.
.
.
.
Pasdaran پاسداران
Basij بسیج
Artesh ارتش نظامی
Iranian police پلیس
Until Prince Reza Pahlavi unleashes his SECURITY PERSONNEL LOYALISTS inside Iran, the revolutionary struggle against the puppet Mullahs will be long and destructive of precious human life in Iran.
THE ABOVE MUST BECOME INVOLVED IN THE REVOLUTION, NOT JUST STAND ASIDE AND WATCH.
THEY MUST WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS AND BADGES AND PROTEST.
THEY MUST GIVE FURTHER LEGITIMACY TO THE PROTESTS.
THEY MUST CARRY THEIR WEAPONS, AND GIVE OTHER GUNS TO THE PROTESTORS WHO HAVE UNDERGONE MILITARY TRAINING.
The Revolutionary Role of Iran's Security Forces in Overthrowing the Islamic Republic: A Thesis for Internal Regime Change
Executive Summary: The Unique Position of Iran's Security Apparatus
For 47 years, the Islamic Republic has maintained power through systematic oppression, economic mismanagement, and institutionalized corruption that has stolen hundreds of billions of dollars from the Iranian people.
Today, the security forces—the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), the regular military (Artesh), the police (Law Enforcement Command), and the paramilitary Basij—stand at a historic crossroads.
These institutions, created ostensibly to protect Iran and its revolution, have instead become instruments of a corrupt elite that enriches itself while ordinary Iranians and rank-and-file security personnel alike suffer economic devastation.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
This thesis argues that Iran's security forces possess both the moral imperative and operational capacity to remove the Mullah regime without foreign intervention or widespread civil war.
This thesis argues that Iran's security forces possess both the moral imperative and operational capacity to remove the Mullah regime without foreign intervention or widespread civil war.
The security apparatus shares the grievances of the Iranian people—economic hardship, currency collapse, and systematic corruption—while uniquely possessing the organizational structure, weapons, and institutional knowledge to execute regime change.
Historical precedents from Tunisia (2011), Egypt (2011), and Iran itself (1979) demonstrate that when security forces withdraw support from illegitimate regimes, those regimes collapse rapidly.[7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
Part I: Shared Connections Between Security Forces and the Iranian People
The Common Economic Crisis
The current economic catastrophe affects security personnel and civilians equally. The Iranian rial has collapsed to 1.45 million per U.S. dollar, destroying the purchasing power of fixed salaries. While IRGC commanders pocket millions through corruption schemes—overcharging the government $500-1,000 per month per militia fighter and controlling $25-30 billion in smuggling operations—ordinary security force members struggle alongside their fellow citizens.[4][14][5][15]
Recent reports reveal the regime's desperation: authorities now distribute 500,000 to 1,000,000 toman gift cards to Basij members to "encourage them to suppress their own neighbors". This cash incentive system exposes the regime's recognition that economic pressure has eroded even the loyalty of its paramilitary forces. Security personnel are being bribed to attack their own communities—a profound moral crisis that creates the psychological conditions for defection.[9]
The lived reality is that a Basij member, police officer, or Artesh soldier faces the same inflation (52% year-over-year), the same food price increases (70%+), and the same currency collapse as protestors in the streets. Their families suffer identical hardships. The distinction between "security forces" and "the people" dissolves when both groups are victims of the same corrupt system.[14][16][17]
Institutional Grievances Within the Security Apparatus
Beyond shared economic suffering, the security forces harbor specific institutional grievances that create revolutionary potential:
The Marginalization of Artesh (Regular Army): Iran's conventional military has been systematically sidelined, underfunded, and politically isolated for four decades. The Artesh receives inferior equipment and resources compared to the IRGC, despite bearing responsibility for territorial defense. Officers educated in military professionalism witness their institution treated as a potential threat rather than a pillar of national defense. This creates a cadre of trained military professionals who owe no ideological loyalty to the revolution and who maintain deeper connections to Iranian national identity rather than Islamic revolutionary ideology.[18][19][20][21]
Internal IRGC Contradictions: Even within the Revolutionary Guards, tensions exist. Reports indicate generational divides between older officers shaped by the Iran-Iraq War and younger commanders who question the regional proxy strategy. Recent arrests of IRGC generals and lower-ranking soldiers following Israeli strikes reveal the regime's paranoia and distrust of its own forces. The systematic corruption at senior levels—documented cases of commanders embezzling militia salaries and managing billion-dollar smuggling networks—breeds resentment among mid-level officers who witness their institution's degradation into a mafia-like enterprise.[22][5][23][24][25][4]
Basij's Identity Crisis: While portrayed as ideological zealots, many Basij members joined for practical benefits—university admission, government jobs, military service exemptions—rather than revolutionary conviction. Studies indicate that Basij forces are viewed as a "profound source of disquiet and rancor" among the general public. Members increasingly recognize they are despised by their communities and being asked to suppress people facing identical economic pressures.[26]
The Moral Burden of Repression
Security forces are being ordered to commit violence against peaceful protestors, including hospital raids to arrest wounded civilians. These actions create psychological trauma and moral injury among personnel who recognize they are suppressing legitimate grievances. The January 2026 protests have killed dozens, with reports of security forces firing on unarmed demonstrators.[27][28][29][17]
Historical analysis shows that orders to fire on civilians create critical defection points. In Tunisia 2011, General Rachid Ammar refused orders to shoot protestors, precipitating Ben Ali's fall. In Iran 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini called on soldiers to defect, and revolutionaries gave flowers and civilian clothes to deserters, successfully fracturing the Shah's military. The current regime's reliance on violent suppression places unbearable moral weight on security personnel who must choose between their communities and a corrupt leadership.[12][13][7]
Part II: Corruption and Misappropriation as Revolutionary Catalyst
Documented Scale of Theft
The corruption of the Islamic Republic is not speculation—it is documented by the regime's own officials:
· Annual theft: Former senior officials acknowledge $40-50 billion stolen yearly from Iran's economy[6]
· Ministry of Defense: Official reports confirm "embezzlement," "bribery," and "collusion in transactions," with the weaknesses including "lack of a strong and centralized independent body for comprehensive supervision" and "vague and extensive statutes of some companies"[1]
· High-profile cases: The $21 billion Mobarakeh Steel fraud, $3 billion Sarmayeh Bank embezzlement, $5 billion missing from Tehran municipality during Ghalibaf's tenure as mayor[3][30][4]
· IRGC salary schemes: Commanders report militia fighter salaries of $700 to the government while paying fighters $100-200, pocketing $500-1,000 per person monthly—a scheme worth hundreds of millions annually[4]
The IRGC Economic Empire
The Revolutionary Guards control an estimated 40-70% of Iran's economy through a labyrinthine network of front companies, monopolies, and smuggling operations:[2][5][15][23][31][24]
· Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters: The largest government contractor, winning projects without competitive bidding, dominating oil, gas, petrochemical, infrastructure, and construction sectors[23][31]
· IRGC Cooperative Foundation: Manages IRGC investments across banking, retail, media, entertainment, transportation, and agriculture. The European Council identifies it as "responsible for funneling money into the regime's brutal repression"[23]
· Smuggling networks: Controls 40-50% of oil exports through unofficial channels worth $25-30 billion, bypassing government oversight[15]
· Zero accountability: As military entities, IRGC companies pay no taxes, face no regulatory oversight, and eliminate private competitors through political pressure[24][1][23]
This economic empire enriches a narrow elite—senior IRGC commanders, clerical families, and regime insiders—while Iran's economy collapses. The contradiction is stark: security forces are ordered to protect a system that steals from the nation while they and their families starve.
Corruption as Systematic, Not Incidental
Importantly, this corruption is not the work of individual bad actors but is structural and systematic:[2][3][15]
· The Supreme Leader controls vast financial resources through institutions like Setad Ejraie (Executive Headquarters of Imam's Directive), which along with Khatam al-Anbiya, Astan-e Quds, and Foundation of the Oppressed control 60% of national wealth—none connected to parliament or government oversight[2]
· The regime's own Javan daily acknowledges corruption "is constantly being reproduced" due to "economic and social situations"[2]
· Corruption investigations reach only the "tip of the iceberg" as perpetrators "have a lot of influence, and because of their political influence, they can easily deal with people who hinder their activities"[2]
This systematic theft explains why sanctions alone cannot account for Iran's economic crisis. Regime insiders admit governance failures and corruption—not external pressure—drive the collapse. Security forces tasked with defending this system must confront the reality that they protect organized theft, not Islamic revolution or Iranian national interests.[32][33][6]
Part III: The Current Revolutionary Moment (2025-2026)
Unprecedented Protest Dynamics
The protests erupting since December 2025 represent a qualitative shift from previous unrest:[34][35][14]
Scale and Coordination: Research organizations documented 179+ protests across 21+ provinces by January 5, 2026, spreading to over 100 cities. For the first time, a specific timed call for protests received coordinated nationwide response, demonstrating organizational capacity previously absent.[36][37][38][35]
Social Coalition: The current movement unites bazaar merchants (the economy's backbone), university students, workers, women defying hijab laws, and ethnic minorities—mirroring the 1979 coalition that overthrew the Shah. This cross-class, cross-ethnic mobilization poses existential threat to any regime.[14][34]
Explicit Revolutionary Demands: Unlike earlier reform-oriented movements, current protests feature explicit calls for regime change. Slogans include "Death to the dictator" (targeting Khamenei personally), "No Gaza, No Lebanon, my life for Iran" (rejecting proxy wars), and direct challenges to the Islamic Republic's legitimacy.[37][17][39][34]
Collapse of Fear: Analysts note the protesters have lost fear of the regime—a psychological threshold that historically precedes revolutionary success. The regime's traditional coercion-concession playbook appears ineffective as public fear evaporates.[39][14]
Regime Vulnerability Indicators
Multiple factors indicate the Islamic Republic faces unprecedented fragility:
Economic Collapse: The currency crisis, 52% inflation, and 70%+ food price increases have destroyed the regime's ability to buy social peace. The government's announcement of a $7 per person monthly allowance for four months exposed both desperation and inadequacy.[16][17][14]
Regional Defeats: The June 2025 war with Israel damaged military facilities and killed senior commanders, demonstrating vulnerability. The collapse of Assad's Syria, degradation of Hezbollah, and weakening of Hamas destroyed the "axis of resistance" strategy that justified economic sacrifice.[40][32][14]
Elite Fragmentation: Former President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif publicly questioned strategic alignment with Russia. Mehdi Karroubi directly blamed Khamenei for "destroying the economy, culture, security, and ethics." Parliamentary disputes and factional infighting reveal loss of elite cohesion.[41][32]
Security Force Strain: The deployment of IRGC Ground Forces—a rare measure reserved for extreme circumstances—indicates that regular Law Enforcement Command and Basij units face "bandwidth constraints" and cannot cover the nationwide protests. Reports of 950 police and 60 Basij injured, plus 2 IRGC Ground Forces members killed, show the security apparatus under unprecedented pressure.[29][27]
Defection Signals: Opposition leader Reza Pahlavi reports 20,000+ military members registered with his defection platform. Reports document police defecting and joining protestors, chanting "Death to the dictator". These preliminary defections indicate growing willingness among security personnel to break with the regime.[42][43][44]
Historical Parallels: The 1979 Playbook in Reverse
The regime's deepest fear is justified: the current coalition mirrors 1979, when bazaaris, students, workers, and clerics united against the Shah. Key parallels include:[7][14]
· Military demoralization: Just as the Shah's forces became demoralized by orders to suppress demonstrators, current security forces face moral crisis from hospital raids and shooting civilians[17][29][7]
· Elite defection: In 1979, many generals planned defection or joined the anti-Shah movement when they recognized the regime's illegitimacy. Today's elite fragmentation and public criticism by former officials signal similar dynamics[45][32]
· Cycle of repression: The Shah's violent crackdowns fueled larger protests. Today's security crackdowns generate international condemnation and domestic outrage, accelerating the crisis[17][14]
The critical difference is that in 1979, the revolutionaries successfully called on soldiers to defect, offering them safe passage and integration into the new order. Today, an equivalent call directed at security forces could fracture the regime's coercive capacity.[7]
Part IV: Why Security Forces Can Remove the Mullahs Alone—A Step-by-Step Strategy
Foundational Premise: Regime Survival Depends on Security Forces
Despite controlling vast wealth and wielding religious authority, the Islamic Republic's survival depends entirely on the willingness of security forces to use violence against the population. Modern regime theory confirms that regimes collapse when coercive institutions withdraw support—not necessarily when popular discontent reaches certain thresholds.[8][46][47][48][40]
Historical evidence:
· Tunisia 2011: Ben Ali's regime collapsed within days when General Ammar refused to shoot protestors, despite the president controlling police and presidential guards[13][12]
· Egypt 2011: Mubarak fell when the military calculated that sacrificing him protected their broader institutional interests, despite facing smaller protests than Iran currently experiences[49][50][8]
· Iran 1979: The Shah fled when military demoralization and defection made violent suppression untenable[45][7]
In each case, the decisive factor was security force defection, not the scale of protests. This places ultimate power in the hands of Iran's military and police institutions.
Prerequisites for Successful Internal Overthrow
Drawing from academic research on military defections and successful regime transitions, several conditions must exist:[51][52][53]
Coordination among plotters: Coups succeed through coordination, not overwhelming force. Officers must communicate, build trust networks, and agree on timing. The key is not converting every soldier but establishing sufficient coordination among mid-level commanders who control actual units.[53][54]
Perception of inevitability: Creating the perception that the regime has already fallen or will imminently fall triggers bandwagoning behavior. Most security personnel and officials adapt to what appears to be the new reality rather than risking their lives for a lost cause.[55]
Neutralization of loyalist centers: Rather than fighting the entire security apparatus, plotters must isolate or paralyze the most loyal units—particularly the IRGC's intelligence and counterintelligence divisions and the Basij's elite units.[55]
Manufactured fait accompli: Controlling communications and visible symbols of authority creates the perception of victory, prompting most personnel to accept the transition.[55]
Minimization of civil war risk: Officers defect when they believe the transition can succeed without protracted conflict that would destroy the institution and potentially their lives. Clear assurances of institutional continuity and personal security facilitate defection.[56][53]
External or opposition coordination: While security forces can overthrow the regime, coordination with civilian opposition provides political legitimacy and reduces the risk of military dictatorship replacing clerical dictatorship.[57][58][51]
Step-by-Step Plan for Security Force-Led Regime Change
Phase 1: Clandestine Coordination and Network Building (1-6 months)
Objective: Build coordinated networks among mid-level officers across Artesh, IRGC, and Law Enforcement Command who commit to simultaneous action.
Actions:
1. Identify sympathetic commanders: Focus on mid-level officers (majors through colonels/brigadiers) who control operational units, particularly those in:
o Artesh divisions stationed near Tehran and provincial capitals
o IRGC provincial divisions (NOT Quds Force or counterintelligence)
o Law Enforcement Command provincial headquarters
o Basij brigade commanders outside the elite hardline units
2. Exploit existing grievances: Recruitment messaging should emphasize:
o Economic suffering shared with families and communities
o Corruption that steals from security forces and nation
o Moral burden of suppressing legitimate grievances
o Institutional interests (especially for Artesh officers marginalized by IRGC)
o Patriotic duty to save Iran from economic collapse and international isolation
3. Create secure communication networks: Use encrypted channels, face-to-face meetings in secure locations, and cells structure that limits exposure if discovered. External diaspora organizations like Pahlavi's defection platform can provide technical assistance and secure communication infrastructure.[44][42]
4. Build horizontal networks: The regime has deliberately fragmented security forces to prevent coordination. Plotters must overcome this by building trust networks across institutional boundaries—Artesh officers coordinating with sympathetic IRGC provincial commanders and senior police officials.[59][60][61]
5. Conduct discrete loyalty assessments: Officers must evaluate which units will follow orders, which will remain neutral, and which will actively resist. This intelligence is critical for operational planning.
Critical principle: At this stage, absolute secrecy is paramount. The regime's counterintelligence services will execute anyone suspected of plotting. Use of dead drops, burner communication devices, and compartmentalized cells prevents exposure.[61]
Phase 2: Pre-Positioning and Final Preparation (1-2 weeks before action)
Objective: Position loyal units for rapid action while maintaining operational security and preparing to neutralize loyalist forces.
Actions:
1. Coordinate timing with protest cycles: Plan the decisive action to coincide with large protests that strain regime resources and provide political cover. The protests create noise that disguises military movements and provide popular legitimacy.[35][27]
2. Pre-position Artesh and sympathetic IRGC units: Under guise of normal operations or training exercises, move trustworthy units toward:
o Tehran (particularly around key ministries, IRIB state television, Supreme Leader's compound)
o Provincial capitals and IRGC/Basij headquarters
o Communications infrastructure (television, radio, internet hubs)
o Prisons holding political prisoners (whose release provides immediate legitimacy)
3. Identify and plan to isolate hardcore loyalists: The primary loyal forces are:
o IRGC Intelligence Organization and counterintelligence
o Supreme Leader's protection forces
o Elite Basij units attached to key facilities
o Quds Force commanders (though many are abroad)
4. These units should be isolated through cutting communications, surrounding barracks, or arresting commanders during the initial hours.[55]
5. Prepare messaging and declarations: Draft and pre-record statements explaining actions as:
o Patriotic duty to save Iran from economic collapse and corruption
o Temporary measure to restore constitutional order
o Commitment to transitional process leading to free elections
o Guarantees of security for security personnel who remain neutral or join the transition
o Assurances to ethnic and religious minorities of continued rights
6. Coordinate with opposition leadership: Establish discrete channels with civilian opposition figures (Pahlavi, Tajzadeh, or others with legitimacy) to provide civilian political authority immediately. This prevents perception of military dictatorship.[58]
Phase 3: Decisive Action—The First 48 Hours
Objective: Rapidly seize control of capital and provincial centers, neutralize loyalist resistance, and establish new authority through controlled demonstrations of force and political messaging.
Hour 0-6: Simultaneous Operations Across Iran
In Tehran:
· Artesh units and sympathetic IRGC commanders move to secure:
o IRIB (state television/radio) - Critical priority #1
o Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Intelligence
o Evin Prison and other detention facilities (release political prisoners immediately)
o Telecommunications infrastructure
o Major intersections and government districts
· Small teams arrest or detain:
o Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and immediate staff
o IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour
o Intelligence Minister and counterintelligence chiefs
o Key Basij commanders
o Head of Judiciary
In Provincial Capitals:
· Local Artesh and police commanders secure:
o Provincial IRGC headquarters (isolate, surround, demand surrender)
o Governor's offices and provincial administration buildings
o Local television/radio stations
o Communication nodes
Critical tactical principle: Use of force should be minimal and surgical. The goal is rapid neutralization of command structure, not pitched battles. Most security personnel will not fight once they perceive the transition as inevitable. Commanders should broadcast surrender terms immediately: personnel who lay down arms receive amnesty; those who resist face military justice.[53][55]
Hour 6-12: Broadcasting Authority and Building Momentum
1. Broadcast from IRIB: Using state television and radio (now under control), deliver pre-recorded messages:
o From military commanders: Explain action as necessary to save Iran from economic destruction and corruption. Emphasize patriotic duty, institutional interests, and moral imperative. List specific corruption cases (the $21 billion fraud, commanders' theft of militia salaries, etc.) as evidence of regime's criminal nature.[30][3][1][4]
o From civilian opposition leaders: Provide political legitimacy. Announce formation of transitional council, commitment to free elections within defined timeframe, guarantee of rights for all Iranians.
o To security forces: Direct message to all personnel: "The Islamic Republic has ended. The transition is underway across Iran. Security forces who remain neutral or join the transition will be integrated into new security structure. Those who resist will face military justice. Check with your commanders—you will find the capital has fallen."
2. Release political prisoners: Immediately broadcast footage of political prisoners being freed from Evin and other facilities. This provides powerful visual evidence of regime's end and builds popular support.[7]
3. Coordinate with protests: As news spreads, protestors will spontaneously mass in streets (as occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya). Security forces should facilitate rather than suppress these demonstrations, allowing them to provide popular legitimacy while maintaining order.[46][12]
4. Establish perimeters around loyalist holdouts: If elite IRGC or Basij units resist, surround their facilities, cut power and communications, and broadcast surrender terms. Prolonged sieges drain loyalist morale while minimizing casualties.[53]
Hour 12-48: Consolidation and Bandwagoning
1. Provincial cascades: As Tehran's fall becomes undeniable, provincial commanders face choice: join the transition or face isolation. The momentum typically accelerates as fence-sitters bandwagon to the winning side.[62][54][53]
2. International recognition: Coordinate with diaspora organizations and friendly governments to issue rapid recognition statements. International legitimacy further isolates holdouts.[51][57]
3. Civilian authority establishment: The transitional council (civilian-military mix) holds first public meeting, announces immediate measures:
o Suspension of morality police and mandatory hijab enforcement
o Release of all political prisoners
o Investigation and prosecution of corruption
o Commitment to constitutional process
o Guarantees of security sector reform while maintaining institutional stability
4. Address security personnel directly: The transitional government must immediately address security forces:
o Announce salary increases and economic relief (funded by seizing corrupt officials' assets)
o Guarantee continued employment for professional, non-criminal personnel
o Create truth and reconciliation framework that distinguishes between following orders and criminal acts
o Emphasize integration rather than purges (learning from Iraq's disastrous de-Baathification)[25]
Phase 4: Transition and Stabilization (Weeks to Months)
Objective: Prevent counter-coup, maintain order, begin political transition, and integrate security forces into new democratic framework.
Immediate Security Priorities:
1. Prevent counter-revolution: The primary threat is loyalist IRGC elements attempting counter-coup. Counter-measures:
o Maintain unity among transitional military/security leadership
o Rapidly prosecute corrupt and criminally abusive officials (but through judicial process, not summary execution)
o Keep security forces paid and operational to prevent chaos
o Monitor for coup plotting through intelligence services under civilian oversight
2. Maintain public order: The transition period risks chaos, looting, and score-settling. Security forces must:[63][64]
o Protect infrastructure, hospitals, and essential services
o Prevent sectarian or ethnic violence
o Enforce law while respecting human rights (dramatic shift from regime practices)
o Demonstrate to public that security forces serve Iran and its people, not ideology
3. Demobilize or integrate paramilitary forces: The Basij presents particular challenge—large, ideologically varied, equipped with weapons. Options:
o Voluntary disarmament with compensation
o Integration of professional elements into police or military
o Prosecution of those personally involved in torture or killing
o Use of truth and reconciliation processes for lower-level members
Political Transition Framework:
Based on successful transitions (Tunisia, potentially Egypt initially):[65][66][46]
1. Constitutional convention or reform process (3-12 months): Representatives from across Iranian society (ethnic groups, religious communities, provinces, professional sectors) draft new constitutional framework or reform existing 1906 constitution.
2. Security Sector Reform: International best practices suggest:[64][67][51]
o Merge IRGC and Artesh into unified national military under civilian control
o Professionalize police forces with human rights training
o Eliminate parallel security structures and intelligence agency redundancies
o Subject security budget to parliamentary oversight
o Implement transparent procurement processes
3. Economic transformation: Dismantle IRGC economic empire through:
o Nationalization of assets with compensation based on legitimate investment (not stolen wealth)
o Competitive bidding for government contracts
o Tax collection from all entities
o Independent central bank and fiscal policy
o Anti-corruption institutions with enforcement power
4. Free elections (12-18 months): Following constitutional process and registration of political parties, conduct elections for parliament and presidency. International observers verify fairness.
Truth and Reconciliation: Following 1. South African model, create mechanism for:
o Documenting regime crimes
o Providing justice for victims
o Offering amnesty for those who testify truthfully about non-criminal acts
o Distinguishing between leadership (face prosecution) and rank-and-file (face truth-telling but not prosecution)
Critical Success Factors:
· Maintain security force unity: Fragmentation invites civil war. Leadership must constantly reinforce shared interests and vision.[64][56]
· Deliver rapid economic relief: Immediate measures (release of frozen assets, emergency aid, corruption prosecutions that recover stolen funds) demonstrate tangible change.[63][64]
· Inclusive political process: Transition fails if perceived as ethnic, religious, or factional takeover. Broad representation critical.[66][65][64]
· International support: Engage UN, Western democracies, and regional states for:
o Economic assistance and sanctions relief
o Technical expertise on democratic transitions
o Security guarantees against external threats (especially given Iran's volatile neighborhood)
o Diplomatic recognition and legitimacy[57][58][51]
Part V: Addressing Challenges and Objections
Challenge 1: "The IRGC is too powerful and ideologically committed"
Response: The IRGC is not monolithic. Research reveals:
· Generational divisions between older commanders and younger officers questioning the regional proxy strategy[22]
· Endemic corruption that enriches senior officers while impoverishing mid-level ranks[5][4]
· Bandwidth constraints evident in current protests requiring IRGC Ground Forces deployment[27]
· Historical precedent: in 1979, many imperial generals initially supported the Shah ideologically but defected when institutional survival required it[45][7]
Moreover, the plan explicitly recognizes IRGC elite units will resist. The strategy is neutralization through isolation, not necessarily conversion. When Artesh units (larger and better conventional capabilities) plus sympathetic IRGC provincial forces plus police overwhelm hardline elements, resistance becomes futile.[19][20]
Challenge 2: "Lack of coordination and leadership"
Response: Accurate assessment of current weakness but not insurmountable. The step-by-step plan addresses this explicitly:[68][57]
· Phase 1 focuses on building coordination networks
· External technical assistance from diaspora organizations provides communication infrastructure[42][44]
· Historical coups often coalesce rapidly once core group commits[62][53]
· The decisive action itself creates coordination through forcing choice: join, remain neutral, or resist (with most choosing first two options)
Challenge 3: "Risk of civil war or chaos"
Response: The plan minimizes this risk through:
· Rapid, simultaneous action that creates perception of fait accompli[55]
· Targeting command structure rather than fighting rank-and-file[53]
· Immediate civilian political authority to prevent military dictatorship perception[58][51]
· Maintaining institutional continuity for professional security personnel[25]
· Learning from successful transitions (Tunisia) rather than disasters (Libya, Syria)[69][46][12]
Historical evidence suggests that civil wars follow from prolonged stalemate, not rapid regime change. The 48-hour window is critical—if capital falls and provinces follow quickly, resistance collapses.[12][13][63][64][53]
Challenge 4: "External intervention by Russia, China, or regional actors"
Response:
· Russia and China support the regime diplomatically but have shown no willingness to militarily intervene to save it. Their support is transactional, not ideological.[32][34]
· Rapid transition (48-72 hours) presents them with fait accompli before mobilization possible
· Regional actors (Gulf states, Turkey, Israel) would likely welcome regime change
· U.S. and European states have signaled support for protestors; transitional government receiving international recognition would deter intervention[57][58]
Challenge 5: "This leads to military dictatorship, not democracy"
Response: Valid concern requiring explicit safeguards:
· Immediate formation of civilian-military transitional council with civilian majority[51][58]
· Constitutional commitment to elections within defined timeframe[64]
· International monitoring and assistance to prevent military consolidation[66][64]
· Security Sector Reform that subordinates military to civilian authority[67][51]
· Learning from Egypt's negative example (military consolidated power) while emulating Tunisia's success (military facilitated then withdrew)[8][46][12]
The critical factor is civilian opposition coordination from outset. If Pahlavi, Tajzadeh, or other civilian figures with legitimacy immediately provide political authority, military actors have less incentive and opportunity to consolidate permanent power.[58]
Part VI: The Moral and Strategic Imperative
Why Security Forces Must Act Now
Economic Reality: Iran faces economic freefall. The currency has lost two-thirds of its value in months. Inflation exceeds 50%. Ordinary Iranians including security force families face starvation. Every month of regime continuation deepens the crisis. The corruption schemes documented in this thesis steal billions that could fund salaries, public services, and development.[10][11][3][6][16][1][4][14][17]
Institutional Survival: The Artesh has been marginalized for decades, reduced to "nothing but a shadow of its pre-revolutionary self". The IRGC has been transformed from a revolutionary guard into a criminal enterprise that enriches commanders while rank-and-file soldiers suppress their own neighbors for gift cards. The police and Basij are ordered to commit human rights abuses that destroy their standing in society.[20][5][9][26][29][19][4][17][23]
Institutional survival requires action. The current regime offers no future for professional military institutions—only continued marginalization, corruption, and moral degradation.
Patriotic Duty: Security forces swear oaths to defend Iran, not the Islamic Republic or individual leaders. The regime's policies have:
· Destroyed the economy through corruption and mismanagement[6][32]
· Isolated Iran internationally and provoked conflicts that weaken national security[40][32]
· Stolen tens of billions from national resources[3][1][4][6][2]
· Created conditions for potential foreign intervention through weakness[14][40]
Defending Iran now means removing the regime that endangers the nation.
Moral Imperative: Security personnel witness daily the moral bankruptcy of the system. They see:
· Commanders stealing militia salaries while fighters go unpaid[4]
· Billions embezzled while ordinary Iranians starve[3][6]
· Orders to shoot civilians expressing legitimate grievances[29][27][17]
· Hospital raids to arrest wounded protestors[29][17]
· Systematic lying about "rioters" when they know these are peaceful demonstrators[70][37]
At some point, following orders becomes complicity in crimes. That point has arrived.
The Window of Opportunity
Multiple factors create unprecedented revolutionary potential:
1. Elite fragmentation: Former officials publicly attack the Supreme Leader; factions openly dispute; unity has collapsed[41][32]
2. Economic crisis: The currency collapse has destroyed the regime's ability to buy loyalty or social peace[17][14]
3. Regional defeats: The "axis of resistance" strategy lies in ruins; Syria lost, Hezbollah degraded, Hamas weakened[40][14]
4. Protest momentum: 100+ cities mobilized, coordination emerging, fear dissipating[36][37][35][14]
5. International support: U.S., Europe, and regional actors signal support for transition[57][58]
6. Bandwidth exhaustion: The security apparatus shows strain—IRGC Ground Forces deployment indicates regular forces cannot manage the unrest[27]
Windows close. If the regime survives this crisis, it will implement harsh lessons: more surveillance, deeper purges, tighter control. Officers considering defection will be identified and eliminated. The economic situation will worsen. Regional powers may intervene to prop up the regime.
The time for action is now.
Historical Vindication
When historians examine this period, they will ask: Where were Iran's security forces when the people rose against 47 years of tyranny? Did they stand with a corrupt, criminal regime that stole from the nation? Or did they fulfill their duty to defend Iran by removing the greatest threat to its future?
Officers who act to remove this regime will be remembered as patriots who saved Iran from economic collapse, international isolation, and continued corruption. Those who defend it will be remembered as collaborators in a criminal enterprise.
The Tunisian military chose honor in 2011 and is celebrated. Egypt's military chose opportunism and faces criticism. Iran's security forces face the same choice.[49][13][8][12]
Conclusion: The Path Forward
This thesis has documented:
1. Shared grievances between security forces and the Iranian people—economic devastation, currency collapse, inflation—that create common cause against the regime[11][9][10]
2. Systematic corruption that has stolen $40-50 billion annually through schemes involving IRGC commanders, senior officials, and clerical elite[1][6][3][4][2]
3. Unprecedented crisis in which protests span 100+ cities, elite unity has fractured, and the regime shows signs of bandwidth exhaustion[37][36][32][27][14]
4. Historical precedent demonstrating that security force defection, not popular protests alone, determines regime survival[13][8][12][7]
5. Operational plan for security force-led regime change that minimizes casualties, prevents civil war, and facilitates transition to democratic governance[51][64][55]
The Islamic Republic has ruled for 47 years through violence, corruption, and ideological manipulation. It has stolen tens of billions from the Iranian people. It has impoverished the nation while enriching a narrow elite. It has ordered security forces to commit crimes against their fellow citizens.
That system can end. Security forces—the Revolutionary Guard, the Artesh, the police, the Basij—possess the organizational capacity, the weapons, and most importantly, the moral authority to remove this regime. They share the people's suffering. They witness the corruption firsthand. They bear the moral burden of suppressing legitimate grievances.
The question is not whether the Islamic Republic will fall—economic reality and popular rejection ensure its eventual collapse. The question is whether Iran's security forces will act decisively to facilitate an orderly transition, or whether they will cling to a dying system until chaos and potential civil war make transition far more costly.
History offers clear lessons: when security forces withdraw support, illegitimate regimes collapse rapidly and with minimal bloodshed. When they defend such regimes to the bitter end, nations suffer prolonged violence and destruction.
Iran's security forces can choose honor, patriotism, and institutional survival by acting now to remove the Mullah regime and facilitate transition to legitimate, accountable governance. That is not treason—it is the highest form of loyalty to Iran and its people.
The time is now. The power is yours. The future of Iran depends on your choice.
As we wait, PERSIA GOLD FLIES NORTH COVERTLY.
________________________________________________________________
⁂
1. https://iranwire.com/en/features/69671/
2. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/economy/irans-regime-acknowledges-increase-of-state-linked-corruption/
3. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/corruption-sanctions-mismangement-iran/
4. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202302054479
5. https://struanstevenson.com/news-and-views/articles/venal-corruption-iranian-regime/
6. https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/05/tehrans-method-of-governance-has-reached-a-dead-end-former-top-adviser-tells-euronews
7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution
8. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/29474
9. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/r1n6vm2ewl
10. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/31/protests-in-iran-spread-amid-deep-discontent-over-economic-duress
11. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/29/world/middleeast/iran-currency-collapse-rial-inflation-protests.html
12. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/tunisia-army-pivotal-to-ben-ali-ousting-reports-idUSTRE70G52B/
13. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/africa/16tunis.html
14. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/irans-2025-2026-uprising-anatomy-regime-crisis-harshad-shah-aeb3f
15. https://freeiransn.com/how-the-irgcs-corruption-and-monopolies-have-destroyed-iranian-industry/
16. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRnrRvMo5Lw
17. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/01/07/on-the-ground-in-iran-ailing-economy-pushes-nation-toward-a-defining-moment/
18. https://www.reddit.com/r/iran/comments/reo4q6/how_does_relation_islamic_revolutionary_guard/
19. https://www.aei.org/articles/eternal-rivals-the-artesh-and-the-irgc/
20. https://www.mei.edu/publications/eternal-rivals-artesh-and-irgc
21. https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc38/mds/witoschek.pdf
22. https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/where-is-irans-military-doctrine-heading
23. https://gulfif.org/the-economic-empire-of-the-revolutionary-guards-in-iran/
24. https://agsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Sara-Bazoobandi_IRGC_ONLINE.pdf
25. https://www.reddit.com/r/NewIran/comments/1ejzz6r/do_you_think_soliders_in_the_irgc_and_artesh_are/
26. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basij
27. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-8-2026
28. https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/01/middleeast/iran-protests-deadly-clashes-latam-intl
29. https://www.aol.com/articles/shortages-cash-handouts-killings-iran-155923354.html
30. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202312062449
31. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10743580
32. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/irans-ruling-establishment-faces-multi-front-crisis-as-internal-rifts-intensify/
33. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/1/6/irans-new-year-demonstrations-and-the-question-of-regime-survival
34. https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/01/02/irans-protests-drivers-actors-consequences-and-external-dimensions/
35. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601095873
36. https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-7-2026/
37. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025–2026_Iranian_protests
38. https://www.facebook.com/InstitutefortheStudyofWar/posts/iran-update-january-5-2026-ctp-isw-recorded-a-total-of-at-least-179-protests-in-/1306361494869458/
39. https://dawnmena.org/irans-current-uprising-and-the-collapse-of-ideological-legitimacy/
40. https://newlinesinstitute.org/strategic-competition/regional-competition/real-time-analysis-iran-after-the-israeli-strikes-regime-change-remains-unlikely-but-not-impossible/
41. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-updates-october-2025
42. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202507150372
43. https://www.facebook.com/gghamari/posts/️breaking-from-iran️police-defect-from-the-terrorist-islamic-republic-and-side-w/1266775605267775/
44. https://www.facebook.com/IranIntlEnglish/posts/reza-pahlavi-the-exiled-son-of-irans-last-shah-told-politico-that-at-least-50000/1243814714422286/
45. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501102894
46. https://mecouncil.org/publication/the-paradox-of-trust-in-the-military-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/
47. https://ict.org.il/irans-statecraft-shaping-identity-and-cognitive-framing-amid-societal-cohesion-challenges/
48. https://mojust.org/2026/01/08/iran-the-rupture-of-legitimacy-and-the-security-cartel/
49. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-egyptian-military-faces-its-defining-hour/
50. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2069/
51. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Pathway-to-Defections-US-UK.pdf
52. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/PRIO-Military Defection.pdf
53. https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-not-so-secret-ingredients-of-military-coups/
54. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26363910
55. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d'%C3%A9tat
56. https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Thaler-Working-Paper-5.25.23.pdf
57. https://www.stimson.org/2026/in-iran-protests-information-spreads-faster-than-organization/
58. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-to-watch-as-anti-regime-protests-engulf-iran/
59. https://moodle2.units.it/pluginfile.php/711929/mod_resource/content/1/Quinlivan-CoupProofingPracticeConsequences-1999.pdf
60. https://ifit-transitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/the-scope-for-dialogue-with-security-forces-in-hybrid-regimes.pdf
61. https://cidcm.umd.edu/sites/cidcm.umd.edu/files/germany_coup-proofing_umd_4-17.pdf
62. https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/27/4/viaf033/8402320
63. https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2022-12/1_transitioning_from_military_interv.pdf
64. https://academic.oup.com/book/2739/chapter/143212547
65. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/ten-years-later-reflections-on-egypts-2011-uprising/
66. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-military-and-mass-protests-in-africa/
67. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/14827/SF218_constabularyforces.pdf
68. https://www.eurotopics.net/en/350733/protests-in-iran-regime-change-on-the-cards
69. https://newlinesmag.com/essays/how-disinformation-fueled-the-tunisian-revolution/
70. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-protests-internet-shutdown.html
71. https://israel-alma.org/the-irgc-basij-forces-the-volunteers-responsible-for-internal-security-and-the-suppression-of-opposition-to-the-regime/
72. https://theconversation.com/facing-protests-and-new-threats-from-trump-is-the-iranian-regime-on-its-last-legs-272795
73. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/06/iran-announces-more-casualties-intensifies-internal-crackdown-as-israeli-operations-continue.php
74. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-on-iran-and-the-shiite-axis-november-19-26-2025/
75. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-protests/iran-uprising-day-4-protesters-storm-governorate-in-fasa-as-nationwide-bazaar-strikes-paralyze-regimes-economy/
76. https://www.ganintegrity.com/country-profiles/iran/
77. https://www.aei.org/articles/iran-the-case-for-regime-change/
78. https://observer.co.uk/news/international/article/defiance-in-iran-if-we-want-the-regime-out-we-cant-back-down
79. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/terrorism-a-fundamentalism/giving-financial-incentives-to-iran-goes-to-terrorists/
80. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cre28d2j2zxo
81. https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/HJS-Regime-Collapse-in-Iran-Report-web.pdf
82. https://geopoliticsunplugged.substack.com/p/irans-winter-protests-structural
83. https://www.facebook.com/IsraelNewsAgency/posts/growing-defection-patterns-within-iranian-military-ranks-police-sections-and-var/1248418907330643/
84. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Egyptian_revolution
85. https://www.kevinkoehler.org/Koehler 2016 - Officers and Regimes.pdf
86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328532
87. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1569613
88. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70024?af=R
89. https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-protests-and-threat-domestic-stability
90. https://strategiecs.com/en/analyses/transformations-in-the-iranian-domestic-scene-after-the-war
91. https://acleddata.com/report/anti-government-demonstrations-iran-long-term-challenge-islamic-republic
92. https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/06/security-forces-clash-with-protesters-in-irans-main-bazaar-as-36-killed-in-rallies
93. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/strengthening-regime-resilience-tehran-prepares-conflict-and-succession
94. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-882209
95. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2025.2572637
96. https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2023_wp5_thaler-v3-FINAL.pdf
Part I: Shared Connections Between Security Forces and the Iranian People
The Common Economic Crisis
The current economic catastrophe affects security personnel and civilians equally. The Iranian rial has collapsed to 1.45 million per U.S. dollar, destroying the purchasing power of fixed salaries. While IRGC commanders pocket millions through corruption schemes—overcharging the government $500-1,000 per month per militia fighter and controlling $25-30 billion in smuggling operations—ordinary security force members struggle alongside their fellow citizens.[4][14][5][15]
Recent reports reveal the regime's desperation: authorities now distribute 500,000 to 1,000,000 toman gift cards to Basij members to "encourage them to suppress their own neighbors". This cash incentive system exposes the regime's recognition that economic pressure has eroded even the loyalty of its paramilitary forces. Security personnel are being bribed to attack their own communities—a profound moral crisis that creates the psychological conditions for defection.[9]
The lived reality is that a Basij member, police officer, or Artesh soldier faces the same inflation (52% year-over-year), the same food price increases (70%+), and the same currency collapse as protestors in the streets. Their families suffer identical hardships. The distinction between "security forces" and "the people" dissolves when both groups are victims of the same corrupt system.[14][16][17]
Institutional Grievances Within the Security Apparatus
Beyond shared economic suffering, the security forces harbor specific institutional grievances that create revolutionary potential:
The Marginalization of Artesh (Regular Army): Iran's conventional military has been systematically sidelined, underfunded, and politically isolated for four decades. The Artesh receives inferior equipment and resources compared to the IRGC, despite bearing responsibility for territorial defense. Officers educated in military professionalism witness their institution treated as a potential threat rather than a pillar of national defense. This creates a cadre of trained military professionals who owe no ideological loyalty to the revolution and who maintain deeper connections to Iranian national identity rather than Islamic revolutionary ideology.[18][19][20][21]
Internal IRGC Contradictions: Even within the Revolutionary Guards, tensions exist. Reports indicate generational divides between older officers shaped by the Iran-Iraq War and younger commanders who question the regional proxy strategy. Recent arrests of IRGC generals and lower-ranking soldiers following Israeli strikes reveal the regime's paranoia and distrust of its own forces. The systematic corruption at senior levels—documented cases of commanders embezzling militia salaries and managing billion-dollar smuggling networks—breeds resentment among mid-level officers who witness their institution's degradation into a mafia-like enterprise.[22][5][23][24][25][4]
Basij's Identity Crisis: While portrayed as ideological zealots, many Basij members joined for practical benefits—university admission, government jobs, military service exemptions—rather than revolutionary conviction. Studies indicate that Basij forces are viewed as a "profound source of disquiet and rancor" among the general public. Members increasingly recognize they are despised by their communities and being asked to suppress people facing identical economic pressures.[26]
The Moral Burden of Repression
Security forces are being ordered to commit violence against peaceful protestors, including hospital raids to arrest wounded civilians. These actions create psychological trauma and moral injury among personnel who recognize they are suppressing legitimate grievances. The January 2026 protests have killed dozens, with reports of security forces firing on unarmed demonstrators.[27][28][29][17]
Historical analysis shows that orders to fire on civilians create critical defection points. In Tunisia 2011, General Rachid Ammar refused orders to shoot protestors, precipitating Ben Ali's fall. In Iran 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini called on soldiers to defect, and revolutionaries gave flowers and civilian clothes to deserters, successfully fracturing the Shah's military. The current regime's reliance on violent suppression places unbearable moral weight on security personnel who must choose between their communities and a corrupt leadership.[12][13][7]
Part II: Corruption and Misappropriation as Revolutionary Catalyst
Documented Scale of Theft
The corruption of the Islamic Republic is not speculation—it is documented by the regime's own officials:
· Annual theft: Former senior officials acknowledge $40-50 billion stolen yearly from Iran's economy[6]
· Ministry of Defense: Official reports confirm "embezzlement," "bribery," and "collusion in transactions," with the weaknesses including "lack of a strong and centralized independent body for comprehensive supervision" and "vague and extensive statutes of some companies"[1]
· High-profile cases: The $21 billion Mobarakeh Steel fraud, $3 billion Sarmayeh Bank embezzlement, $5 billion missing from Tehran municipality during Ghalibaf's tenure as mayor[3][30][4]
· IRGC salary schemes: Commanders report militia fighter salaries of $700 to the government while paying fighters $100-200, pocketing $500-1,000 per person monthly—a scheme worth hundreds of millions annually[4]
The IRGC Economic Empire
The Revolutionary Guards control an estimated 40-70% of Iran's economy through a labyrinthine network of front companies, monopolies, and smuggling operations:[2][5][15][23][31][24]
· Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters: The largest government contractor, winning projects without competitive bidding, dominating oil, gas, petrochemical, infrastructure, and construction sectors[23][31]
· IRGC Cooperative Foundation: Manages IRGC investments across banking, retail, media, entertainment, transportation, and agriculture. The European Council identifies it as "responsible for funneling money into the regime's brutal repression"[23]
· Smuggling networks: Controls 40-50% of oil exports through unofficial channels worth $25-30 billion, bypassing government oversight[15]
· Zero accountability: As military entities, IRGC companies pay no taxes, face no regulatory oversight, and eliminate private competitors through political pressure[24][1][23]
This economic empire enriches a narrow elite—senior IRGC commanders, clerical families, and regime insiders—while Iran's economy collapses. The contradiction is stark: security forces are ordered to protect a system that steals from the nation while they and their families starve.
Corruption as Systematic, Not Incidental
Importantly, this corruption is not the work of individual bad actors but is structural and systematic:[2][3][15]
· The Supreme Leader controls vast financial resources through institutions like Setad Ejraie (Executive Headquarters of Imam's Directive), which along with Khatam al-Anbiya, Astan-e Quds, and Foundation of the Oppressed control 60% of national wealth—none connected to parliament or government oversight[2]
· The regime's own Javan daily acknowledges corruption "is constantly being reproduced" due to "economic and social situations"[2]
· Corruption investigations reach only the "tip of the iceberg" as perpetrators "have a lot of influence, and because of their political influence, they can easily deal with people who hinder their activities"[2]
This systematic theft explains why sanctions alone cannot account for Iran's economic crisis. Regime insiders admit governance failures and corruption—not external pressure—drive the collapse. Security forces tasked with defending this system must confront the reality that they protect organized theft, not Islamic revolution or Iranian national interests.[32][33][6]
Part III: The Current Revolutionary Moment (2025-2026)
Unprecedented Protest Dynamics
The protests erupting since December 2025 represent a qualitative shift from previous unrest:[34][35][14]
Scale and Coordination: Research organizations documented 179+ protests across 21+ provinces by January 5, 2026, spreading to over 100 cities. For the first time, a specific timed call for protests received coordinated nationwide response, demonstrating organizational capacity previously absent.[36][37][38][35]
Social Coalition: The current movement unites bazaar merchants (the economy's backbone), university students, workers, women defying hijab laws, and ethnic minorities—mirroring the 1979 coalition that overthrew the Shah. This cross-class, cross-ethnic mobilization poses existential threat to any regime.[14][34]
Explicit Revolutionary Demands: Unlike earlier reform-oriented movements, current protests feature explicit calls for regime change. Slogans include "Death to the dictator" (targeting Khamenei personally), "No Gaza, No Lebanon, my life for Iran" (rejecting proxy wars), and direct challenges to the Islamic Republic's legitimacy.[37][17][39][34]
Collapse of Fear: Analysts note the protesters have lost fear of the regime—a psychological threshold that historically precedes revolutionary success. The regime's traditional coercion-concession playbook appears ineffective as public fear evaporates.[39][14]
Regime Vulnerability Indicators
Multiple factors indicate the Islamic Republic faces unprecedented fragility:
Economic Collapse: The currency crisis, 52% inflation, and 70%+ food price increases have destroyed the regime's ability to buy social peace. The government's announcement of a $7 per person monthly allowance for four months exposed both desperation and inadequacy.[16][17][14]
Regional Defeats: The June 2025 war with Israel damaged military facilities and killed senior commanders, demonstrating vulnerability. The collapse of Assad's Syria, degradation of Hezbollah, and weakening of Hamas destroyed the "axis of resistance" strategy that justified economic sacrifice.[40][32][14]
Elite Fragmentation: Former President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif publicly questioned strategic alignment with Russia. Mehdi Karroubi directly blamed Khamenei for "destroying the economy, culture, security, and ethics." Parliamentary disputes and factional infighting reveal loss of elite cohesion.[41][32]
Security Force Strain: The deployment of IRGC Ground Forces—a rare measure reserved for extreme circumstances—indicates that regular Law Enforcement Command and Basij units face "bandwidth constraints" and cannot cover the nationwide protests. Reports of 950 police and 60 Basij injured, plus 2 IRGC Ground Forces members killed, show the security apparatus under unprecedented pressure.[29][27]
Defection Signals: Opposition leader Reza Pahlavi reports 20,000+ military members registered with his defection platform. Reports document police defecting and joining protestors, chanting "Death to the dictator". These preliminary defections indicate growing willingness among security personnel to break with the regime.[42][43][44]
Historical Parallels: The 1979 Playbook in Reverse
The regime's deepest fear is justified: the current coalition mirrors 1979, when bazaaris, students, workers, and clerics united against the Shah. Key parallels include:[7][14]
· Military demoralization: Just as the Shah's forces became demoralized by orders to suppress demonstrators, current security forces face moral crisis from hospital raids and shooting civilians[17][29][7]
· Elite defection: In 1979, many generals planned defection or joined the anti-Shah movement when they recognized the regime's illegitimacy. Today's elite fragmentation and public criticism by former officials signal similar dynamics[45][32]
· Cycle of repression: The Shah's violent crackdowns fueled larger protests. Today's security crackdowns generate international condemnation and domestic outrage, accelerating the crisis[17][14]
The critical difference is that in 1979, the revolutionaries successfully called on soldiers to defect, offering them safe passage and integration into the new order. Today, an equivalent call directed at security forces could fracture the regime's coercive capacity.[7]
Part IV: Why Security Forces Can Remove the Mullahs Alone—A Step-by-Step Strategy
Foundational Premise: Regime Survival Depends on Security Forces
Despite controlling vast wealth and wielding religious authority, the Islamic Republic's survival depends entirely on the willingness of security forces to use violence against the population. Modern regime theory confirms that regimes collapse when coercive institutions withdraw support—not necessarily when popular discontent reaches certain thresholds.[8][46][47][48][40]
Historical evidence:
· Tunisia 2011: Ben Ali's regime collapsed within days when General Ammar refused to shoot protestors, despite the president controlling police and presidential guards[13][12]
· Egypt 2011: Mubarak fell when the military calculated that sacrificing him protected their broader institutional interests, despite facing smaller protests than Iran currently experiences[49][50][8]
· Iran 1979: The Shah fled when military demoralization and defection made violent suppression untenable[45][7]
In each case, the decisive factor was security force defection, not the scale of protests. This places ultimate power in the hands of Iran's military and police institutions.
Prerequisites for Successful Internal Overthrow
Drawing from academic research on military defections and successful regime transitions, several conditions must exist:[51][52][53]
Coordination among plotters: Coups succeed through coordination, not overwhelming force. Officers must communicate, build trust networks, and agree on timing. The key is not converting every soldier but establishing sufficient coordination among mid-level commanders who control actual units.[53][54]
Perception of inevitability: Creating the perception that the regime has already fallen or will imminently fall triggers bandwagoning behavior. Most security personnel and officials adapt to what appears to be the new reality rather than risking their lives for a lost cause.[55]
Neutralization of loyalist centers: Rather than fighting the entire security apparatus, plotters must isolate or paralyze the most loyal units—particularly the IRGC's intelligence and counterintelligence divisions and the Basij's elite units.[55]
Manufactured fait accompli: Controlling communications and visible symbols of authority creates the perception of victory, prompting most personnel to accept the transition.[55]
Minimization of civil war risk: Officers defect when they believe the transition can succeed without protracted conflict that would destroy the institution and potentially their lives. Clear assurances of institutional continuity and personal security facilitate defection.[56][53]
External or opposition coordination: While security forces can overthrow the regime, coordination with civilian opposition provides political legitimacy and reduces the risk of military dictatorship replacing clerical dictatorship.[57][58][51]
Step-by-Step Plan for Security Force-Led Regime Change
Phase 1: Clandestine Coordination and Network Building (1-6 months)
Objective: Build coordinated networks among mid-level officers across Artesh, IRGC, and Law Enforcement Command who commit to simultaneous action.
Actions:
1. Identify sympathetic commanders: Focus on mid-level officers (majors through colonels/brigadiers) who control operational units, particularly those in:
o Artesh divisions stationed near Tehran and provincial capitals
o IRGC provincial divisions (NOT Quds Force or counterintelligence)
o Law Enforcement Command provincial headquarters
o Basij brigade commanders outside the elite hardline units
2. Exploit existing grievances: Recruitment messaging should emphasize:
o Economic suffering shared with families and communities
o Corruption that steals from security forces and nation
o Moral burden of suppressing legitimate grievances
o Institutional interests (especially for Artesh officers marginalized by IRGC)
o Patriotic duty to save Iran from economic collapse and international isolation
3. Create secure communication networks: Use encrypted channels, face-to-face meetings in secure locations, and cells structure that limits exposure if discovered. External diaspora organizations like Pahlavi's defection platform can provide technical assistance and secure communication infrastructure.[44][42]
4. Build horizontal networks: The regime has deliberately fragmented security forces to prevent coordination. Plotters must overcome this by building trust networks across institutional boundaries—Artesh officers coordinating with sympathetic IRGC provincial commanders and senior police officials.[59][60][61]
5. Conduct discrete loyalty assessments: Officers must evaluate which units will follow orders, which will remain neutral, and which will actively resist. This intelligence is critical for operational planning.
Critical principle: At this stage, absolute secrecy is paramount. The regime's counterintelligence services will execute anyone suspected of plotting. Use of dead drops, burner communication devices, and compartmentalized cells prevents exposure.[61]
Phase 2: Pre-Positioning and Final Preparation (1-2 weeks before action)
Objective: Position loyal units for rapid action while maintaining operational security and preparing to neutralize loyalist forces.
Actions:
1. Coordinate timing with protest cycles: Plan the decisive action to coincide with large protests that strain regime resources and provide political cover. The protests create noise that disguises military movements and provide popular legitimacy.[35][27]
2. Pre-position Artesh and sympathetic IRGC units: Under guise of normal operations or training exercises, move trustworthy units toward:
o Tehran (particularly around key ministries, IRIB state television, Supreme Leader's compound)
o Provincial capitals and IRGC/Basij headquarters
o Communications infrastructure (television, radio, internet hubs)
o Prisons holding political prisoners (whose release provides immediate legitimacy)
3. Identify and plan to isolate hardcore loyalists: The primary loyal forces are:
o IRGC Intelligence Organization and counterintelligence
o Supreme Leader's protection forces
o Elite Basij units attached to key facilities
o Quds Force commanders (though many are abroad)
4. These units should be isolated through cutting communications, surrounding barracks, or arresting commanders during the initial hours.[55]
5. Prepare messaging and declarations: Draft and pre-record statements explaining actions as:
o Patriotic duty to save Iran from economic collapse and corruption
o Temporary measure to restore constitutional order
o Commitment to transitional process leading to free elections
o Guarantees of security for security personnel who remain neutral or join the transition
o Assurances to ethnic and religious minorities of continued rights
6. Coordinate with opposition leadership: Establish discrete channels with civilian opposition figures (Pahlavi, Tajzadeh, or others with legitimacy) to provide civilian political authority immediately. This prevents perception of military dictatorship.[58]
Phase 3: Decisive Action—The First 48 Hours
Objective: Rapidly seize control of capital and provincial centers, neutralize loyalist resistance, and establish new authority through controlled demonstrations of force and political messaging.
Hour 0-6: Simultaneous Operations Across Iran
In Tehran:
· Artesh units and sympathetic IRGC commanders move to secure:
o IRIB (state television/radio) - Critical priority #1
o Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Intelligence
o Evin Prison and other detention facilities (release political prisoners immediately)
o Telecommunications infrastructure
o Major intersections and government districts
· Small teams arrest or detain:
o Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and immediate staff
o IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour
o Intelligence Minister and counterintelligence chiefs
o Key Basij commanders
o Head of Judiciary
In Provincial Capitals:
· Local Artesh and police commanders secure:
o Provincial IRGC headquarters (isolate, surround, demand surrender)
o Governor's offices and provincial administration buildings
o Local television/radio stations
o Communication nodes
Critical tactical principle: Use of force should be minimal and surgical. The goal is rapid neutralization of command structure, not pitched battles. Most security personnel will not fight once they perceive the transition as inevitable. Commanders should broadcast surrender terms immediately: personnel who lay down arms receive amnesty; those who resist face military justice.[53][55]
Hour 6-12: Broadcasting Authority and Building Momentum
1. Broadcast from IRIB: Using state television and radio (now under control), deliver pre-recorded messages:
o From military commanders: Explain action as necessary to save Iran from economic destruction and corruption. Emphasize patriotic duty, institutional interests, and moral imperative. List specific corruption cases (the $21 billion fraud, commanders' theft of militia salaries, etc.) as evidence of regime's criminal nature.[30][3][1][4]
o From civilian opposition leaders: Provide political legitimacy. Announce formation of transitional council, commitment to free elections within defined timeframe, guarantee of rights for all Iranians.
o To security forces: Direct message to all personnel: "The Islamic Republic has ended. The transition is underway across Iran. Security forces who remain neutral or join the transition will be integrated into new security structure. Those who resist will face military justice. Check with your commanders—you will find the capital has fallen."
2. Release political prisoners: Immediately broadcast footage of political prisoners being freed from Evin and other facilities. This provides powerful visual evidence of regime's end and builds popular support.[7]
3. Coordinate with protests: As news spreads, protestors will spontaneously mass in streets (as occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya). Security forces should facilitate rather than suppress these demonstrations, allowing them to provide popular legitimacy while maintaining order.[46][12]
4. Establish perimeters around loyalist holdouts: If elite IRGC or Basij units resist, surround their facilities, cut power and communications, and broadcast surrender terms. Prolonged sieges drain loyalist morale while minimizing casualties.[53]
Hour 12-48: Consolidation and Bandwagoning
1. Provincial cascades: As Tehran's fall becomes undeniable, provincial commanders face choice: join the transition or face isolation. The momentum typically accelerates as fence-sitters bandwagon to the winning side.[62][54][53]
2. International recognition: Coordinate with diaspora organizations and friendly governments to issue rapid recognition statements. International legitimacy further isolates holdouts.[51][57]
3. Civilian authority establishment: The transitional council (civilian-military mix) holds first public meeting, announces immediate measures:
o Suspension of morality police and mandatory hijab enforcement
o Release of all political prisoners
o Investigation and prosecution of corruption
o Commitment to constitutional process
o Guarantees of security sector reform while maintaining institutional stability
4. Address security personnel directly: The transitional government must immediately address security forces:
o Announce salary increases and economic relief (funded by seizing corrupt officials' assets)
o Guarantee continued employment for professional, non-criminal personnel
o Create truth and reconciliation framework that distinguishes between following orders and criminal acts
o Emphasize integration rather than purges (learning from Iraq's disastrous de-Baathification)[25]
Phase 4: Transition and Stabilization (Weeks to Months)
Objective: Prevent counter-coup, maintain order, begin political transition, and integrate security forces into new democratic framework.
Immediate Security Priorities:
1. Prevent counter-revolution: The primary threat is loyalist IRGC elements attempting counter-coup. Counter-measures:
o Maintain unity among transitional military/security leadership
o Rapidly prosecute corrupt and criminally abusive officials (but through judicial process, not summary execution)
o Keep security forces paid and operational to prevent chaos
o Monitor for coup plotting through intelligence services under civilian oversight
2. Maintain public order: The transition period risks chaos, looting, and score-settling. Security forces must:[63][64]
o Protect infrastructure, hospitals, and essential services
o Prevent sectarian or ethnic violence
o Enforce law while respecting human rights (dramatic shift from regime practices)
o Demonstrate to public that security forces serve Iran and its people, not ideology
3. Demobilize or integrate paramilitary forces: The Basij presents particular challenge—large, ideologically varied, equipped with weapons. Options:
o Voluntary disarmament with compensation
o Integration of professional elements into police or military
o Prosecution of those personally involved in torture or killing
o Use of truth and reconciliation processes for lower-level members
Political Transition Framework:
Based on successful transitions (Tunisia, potentially Egypt initially):[65][66][46]
1. Constitutional convention or reform process (3-12 months): Representatives from across Iranian society (ethnic groups, religious communities, provinces, professional sectors) draft new constitutional framework or reform existing 1906 constitution.
2. Security Sector Reform: International best practices suggest:[64][67][51]
o Merge IRGC and Artesh into unified national military under civilian control
o Professionalize police forces with human rights training
o Eliminate parallel security structures and intelligence agency redundancies
o Subject security budget to parliamentary oversight
o Implement transparent procurement processes
3. Economic transformation: Dismantle IRGC economic empire through:
o Nationalization of assets with compensation based on legitimate investment (not stolen wealth)
o Competitive bidding for government contracts
o Tax collection from all entities
o Independent central bank and fiscal policy
o Anti-corruption institutions with enforcement power
4. Free elections (12-18 months): Following constitutional process and registration of political parties, conduct elections for parliament and presidency. International observers verify fairness.
Truth and Reconciliation: Following 1. South African model, create mechanism for:
o Documenting regime crimes
o Providing justice for victims
o Offering amnesty for those who testify truthfully about non-criminal acts
o Distinguishing between leadership (face prosecution) and rank-and-file (face truth-telling but not prosecution)
Critical Success Factors:
· Maintain security force unity: Fragmentation invites civil war. Leadership must constantly reinforce shared interests and vision.[64][56]
· Deliver rapid economic relief: Immediate measures (release of frozen assets, emergency aid, corruption prosecutions that recover stolen funds) demonstrate tangible change.[63][64]
· Inclusive political process: Transition fails if perceived as ethnic, religious, or factional takeover. Broad representation critical.[66][65][64]
· International support: Engage UN, Western democracies, and regional states for:
o Economic assistance and sanctions relief
o Technical expertise on democratic transitions
o Security guarantees against external threats (especially given Iran's volatile neighborhood)
o Diplomatic recognition and legitimacy[57][58][51]
Part V: Addressing Challenges and Objections
Challenge 1: "The IRGC is too powerful and ideologically committed"
Response: The IRGC is not monolithic. Research reveals:
· Generational divisions between older commanders and younger officers questioning the regional proxy strategy[22]
· Endemic corruption that enriches senior officers while impoverishing mid-level ranks[5][4]
· Bandwidth constraints evident in current protests requiring IRGC Ground Forces deployment[27]
· Historical precedent: in 1979, many imperial generals initially supported the Shah ideologically but defected when institutional survival required it[45][7]
Moreover, the plan explicitly recognizes IRGC elite units will resist. The strategy is neutralization through isolation, not necessarily conversion. When Artesh units (larger and better conventional capabilities) plus sympathetic IRGC provincial forces plus police overwhelm hardline elements, resistance becomes futile.[19][20]
Challenge 2: "Lack of coordination and leadership"
Response: Accurate assessment of current weakness but not insurmountable. The step-by-step plan addresses this explicitly:[68][57]
· Phase 1 focuses on building coordination networks
· External technical assistance from diaspora organizations provides communication infrastructure[42][44]
· Historical coups often coalesce rapidly once core group commits[62][53]
· The decisive action itself creates coordination through forcing choice: join, remain neutral, or resist (with most choosing first two options)
Challenge 3: "Risk of civil war or chaos"
Response: The plan minimizes this risk through:
· Rapid, simultaneous action that creates perception of fait accompli[55]
· Targeting command structure rather than fighting rank-and-file[53]
· Immediate civilian political authority to prevent military dictatorship perception[58][51]
· Maintaining institutional continuity for professional security personnel[25]
· Learning from successful transitions (Tunisia) rather than disasters (Libya, Syria)[69][46][12]
Historical evidence suggests that civil wars follow from prolonged stalemate, not rapid regime change. The 48-hour window is critical—if capital falls and provinces follow quickly, resistance collapses.[12][13][63][64][53]
Challenge 4: "External intervention by Russia, China, or regional actors"
Response:
· Russia and China support the regime diplomatically but have shown no willingness to militarily intervene to save it. Their support is transactional, not ideological.[32][34]
· Rapid transition (48-72 hours) presents them with fait accompli before mobilization possible
· Regional actors (Gulf states, Turkey, Israel) would likely welcome regime change
· U.S. and European states have signaled support for protestors; transitional government receiving international recognition would deter intervention[57][58]
Challenge 5: "This leads to military dictatorship, not democracy"
Response: Valid concern requiring explicit safeguards:
· Immediate formation of civilian-military transitional council with civilian majority[51][58]
· Constitutional commitment to elections within defined timeframe[64]
· International monitoring and assistance to prevent military consolidation[66][64]
· Security Sector Reform that subordinates military to civilian authority[67][51]
· Learning from Egypt's negative example (military consolidated power) while emulating Tunisia's success (military facilitated then withdrew)[8][46][12]
The critical factor is civilian opposition coordination from outset. If Pahlavi, Tajzadeh, or other civilian figures with legitimacy immediately provide political authority, military actors have less incentive and opportunity to consolidate permanent power.[58]
Part VI: The Moral and Strategic Imperative
Why Security Forces Must Act Now
Economic Reality: Iran faces economic freefall. The currency has lost two-thirds of its value in months. Inflation exceeds 50%. Ordinary Iranians including security force families face starvation. Every month of regime continuation deepens the crisis. The corruption schemes documented in this thesis steal billions that could fund salaries, public services, and development.[10][11][3][6][16][1][4][14][17]
Institutional Survival: The Artesh has been marginalized for decades, reduced to "nothing but a shadow of its pre-revolutionary self". The IRGC has been transformed from a revolutionary guard into a criminal enterprise that enriches commanders while rank-and-file soldiers suppress their own neighbors for gift cards. The police and Basij are ordered to commit human rights abuses that destroy their standing in society.[20][5][9][26][29][19][4][17][23]
Institutional survival requires action. The current regime offers no future for professional military institutions—only continued marginalization, corruption, and moral degradation.
Patriotic Duty: Security forces swear oaths to defend Iran, not the Islamic Republic or individual leaders. The regime's policies have:
· Destroyed the economy through corruption and mismanagement[6][32]
· Isolated Iran internationally and provoked conflicts that weaken national security[40][32]
· Stolen tens of billions from national resources[3][1][4][6][2]
· Created conditions for potential foreign intervention through weakness[14][40]
Defending Iran now means removing the regime that endangers the nation.
Moral Imperative: Security personnel witness daily the moral bankruptcy of the system. They see:
· Commanders stealing militia salaries while fighters go unpaid[4]
· Billions embezzled while ordinary Iranians starve[3][6]
· Orders to shoot civilians expressing legitimate grievances[29][27][17]
· Hospital raids to arrest wounded protestors[29][17]
· Systematic lying about "rioters" when they know these are peaceful demonstrators[70][37]
At some point, following orders becomes complicity in crimes. That point has arrived.
The Window of Opportunity
Multiple factors create unprecedented revolutionary potential:
1. Elite fragmentation: Former officials publicly attack the Supreme Leader; factions openly dispute; unity has collapsed[41][32]
2. Economic crisis: The currency collapse has destroyed the regime's ability to buy loyalty or social peace[17][14]
3. Regional defeats: The "axis of resistance" strategy lies in ruins; Syria lost, Hezbollah degraded, Hamas weakened[40][14]
4. Protest momentum: 100+ cities mobilized, coordination emerging, fear dissipating[36][37][35][14]
5. International support: U.S., Europe, and regional actors signal support for transition[57][58]
6. Bandwidth exhaustion: The security apparatus shows strain—IRGC Ground Forces deployment indicates regular forces cannot manage the unrest[27]
Windows close. If the regime survives this crisis, it will implement harsh lessons: more surveillance, deeper purges, tighter control. Officers considering defection will be identified and eliminated. The economic situation will worsen. Regional powers may intervene to prop up the regime.
The time for action is now.
Historical Vindication
When historians examine this period, they will ask: Where were Iran's security forces when the people rose against 47 years of tyranny? Did they stand with a corrupt, criminal regime that stole from the nation? Or did they fulfill their duty to defend Iran by removing the greatest threat to its future?
Officers who act to remove this regime will be remembered as patriots who saved Iran from economic collapse, international isolation, and continued corruption. Those who defend it will be remembered as collaborators in a criminal enterprise.
The Tunisian military chose honor in 2011 and is celebrated. Egypt's military chose opportunism and faces criticism. Iran's security forces face the same choice.[49][13][8][12]
Conclusion: The Path Forward
This thesis has documented:
1. Shared grievances between security forces and the Iranian people—economic devastation, currency collapse, inflation—that create common cause against the regime[11][9][10]
2. Systematic corruption that has stolen $40-50 billion annually through schemes involving IRGC commanders, senior officials, and clerical elite[1][6][3][4][2]
3. Unprecedented crisis in which protests span 100+ cities, elite unity has fractured, and the regime shows signs of bandwidth exhaustion[37][36][32][27][14]
4. Historical precedent demonstrating that security force defection, not popular protests alone, determines regime survival[13][8][12][7]
5. Operational plan for security force-led regime change that minimizes casualties, prevents civil war, and facilitates transition to democratic governance[51][64][55]
The Islamic Republic has ruled for 47 years through violence, corruption, and ideological manipulation. It has stolen tens of billions from the Iranian people. It has impoverished the nation while enriching a narrow elite. It has ordered security forces to commit crimes against their fellow citizens.
That system can end. Security forces—the Revolutionary Guard, the Artesh, the police, the Basij—possess the organizational capacity, the weapons, and most importantly, the moral authority to remove this regime. They share the people's suffering. They witness the corruption firsthand. They bear the moral burden of suppressing legitimate grievances.
The question is not whether the Islamic Republic will fall—economic reality and popular rejection ensure its eventual collapse. The question is whether Iran's security forces will act decisively to facilitate an orderly transition, or whether they will cling to a dying system until chaos and potential civil war make transition far more costly.
History offers clear lessons: when security forces withdraw support, illegitimate regimes collapse rapidly and with minimal bloodshed. When they defend such regimes to the bitter end, nations suffer prolonged violence and destruction.
Iran's security forces can choose honor, patriotism, and institutional survival by acting now to remove the Mullah regime and facilitate transition to legitimate, accountable governance. That is not treason—it is the highest form of loyalty to Iran and its people.
The time is now. The power is yours. The future of Iran depends on your choice.
As we wait, PERSIA GOLD FLIES NORTH COVERTLY.
________________________________________________________________
⁂
1. https://iranwire.com/en/features/69671/
2. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/economy/irans-regime-acknowledges-increase-of-state-linked-corruption/
3. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/corruption-sanctions-mismangement-iran/
4. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202302054479
5. https://struanstevenson.com/news-and-views/articles/venal-corruption-iranian-regime/
6. https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/05/tehrans-method-of-governance-has-reached-a-dead-end-former-top-adviser-tells-euronews
7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution
8. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/29474
9. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/r1n6vm2ewl
10. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/31/protests-in-iran-spread-amid-deep-discontent-over-economic-duress
11. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/29/world/middleeast/iran-currency-collapse-rial-inflation-protests.html
12. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/tunisia-army-pivotal-to-ben-ali-ousting-reports-idUSTRE70G52B/
13. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/africa/16tunis.html
14. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/irans-2025-2026-uprising-anatomy-regime-crisis-harshad-shah-aeb3f
15. https://freeiransn.com/how-the-irgcs-corruption-and-monopolies-have-destroyed-iranian-industry/
16. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRnrRvMo5Lw
17. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/01/07/on-the-ground-in-iran-ailing-economy-pushes-nation-toward-a-defining-moment/
18. https://www.reddit.com/r/iran/comments/reo4q6/how_does_relation_islamic_revolutionary_guard/
19. https://www.aei.org/articles/eternal-rivals-the-artesh-and-the-irgc/
20. https://www.mei.edu/publications/eternal-rivals-artesh-and-irgc
21. https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc38/mds/witoschek.pdf
22. https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/where-is-irans-military-doctrine-heading
23. https://gulfif.org/the-economic-empire-of-the-revolutionary-guards-in-iran/
24. https://agsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Sara-Bazoobandi_IRGC_ONLINE.pdf
25. https://www.reddit.com/r/NewIran/comments/1ejzz6r/do_you_think_soliders_in_the_irgc_and_artesh_are/
26. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basij
27. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-8-2026
28. https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/01/middleeast/iran-protests-deadly-clashes-latam-intl
29. https://www.aol.com/articles/shortages-cash-handouts-killings-iran-155923354.html
30. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202312062449
31. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10743580
32. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/irans-ruling-establishment-faces-multi-front-crisis-as-internal-rifts-intensify/
33. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/1/6/irans-new-year-demonstrations-and-the-question-of-regime-survival
34. https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/01/02/irans-protests-drivers-actors-consequences-and-external-dimensions/
35. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601095873
36. https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-7-2026/
37. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025–2026_Iranian_protests
38. https://www.facebook.com/InstitutefortheStudyofWar/posts/iran-update-january-5-2026-ctp-isw-recorded-a-total-of-at-least-179-protests-in-/1306361494869458/
39. https://dawnmena.org/irans-current-uprising-and-the-collapse-of-ideological-legitimacy/
40. https://newlinesinstitute.org/strategic-competition/regional-competition/real-time-analysis-iran-after-the-israeli-strikes-regime-change-remains-unlikely-but-not-impossible/
41. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-updates-october-2025
42. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202507150372
43. https://www.facebook.com/gghamari/posts/️breaking-from-iran️police-defect-from-the-terrorist-islamic-republic-and-side-w/1266775605267775/
44. https://www.facebook.com/IranIntlEnglish/posts/reza-pahlavi-the-exiled-son-of-irans-last-shah-told-politico-that-at-least-50000/1243814714422286/
45. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501102894
46. https://mecouncil.org/publication/the-paradox-of-trust-in-the-military-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/
47. https://ict.org.il/irans-statecraft-shaping-identity-and-cognitive-framing-amid-societal-cohesion-challenges/
48. https://mojust.org/2026/01/08/iran-the-rupture-of-legitimacy-and-the-security-cartel/
49. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-egyptian-military-faces-its-defining-hour/
50. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2069/
51. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Pathway-to-Defections-US-UK.pdf
52. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/PRIO-Military Defection.pdf
53. https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-not-so-secret-ingredients-of-military-coups/
54. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26363910
55. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d'%C3%A9tat
56. https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Thaler-Working-Paper-5.25.23.pdf
57. https://www.stimson.org/2026/in-iran-protests-information-spreads-faster-than-organization/
58. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-to-watch-as-anti-regime-protests-engulf-iran/
59. https://moodle2.units.it/pluginfile.php/711929/mod_resource/content/1/Quinlivan-CoupProofingPracticeConsequences-1999.pdf
60. https://ifit-transitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/the-scope-for-dialogue-with-security-forces-in-hybrid-regimes.pdf
61. https://cidcm.umd.edu/sites/cidcm.umd.edu/files/germany_coup-proofing_umd_4-17.pdf
62. https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/27/4/viaf033/8402320
63. https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2022-12/1_transitioning_from_military_interv.pdf
64. https://academic.oup.com/book/2739/chapter/143212547
65. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/ten-years-later-reflections-on-egypts-2011-uprising/
66. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-military-and-mass-protests-in-africa/
67. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/14827/SF218_constabularyforces.pdf
68. https://www.eurotopics.net/en/350733/protests-in-iran-regime-change-on-the-cards
69. https://newlinesmag.com/essays/how-disinformation-fueled-the-tunisian-revolution/
70. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-protests-internet-shutdown.html
71. https://israel-alma.org/the-irgc-basij-forces-the-volunteers-responsible-for-internal-security-and-the-suppression-of-opposition-to-the-regime/
72. https://theconversation.com/facing-protests-and-new-threats-from-trump-is-the-iranian-regime-on-its-last-legs-272795
73. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/06/iran-announces-more-casualties-intensifies-internal-crackdown-as-israeli-operations-continue.php
74. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-on-iran-and-the-shiite-axis-november-19-26-2025/
75. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-protests/iran-uprising-day-4-protesters-storm-governorate-in-fasa-as-nationwide-bazaar-strikes-paralyze-regimes-economy/
76. https://www.ganintegrity.com/country-profiles/iran/
77. https://www.aei.org/articles/iran-the-case-for-regime-change/
78. https://observer.co.uk/news/international/article/defiance-in-iran-if-we-want-the-regime-out-we-cant-back-down
79. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/terrorism-a-fundamentalism/giving-financial-incentives-to-iran-goes-to-terrorists/
80. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cre28d2j2zxo
81. https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/HJS-Regime-Collapse-in-Iran-Report-web.pdf
82. https://geopoliticsunplugged.substack.com/p/irans-winter-protests-structural
83. https://www.facebook.com/IsraelNewsAgency/posts/growing-defection-patterns-within-iranian-military-ranks-police-sections-and-var/1248418907330643/
84. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Egyptian_revolution
85. https://www.kevinkoehler.org/Koehler 2016 - Officers and Regimes.pdf
86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328532
87. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1569613
88. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70024?af=R
89. https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-protests-and-threat-domestic-stability
90. https://strategiecs.com/en/analyses/transformations-in-the-iranian-domestic-scene-after-the-war
91. https://acleddata.com/report/anti-government-demonstrations-iran-long-term-challenge-islamic-republic
92. https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/06/security-forces-clash-with-protesters-in-irans-main-bazaar-as-36-killed-in-rallies
93. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/strengthening-regime-resilience-tehran-prepares-conflict-and-succession
94. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-882209
95. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2025.2572637
96. https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2023_wp5_thaler-v3-FINAL.pdf
