The wrong theater.

As per "Cold Start" and actual experience in 1948, 1962, 1965, 1971, 1999 .......and zillions of border skirmishes suggest the real action is on LAND, and more specifically up the mountains.

Submarines and the navy generally since 1947 have seen little or no action, and a quick gaze at the Crystal Ball seems to confirm that they are not likely to see any action in the future either, save as serving as some kind of dubious mascot of India's arrival in the Super Power League status scene. Rather like the last Czar of Imperial Russia spending well over 50% of his military budget on the strategically unimportant navy with its 91,000 personnel, and wholly neglecting the far more important army of 1,200,000.

It is only when the Russian imperial army ill-equipped with poor logistics and supplies suffered devastating losses in 1916, that the Czarist regime collapsed a year later.......THE DEFEAT OF THE ARMY WAS A CATALYST FOR THE HORRIFIC JEWISH BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION SUBSEQUENTLY WHICH EVENTUALLY CLAIMED THE LIVES OF 60 MILLION SOVIETS FROM 1918--1991.

India has been tested by Pakistan, which has one of the worst military's in the world, and India has done reasonably well against them in easy two week spats. But it is ironical that India should now buy over priced hardware from Russia and many other countries instead of investing in domestic production, and focusing greater resources in the army. A C-130 should normally cost about $60 million per plane not $350 million each. Its a very old plane based on a German WWII design, produced since the 1950's. A very simple old plane which should have a simple low price.

However obviously in corrupt Macaulay Brown Sahib India as per the previous copy paste, defense procurement is not PRIMARILY about strategic national requirements but about which babus and netas can make the most money from kick-backs from foreign countries, hence the decades long periods of "tendering" "haggling" from foreign buyers for every major items of purchase. Its a Mela and a ritualized event........the result means:

1) India's arms inventory is 70-80% foreign imported. The USA, China's and Russia's arms inventories are 100% domestic manufactured and designed. To be a reasonably serious POWER India must COPY the USA, China and Russia's policy and investment on domestic production and design only. The remaining arms inventory of India, where domestic production is concerned many of the spares have foreign components........Arjun tank, Tejas planes; so not really domestic in the 100% sense. You cannot fight mass warfare for long periods by relying on a MERE 39 ordnance factories, and foreign suppliers for spares. You cannot do a Nehru in the 1960's begging foreign countries to provide arms and help of whatever shape, and they subsequently don't.....you logically manufacture your own arms....standard or substandard. The T-34 tank was not standard, it had many faults when introduced by the Soviets in 1940, but eventually the problems were ironed out. But the Indian military/babus corrupt complex want PERFECT....WORLD CLASS weapons systems from the get go from DORDO....which of course they can't, deliver.

2) This foreign tendering and purchase means India has a complex mishmash of wholly irrelevant arms from various sources. India has too many different combat planes, tanks and artillery. Useless......unless you want to open a museum.

3) India needs to bolster her ordnance capacity from the current mere 39 factories to about 300--500 actual ordnance factories, and about 10,000 defense related factories employing a few million people....3-5 million. A complete ban on foreign purchases, and greater defense expenditure should meet such targets.

4) India needs to permanently maintain about 700---800,000 men in Kashmir; 200,000 Himachal Pradesh/Uttarakhand; 300,000 men in Arunchal Pradesh; 500,000 Assam; 600,000 near Pakistan in the Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat and about 200,000 in other parts of India.......with 2,400,000 regular reserves. Since the Indian military lacks proper logistics, and good infrastructure it makes sense to follow the Rommel doctrine of keeping men in the "VICINITY" of likely future flash points of war. Rommel realized with the experience of fighting 4 years that his sector B lacked proper air-cover with just 550 planes of which 400 were serviceable in the entire Western sector in June 1944(France and the Low countries), and of course poor logistics......3/4 pounds of ration for each German soldier in comparison to 30 pounds daily ration for British troops and 40 pounds daily ration for American troops....limited ammunition, and very limited transports. So instead of wasting time moving men around the battle theater in such a hostile situation he preferred to station his best units, and about 4/5 panzer divisions of the 10 in France near the beaches of Normandy, where he speculated the action could be under his command, besides building formidable, if incomplete defensive systems (In light and and in anticipation of the weaknesses of his forces)........Hitler refused.

5) India THUS REQUIRES substantial new basic field army equipment such as 155mm artillery (5,000---10,000), 120mm mortars which are a must for mountain warfare (10,000---20,000), 23mm, 40mm and 106mm heavy AA guns (15,000--20,000) which are quite easy to manufacture in India, and you don't need to import that many foreign components.....and shells for these equipment. Of course there will be a few sad netas and babus but what can you do when you have to pursue pure national security policy?

6) India needs to secure her borders ON LAND first and foremost, and have a credible ability to defend her sovereignty ON LAND (a modest basic ambition) BEFORE she invests in a blue water navy that projects India's Superpower status further and further away (immodest silly aspiration pushed by Washington and their agents in India).......if in the highly unlikely scenario India is blocked by sea by losing in a few naval engagements, nothing serious will happen if India uses Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as alternative default ports for importing and exporting during war. If India HOWEVER loses a battle or two or the war on LAND then it is the end of the story. Poor Third World nations must make strategic scarce resource choices of where to invest in their defense procurement and strategy. It should be simple and modest and on LAND.......though obviously admitted 120mm mortars, 40mm LAA and 155mm artillery are not that sexy(5) to look at in comparison to say a spanking brand new stealth submarine, or over priced ex-Soviet aircraft carriers.

The Times of India article posted below does a bit of PR for the Neta/babus corruption complex. Hopefully not doing any story plants for the corrupt military Neta complex in India.

I am detached from India, not EVER intending to visit the country and I have no vested interests there or in Switzerland....its purely an intellectual exercise for me (PAST-TIME).


Navy retires INS Vagli, India down to 14 subs
The last of India's Foxtrot-class submarines, INS Vagli, will retire after 36 years of operational service on Thursday. But the well-deserved nostalgia over INS Vagli's yeoman service should come with a harsh reality check.

India is now down to just 14 ageing submarines, with only eight to nine operational at any given time. It will get progressively worse. By the time Navy gets the first of the six Scorpene submarines being built at Mazagon Docks in 2015 — the Rs 23,562-crore project is already running three years behind schedule — only 10 submarines will be operational.

Latest projections, in fact, show India will have only five of the existing 10 Russian Kilo-class and four German HDW submarines by 2020. And only two by 2022.

Even if the six Scorpenes manage to roll out between 2015 and 2020, as is now expected, India will have a grand total of just eight to nine diesel-electric submarines by 2022.

This when the requirement is for at least 18 conventional submarines, with both China and Pakistan rapidly bolstering their underwater combat capabilities.

It, once again, underlines India's sheer lack of long-term strategic planning to systematically build military capabilities in tune with geo-political objectives, despite big bucks being spent on defence acquisitions in recent years.