (35°45'46"N, 51°21'26"E)[45][46]
Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters: 35.70778°N, 51.44028°E (35°42'28"N, 51°26'25"E)[48][49]
Evin Prison: 35.7960°N, 51.3840°E (35°47'46"N, 51°23'3"E)[50][51][52]
Pasdaran District: 35.76556°N, 51.45333°E (35°45'56"N, 51°27'12"E)[63]
Coordinates for the Thar-Allah Headquarters, Sar-Allah Operational Base, the four sub-headquarters, and specific security brigade locations have been provided to U.S. officials through classified intelligence channels but are not available in open sources. The UANI report states it contains "exact coordinates" for these 50 high-value targets.[1][2][3][15]
Recent Operational Context (2025-2026)
Israeli Strikes on IRGC Infrastructure
During the June 2025 Iran-Israel War (also known as the Twelve-Day War), Israeli forces conducted extensive airstrikes against IRGC installations throughout Tehran. The IDF targeted the IRGC Ground Forces Sarallah Operational Base, Basij headquarters, the command center of the Quds Force, Evin Prison, and numerous other facilities.[18][19][36]
On June 15, 2025, Israeli strikes reportedly hit the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence building in Tehran. The following day, the IDF struck a building killing Iran's intelligence chief Mohammad Kazemi, along with Hassan Mohaqeq and Mohammad Khatami—three senior IRGC Intelligence Organization officials. These targeted killings demonstrated Israel's intelligence penetration of Iran's most sensitive security apparatus.[55][36]
The IDF issued evacuation warnings to residents of District 18 in southwestern Tehran before conducting strikes in that area. Strikes across the city killed hundreds of IRGC personnel according to Israeli estimates, with the IDF specifically targeting command centers, internal security forces, and military infrastructure.[36][37]
Iran International reported that Khamenei was moved to the Lavizan bunker complex "hours after Israel began its attacks on Tehran early Friday," with sources indicating his "deteriorating psychological state" as military commanders concealed the full extent of damage from him.[54][56][55][36]
January 2026 Intelligence Disclosure and Trump Administration Response
In January 2026, as nationwide protests entered their third week and the death toll of Iranian protesters reportedly surpassed 2,000, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) delivered a comprehensive dossier to the Trump administration containing detailed intelligence on 50 high-value IRGC targets in Tehran. The report was compiled by Kasra Aarabi, Director of IRGC Research at UANI, and delivered to White House officials in the early hours of January 12, 2026, ahead of critical security meetings.[1][2][3][6]
The dossier identified:
· The exact coordinates of the Thar-Allah Headquarters
· Four sub-headquarters overseeing different regions of Tehran
· 23 IRGC-Basij regional bases across Tehran's 22 municipality regions
· Two operational security brigades (Aaleh-e Mohammad and Al-Zahra)
· Hidden infrastructure coordinating intelligence, policing, and psychological operations[2][3][5][31][1]
According to the Daily Mail, "By identifying these sites and divisions, the U.S. military would have a blueprint of the IRGC's ability to coordinate the killing of its own citizens, an atrocity that irked the US president and spurred him to draw up options to assist protesters". Aarabi stated, "The cycle of protests and suppression will continue unless the balance of power changes between unarmed Iranian protesters and the regime's fully armed and radicalized apparatus of repression".[3][1]
President Donald Trump subsequently indicated he cancelled all meetings with Iranian officials, told protesters that "help is on the way," and instructed them to "save the names of the killers and abusers". The IRGC declared maximum alert status in response to potential U.S. strikes, with IRGC Air and Space Force Commander Majid Mousavi announcing heightened readiness.[70][71][1]
Current Threat Environment
As of January 2026, the IRGC maintains maximum alert status across its Tehran installations. The regime faces mounting domestic unrest, international pressure, economic sanctions, and the demonstrated vulnerability of its command infrastructure to precision strikes. The disclosure of precise target coordinates to the U.S. government represents an unprecedented intelligence breakthrough that fundamentally alters the strategic calculus for both the Iranian regime and external actors considering options to support Iranian protesters.[1][72][70][71][55][36]
The IRGC has responded by dispersing leadership, increasing underground facility usage, expanding missile stockpiles, and reinforcing its apparatus of repression through more aggressive Basij deployments and cyber surveillance. However, the deaths of multiple senior commanders, exposure of classified facility locations, and clear demonstration of intelligence penetration have significantly degraded both operational security and regime morale.[71][73][9][48][38][55][36]
Strategic Implications and Assessment
Operational Vulnerabilities
The IRGC's Greater Tehran infrastructure exhibits several critical vulnerabilities despite its comprehensive design:
Centralization of Command: The concentration of multiple command headquarters, operational divisions, and intelligence facilities within Greater Tehran creates target-rich opportunities for adversaries. While this centralization enables rapid coordination during crises, it also means that successful strikes on key nodes can disrupt operations across multiple subordinate units simultaneously.
Known Locations: The disclosure of precise coordinates for 50 installations fundamentally compromises the defensive value of these facilities. Even hardened bunkers and dispersed command posts lose strategic value when adversaries possess accurate targeting data.[1][2][3]
Personnel Concentration: The deaths of senior commanders including the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters commander and his successor within four days, plus the intelligence chief and two deputies, demonstrate that even the most protected leadership remains vulnerable to precision strikes.[9][48][36]
Infrastructure Dependencies: IRGC operations depend on vulnerable infrastructure including road networks, communications systems, power supplies, and logistics chains that can be disrupted. The extensive use of civilian neighborhoods and facilities for military purposes also constrains the regime's defensive options.
Internal Security Architecture Assessment
The Basij paramilitary network represents both the regime's greatest strength and a potential weakness in maintaining control:
Strengths: The 23 regional bases and comprehensive district-level presence enable rapid mobilization, continuous surveillance, and immediate response to emerging protests. The integration of neighborhood informants with formal intelligence structures creates a panopticon effect where citizens face constant monitoring.[1][2][3][20][23]
Weaknesses: The Basij has repeatedly struggled to suppress large-scale protests in Tehran, requiring reinforcement from provincial units. The organization's reliance on ideological motivation rather than professional training creates vulnerabilities when facing determined opposition. Additionally, economic pressures and generational change may be eroding the Basij recruitment base.[32][33]
Performance Indicators: Mixed results during 2009, 2017-2018, 2019-2020, and 2022-2023 protests suggest that while the Basij can ultimately crush dissent through overwhelming force and brutality, it cannot prevent protests from occurring or eliminate underlying grievances. The reported death toll exceeding 2,000 protesters in January 2026 indicates escalating violence but also persistent resistance.[12][13][6][33][1][32]
Intelligence and Cyber Capabilities
The IO-IRGC's expansion into a potentially more powerful organization than the Ministry of Intelligence reflects the regime's prioritization of internal security over external intelligence collection. This reallocation of resources indicates the regime's assessment that domestic threats exceed external military dangers—a calculation that may prove strategically myopic if external adversaries exploit internal vulnerabilities.[9][10][43]
The IRGC Cyber Command's documented activities against dissidents, infrastructure, and foreign targets demonstrate sophisticated capabilities. However, the 2022 breach that leaked member identities suggests vulnerabilities in the organization's own cyber security. The regime's heavy investment in internet censorship, surveillance, and counter-opposition operations indicates both capability and fear of digital threats to its control.[38][44]
Geographic and Territorial Analysis
The division of Tehran into four operational zones under Thar-Allah's sub-headquarters reflects standard military doctrine for controlling large urban areas. However, this structure also creates coordination challenges, potential gaps at zone boundaries, and multiplies the number of facilities requiring security.[1][4][3][16][13]
The concentration of critical facilities in northern Tehran (Pasdaran Avenue area, Evin, Lavizan) creates geographic clustering that simplifies adversary targeting while complicating civilian protection. Conversely, the dispersal of Basij bases throughout all 22 districts ensures no area remains unmonitored but dilutes force concentration.[24][63][50][54]
Greater Tehran's expansion into Alborz Province (particularly Karaj) extends the strategic perimeter the IRGC must defend while providing depth for dispersing critical assets. The 10th Division's location in Karaj serves both as a conventional military reserve and as a backstop should Tehran's internal security forces be overwhelmed.[11][25][21][34][66][27]
Conclusion
The IRGC's installation architecture in Greater Tehran represents a comprehensive, multilayered system designed to protect the Islamic Republic's leadership, project military power, and suppress internal dissent. The Thar-Allah Headquarters serves as the operational nerve center, coordinating four regional sub-headquarters, 23 Basij regional bases, multiple operational divisions, specialized security brigades, intelligence organizations, and cyber warfare units across the capital region.
Recent intelligence disclosures providing exact coordinates for 50 high-value targets have fundamentally compromised the defensive value of this infrastructure, creating unprecedented vulnerabilities for the regime. The demonstrated success of Israeli strikes in eliminating senior commanders and hitting critical facilities during June 2025, combined with ongoing protests and international pressure in January 2026, indicates that the IRGC faces mounting challenges to maintaining its control architecture.[1][2][3][15]
The regime's response—increasing alert levels, dispersing leadership, expanding surveillance, and escalating violence against protesters—suggests recognition of these vulnerabilities while doubling down on repression as the primary strategy for survival. Whether this apparatus can withstand continued external pressure and internal resistance remains the central question for the Islamic Republic's stability and the broader regional security environment.[70][71][73][38][1]
The comprehensive mapping of IRGC installations, command relationships, and operational infrastructure provided in this assessment enables policymakers, military planners, and analysts to understand the architecture of repression sustaining the Iranian regime and identify potential leverage points for supporting the Iranian people's struggle for freedom.
File:Administrative map of Tehran.svg - Wikimedia Commons
_____________________________________________________________
Greater Tehran Metropolitan Boundaries
Greater Tehran extends beyond the city limits of Tehran proper to encompass the central part of Tehran Province and the eastern part of Alborz Province. The metropolitan area includes several major municipalities: Karaj (population 1,592,492), Tehran (8,693,706), Eslamshahr, Shahriar, Qods, Malard, Pakdasht, Qarchak, Parand, Pardis, and Fardis.[34][66][27]
Tehran itself is divided into 22 municipal districts, with 20 located in Tehran County's Central District, while District 1 is in Shemiranat County and District 20 is in Ray County. This administrative complexity reflects the capital's expansion beyond its historical boundaries to absorb formerly independent towns and villages.[34]
Key Coordinate Reference Points
Central Tehran: 35.6944°N, 51.4215°E serves as the general reference point for the capital.[67][68][69]
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction HQ: 35.76269°N, 51.35722°E (35°45'46"N, 51°21'26"E)[45][46]
Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters: 35.70778°N, 51.44028°E (35°42'28"N, 51°26'25"E)[48][49]
Evin Prison: 35.7960°N, 51.3840°E (35°47'46"N, 51°23'3"E)[50][51][52]
Pasdaran District: 35.76556°N, 51.45333°E (35°45'56"N, 51°27'12"E)[63]
Coordinates for the Thar-Allah Headquarters, Sar-Allah Operational Base, the four sub-headquarters, and specific security brigade locations have been provided to U.S. officials through classified intelligence channels but are not available in open sources. The UANI report states it contains "exact coordinates" for these 50 high-value targets.[1][2][3][15]
Recent Operational Context (2025-2026)
Israeli Strikes on IRGC Infrastructure
During the June 2025 Iran-Israel War (also known as the Twelve-Day War), Israeli forces conducted extensive airstrikes against IRGC installations throughout Tehran. The IDF targeted the IRGC Ground Forces Sarallah Operational Base, Basij headquarters, the command center of the Quds Force, Evin Prison, and numerous other facilities.[18][19][36]
On June 15, 2025, Israeli strikes reportedly hit the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence building in Tehran. The following day, the IDF struck a building killing Iran's intelligence chief Mohammad Kazemi, along with Hassan Mohaqeq and Mohammad Khatami—three senior IRGC Intelligence Organization officials. These targeted killings demonstrated Israel's intelligence penetration of Iran's most sensitive security apparatus.[55][36]
The IDF issued evacuation warnings to residents of District 18 in southwestern Tehran before conducting strikes in that area. Strikes across the city killed hundreds of IRGC personnel according to Israeli estimates, with the IDF specifically targeting command centers, internal security forces, and military infrastructure.[36][37]
Iran International reported that Khamenei was moved to the Lavizan bunker complex "hours after Israel began its attacks on Tehran early Friday," with sources indicating his "deteriorating psychological state" as military commanders concealed the full extent of damage from him.[54][56][55][36]
January 2026 Intelligence Disclosure and Trump Administration Response
In January 2026, as nationwide protests entered their third week and the death toll of Iranian protesters reportedly surpassed 2,000, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) delivered a comprehensive dossier to the Trump administration containing detailed intelligence on 50 high-value IRGC targets in Tehran. The report was compiled by Kasra Aarabi, Director of IRGC Research at UANI, and delivered to White House officials in the early hours of January 12, 2026, ahead of critical security meetings.[1][2][3][6]
The dossier identified:
· The exact coordinates of the Thar-Allah Headquarters
· Four sub-headquarters overseeing different regions of Tehran
· 23 IRGC-Basij regional bases across Tehran's 22 municipality regions
· Two operational security brigades (Aaleh-e Mohammad and Al-Zahra)
· Hidden infrastructure coordinating intelligence, policing, and psychological operations[2][3][5][31][1]
According to the Daily Mail, "By identifying these sites and divisions, the U.S. military would have a blueprint of the IRGC's ability to coordinate the killing of its own citizens, an atrocity that irked the US president and spurred him to draw up options to assist protesters". Aarabi stated, "The cycle of protests and suppression will continue unless the balance of power changes between unarmed Iranian protesters and the regime's fully armed and radicalized apparatus of repression".[3][1]
President Donald Trump subsequently indicated he cancelled all meetings with Iranian officials, told protesters that "help is on the way," and instructed them to "save the names of the killers and abusers". The IRGC declared maximum alert status in response to potential U.S. strikes, with IRGC Air and Space Force Commander Majid Mousavi announcing heightened readiness.[70][71][1]
Current Threat Environment
As of January 2026, the IRGC maintains maximum alert status across its Tehran installations. The regime faces mounting domestic unrest, international pressure, economic sanctions, and the demonstrated vulnerability of its command infrastructure to precision strikes. The disclosure of precise target coordinates to the U.S. government represents an unprecedented intelligence breakthrough that fundamentally alters the strategic calculus for both the Iranian regime and external actors considering options to support Iranian protesters.[1][72][70][71][55][36]
The IRGC has responded by dispersing leadership, increasing underground facility usage, expanding missile stockpiles, and reinforcing its apparatus of repression through more aggressive Basij deployments and cyber surveillance. However, the deaths of multiple senior commanders, exposure of classified facility locations, and clear demonstration of intelligence penetration have significantly degraded both operational security and regime morale.[71][73][9][48][38][55][36]
Strategic Implications and Assessment
Operational Vulnerabilities
The IRGC's Greater Tehran infrastructure exhibits several critical vulnerabilities despite its comprehensive design:
Centralization of Command: The concentration of multiple command headquarters, operational divisions, and intelligence facilities within Greater Tehran creates target-rich opportunities for adversaries. While this centralization enables rapid coordination during crises, it also means that successful strikes on key nodes can disrupt operations across multiple subordinate units simultaneously.
Known Locations: The disclosure of precise coordinates for 50 installations fundamentally compromises the defensive value of these facilities. Even hardened bunkers and dispersed command posts lose strategic value when adversaries possess accurate targeting data.[1][2][3]
Personnel Concentration: The deaths of senior commanders including the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters commander and his successor within four days, plus the intelligence chief and two deputies, demonstrate that even the most protected leadership remains vulnerable to precision strikes.[9][48][36]
Infrastructure Dependencies: IRGC operations depend on vulnerable infrastructure including road networks, communications systems, power supplies, and logistics chains that can be disrupted. The extensive use of civilian neighborhoods and facilities for military purposes also constrains the regime's defensive options.
Internal Security Architecture Assessment
The Basij paramilitary network represents both the regime's greatest strength and a potential weakness in maintaining control:
Strengths: The 23 regional bases and comprehensive district-level presence enable rapid mobilization, continuous surveillance, and immediate response to emerging protests. The integration of neighborhood informants with formal intelligence structures creates a panopticon effect where citizens face constant monitoring.[1][2][3][20][23]
Weaknesses: The Basij has repeatedly struggled to suppress large-scale protests in Tehran, requiring reinforcement from provincial units. The organization's reliance on ideological motivation rather than professional training creates vulnerabilities when facing determined opposition. Additionally, economic pressures and generational change may be eroding the Basij recruitment base.[32][33]
Performance Indicators: Mixed results during 2009, 2017-2018, 2019-2020, and 2022-2023 protests suggest that while the Basij can ultimately crush dissent through overwhelming force and brutality, it cannot prevent protests from occurring or eliminate underlying grievances. The reported death toll exceeding 2,000 protesters in January 2026 indicates escalating violence but also persistent resistance.[12][13][6][33][1][32]
Intelligence and Cyber Capabilities
The IO-IRGC's expansion into a potentially more powerful organization than the Ministry of Intelligence reflects the regime's prioritization of internal security over external intelligence collection. This reallocation of resources indicates the regime's assessment that domestic threats exceed external military dangers—a calculation that may prove strategically myopic if external adversaries exploit internal vulnerabilities.[9][10][43]
The IRGC Cyber Command's documented activities against dissidents, infrastructure, and foreign targets demonstrate sophisticated capabilities. However, the 2022 breach that leaked member identities suggests vulnerabilities in the organization's own cyber security. The regime's heavy investment in internet censorship, surveillance, and counter-opposition operations indicates both capability and fear of digital threats to its control.[38][44]
Geographic and Territorial Analysis
The division of Tehran into four operational zones under Thar-Allah's sub-headquarters reflects standard military doctrine for controlling large urban areas. However, this structure also creates coordination challenges, potential gaps at zone boundaries, and multiplies the number of facilities requiring security.[1][4][3][16][13]
The concentration of critical facilities in northern Tehran (Pasdaran Avenue area, Evin, Lavizan) creates geographic clustering that simplifies adversary targeting while complicating civilian protection. Conversely, the dispersal of Basij bases throughout all 22 districts ensures no area remains unmonitored but dilutes force concentration.[24][63][50][54]
Greater Tehran's expansion into Alborz Province (particularly Karaj) extends the strategic perimeter the IRGC must defend while providing depth for dispersing critical assets. The 10th Division's location in Karaj serves both as a conventional military reserve and as a backstop should Tehran's internal security forces be overwhelmed.[11][25][21][34][66][27]
Conclusion
The IRGC's installation architecture in Greater Tehran represents a comprehensive, multilayered system designed to protect the Islamic Republic's leadership, project military power, and suppress internal dissent. The Thar-Allah Headquarters serves as the operational nerve center, coordinating four regional sub-headquarters, 23 Basij regional bases, multiple operational divisions, specialized security brigades, intelligence organizations, and cyber warfare units across the capital region.
Recent intelligence disclosures providing exact coordinates for 50 high-value targets have fundamentally compromised the defensive value of this infrastructure, creating unprecedented vulnerabilities for the regime. The demonstrated success of Israeli strikes in eliminating senior commanders and hitting critical facilities during June 2025, combined with ongoing protests and international pressure in January 2026, indicates that the IRGC faces mounting challenges to maintaining its control architecture.[1][2][3][15]
The regime's response—increasing alert levels, dispersing leadership, expanding surveillance, and escalating violence against protesters—suggests recognition of these vulnerabilities while doubling down on repression as the primary strategy for survival. Whether this apparatus can withstand continued external pressure and internal resistance remains the central question for the Islamic Republic's stability and the broader regional security environment.[70][71][73][38][1]
The comprehensive mapping of IRGC installations, command relationships, and operational infrastructure provided in this assessment enables policymakers, military planners, and analysts to understand the architecture of repression sustaining the Iranian regime and identify potential leverage points for supporting the Iranian people's struggle for freedom.
File:Administrative map of Tehran.svg - Wikimedia Commons
_____________________________________________________________
⁂
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