15.12.11

Strategic shift in Pakistan

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Always good to see state policy being discussed by properly qualified people with the right credentials on a consensus basis, rather than by a cabal of closed shop generals in a Corps commanders meet.

We can look at the problem of Pakistan--USA "misunderstanding" from what happened in late November 2011.

Or from the problems that arose subsequently from the relationship set in late 2001/2002, by Mossad Busharaf.

Or from the late 1970's when the Pakistan military chose extremist Jihadi groups with the most colorful OTT leaders as the main tool for promoting complicated and delicate Pakistani state policy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India......with the active backing and funding of the USA. Seriously speaking what was one expecting to achieve with psycho Hekmatyar who switched between the KGB/CIA/ISI or a one eyed religious teacher of very little stature. To be sure they fitted the Third World requirements of the USA, but certainly not Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Or from 1954, when Pakistan accepted a $1 billion aid package, largely military orientated, and entered into a deep close relationship with the USA......without thinking of the long term consequences of such a relationship.

The USA is a hyper-power run by Jews.


The proposals provided below are HALF-MEASURES and pretty GENERAL, lacking in detail in terms of implementation and outcome objectives.

Moving away from the USA is not an easy matter.

Any move in that direction necessarily means greater reliance and closer relationships with India, and of course China. This so called conference of experts, from what I have read has not addressed this counter-balance measure.

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Pakistan to Rethink Cooperation With US

A convening of Pakistani diplomats and foreign envoys made recommendations for changing policy to be less subservient to US

by John Glaser, antiwar.com

Pakistan will renegotiate a set of agreements with the United States that go back to 2002, as part of a wider shift in policy resulting from the unprovoked U.S. attack in November that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.

The arrangements being reconsidered by the Pakistani government include two key policies: allowing the transit of supplies through Pakistan to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and providing logistics support for occupying forces in Afghanistan and U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region.

The U.S. attack on a Pakistani outpost in November has prompted a rethink of a number of Pakistan policies. The U.S. has already been evicted from the Shamsi airbase in Pakistan, from which it launched drone strikes, and supply routes have already been suspended.

This latest decision to reconfigure those arrangements was the result of a two-day conference attended by Pakistani officials and envoys from around the world with the explicit purpose of evaluating Pakistani cooperation with the U.S. in light of the November attack and a generally poor relationship.

The recommendations coming from the conference include:

(i) amended arrangements for supply routes and logistics support,

(ii) minimizing the presence of the CIA in Pakistan,

(iii) and pursuing efforts to stabilize Afghanistan irrespective of Washington’s approach.

The envoys also recommended Pakistan work to repatriate the over 3.5 million Afghan refugees still living in Pakistan.

Other notable conclusions coming from the conference were an effort to seek a formal apology from the U.S. for the November attack on Pakistani soldiers, firm guarantees that Pakistani sovereignty will be respected in the future. So far, the Obama administration has refused to formally apologize and has done everything to ensure further disintegration of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship.