Neanderthals and modern man

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One cannot believe everything the paedophile BBC says.

That modern man (Homo sapiens---via Turkey and Spain) from Arab lands mixed, fucked and procreated with Neanderthals from about 40,000 BC.....to create today's Europeans. That the incoming Arab Habibi bred out the Neanderthals....by 30,000 BC.

On the other hand, I prefer to believe that a special alien spaceship created by GOD the almighty, brought South, North, West and East Europeans down to earth, to make the world a better place.


The vile slippery Jew with the Bongo Bongo North African religion was introduced as a foil for humanity. To test Europeans first and foremost.



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Modern humans and Neanderthals 'interbred in Europe'

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By The Buggering British Children and Information Clearing House.

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Modern humans and Neanderthals interbred in Europe, an analysis of 40,000-year-old DNA suggests.

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The study suggests an early Homo sapiens settler in Europe harboured a Neanderthal ancestor just a few generations back in his family line.
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Previous work has shown our ancestors had interbred with Neanderthals 55,000 years ago, possibly in the Middle East.
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The new results reveal there was additional mixing once modern humans pushed north into Europe.
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An international team of researchers has published its analysis of the ancient European genome in Nature journal.
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The group successfully extracted and sequenced genetic material from a jawbone found in 2002 inside the cave system of Peștera cu Oase in south-west Romania.
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The ancient man was found to be more closely related to Neanderthals than any other modern human (Homo sapiens) who has previously been analyzed.

Between 6% and 9% of the Oase individual's genome is from Neanderthals - an unprecedented amount. By comparison, present-day Europeans have between 2% and 4%.

Smaller chunks

As DNA is passed on from generation to generation, segments are broken up and recombined, so that genetic material inherited from any one individual becomes interspersed with that of other ancestors. 

The scientists found segments of Neanderthal DNA in the fossil that were large enough to indicate that the ancient man had a Neanderthal ancestor just four to six generations back. 

"It's an incredibly unexpected thing," said Prof David Reich, a co-author of the paper from the Harvard Medical School.

"In the last few years, we've documented interbreeding between Neanderthals and modern humans, but we never thought we'd be so lucky to find someone so close to that event."

Co-author Prof Svante Paabo, from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, said: "It is such a lucky and unexpected thing to get DNA from a person who was so closely related to a Neanderthal."

Previous analyses of ancient and modern human genomes (the DNA contained in the nucleus of our cells that acts as the blueprint for building a person) have shown that modern humans probably interbred with Neanderthals shortly after they migrated out of their African homeland.

This is because present-day people with roots outside sub-Saharan Africa carry a small percentage of Neanderthal DNA. This suggest the mixing event must have occurred before people spread into Asia, Europe and Oceania, diversifying into regional populations.

Pioneering population

The new findings agree well with our knowledge of the archaeology. Radiocarbon dating of remains from sites across Europe suggests that modern humans and Neanderthals co-existed on the continent for some 5,000 years.

However, the 40,000-year-old individual from Oase was probably not responsible for passing on Neanderthal ancestry to present-day Europeans. The analysis shows the man was more closely related to modern East Asians and Native Americans than to today's Europeans.

"This sample, despite being in Romania, doesn't yet look like Europeans today," said Prof Reich. 

"It is evidence of an initial modern human occupation of Europe that didn't give rise to the later population. There may have been a pioneering group of modern humans that got to Europe, but was later replaced by other groups."

To analyse the ancient DNA in the Romanian bones, researchers had to sift out an overwhelming amount of genetic material from other organisms. Most of that was from microbes that lived in the soil where the bone was found. 
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Of the fraction of a percent that was human DNA, most had been introduced by people who handled the bone after its discovery.

But co-author Qiaomei Fu, a postdoctoral researcher in Prof Reich's group at Harvard, solved that problem by restricting her analysis to DNA with a kind of damage that deteriorates the molecule over tens of thousands of years.

The study supports previous research by Prof Erik Trinkaus of Washington University in St Louis and colleagues showing that the jawbone and teeth possessed a mixture of modern and Neanderthal features.

 

Nuclear inspections in Iran

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‘We Ain’t Found Shit’

Scott Ritter explains why Iran shouldn’t accept ‘no notice’ inspections of its nuclear sites

By Scott Ritter at information clearing House

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Nuclear negotiations between Iran and what’s known as the P-5 + 1 group of nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany) are scheduled to conclude on 30 June. A ‘framework agreement’ was set out in April, but still at issue is what kind of access inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency will have. Iran has agreed to inspections of all the sites it has declared are being used to develop its nuclear power programme. The US insists that any agreement must also address what it calls ‘possible military dimensions’ – that is, allegations that Iran has pursued an undeclared nuclear weapons capability – and is demanding the right to conduct ‘no notice’ inspections of nuclear sites, and to interview Iranian nuclear scientists. ‘It’s critical for us to know going forward,’ the US secretary of state, John Kerry, said in June, that ‘those activities have been stopped, and that we can account for that in a legitimate way.’ France has said that any agreement that doesn’t include inspections of military sites would be ‘useless’. Iran has been adamant that it won’t allow them and that its nuclear scientists are off-limits.

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The history of no notice inspections in Iraq does not bode well for their use in Iran. Such inspections are intelligence-based exercises. The bulk of the intelligence underpinning the US concerns over ‘possible military dimensions’ comes from the ‘alleged studies’ documents – a series of files the IAEA obtained in 2008 which appear to show that Iran had conducted some nuclear weapons development in 2002 and 2003. Their credibility has often been called into question and the Iranians declare they are fake. There’s good cause, too, to believe that much of the remaining intelligence buttressing the CIA’s case against Iran is flawed. The strange tale of the Iranian physicist Shahram Amiri, whose defection the CIA facilitated in the spring of 2009, serves as a case in point. Amiri was for several years before his defection an American agent-in-place whose reporting was used by the CIA in formulating its assessments on Iran. But his re-defection to Iran in 2010 suggests that he may have been a double agent, calling into question all his reporting to the CIA, before and after his defection.

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Operation Merlin, in which the CIA attempted to pass on to Iran flawed designs for a nuclear weapon, further undermines the CIA’s credibility as a source of information about an alleged Iranian nuclear weapons programme.

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If they were permitted, where would no notice inspections in Iran take place? There are two sites that the IAEA has publicly declared to be of interest. The first is Parchin, a military facility associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Command. The IAEA was granted a ‘managed access’ inspection of the facility in 2005, and found nothing. In 2007, the IAEA claimed to have received new information linking Parchin to a test of a neutron initiator, the device which starts fission in a nuclear warhead, and asked to visit the site again. Iran has refused on the grounds that the basis for such an inspection is flawed. Robert Kelley, a former IAEA inspector, agreed: ‘The allegations that Iran carried out hydrodynamic experiments related to nuclear explosives in a large steel containment vessel [at Parchin] have questionable technical credibility.’ Parchin is a sensitive military facility, and Iran fears that giving inspectors access would lead to an intelligence-driven fishing expedition. The other site of interest is in Marivan, where the IAEA contends that Iran conducted large-scale explosive tests of a multi-point initiation system, which is used to initiate nuclear fission, and in doing so to activate the neutron initiator, in a weapon. The source of this allegation appears to be what Iran justifiably claims is a set of forged documents. In 2014, Iran offered to let the IAEA conduct another ‘managed access’ on-site inspection of Marivan; the IAEA declined.
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‘You can’t hang your hat on a single issue,’ Garry Dillon, the former head of the IAEA’s Action Team in Iraq, told me in October 1998. ‘By insisting on investigating every minor discrepancy, regardless of the bigger picture, you’re putting process ahead of substance. In the end, all you’ll be doing is chasing ghosts.’ He was right. In Iraq, the inspection process became a vehicle for creating confrontations that undermined international confidence in Baghdad’s willingness to abide by its disarmament obligation. When Iraq finally told the truth about its weapons programmes, no one believed it. We used to joke about how often we came back from an inspection empty-handed, repeating the saying that insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.
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The intelligence about the ‘possible military dimensions’ of Iran’s nuclear programme is of questionable provenance and most of it is more than a dozen years old. The consequences of failure to reach a nuclear accord with Iran today are too serious for the world to embrace a process that has been so controversial while having so little impact on legitimate disarmament. This is especially true when the inspected party, as is the case with Iran, has agreed to implement stringent verification measures and has a proven track record of abiding by them. Iran has been put in the impossible position of having to prove a negative. If it accepts inspections based on allegations it knows to be baseless, then it’s opening itself up to an endless cycle of foreign intrusion into its military and security infrastructure, and the inability of inspectors to discover something of relevance will only reinforce the belief that something is being hidden. We saw this happen before in Iraq, and the end result was a war based on flawed intelligence and baseless accusations that left many thousands dead and a region in turmoil.

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Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer with the United States Marine Corps. From 1991-98, he served as a Chief Inspector for the UN in Iraq, where he led inspections to find weapons of mass destruction.

REAL justice in China

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This is the reason why China MUST become number one,  soon. China must take up the burden of leadership in the world.

The people of the world, poor and some rich yearn for Chinese leadership and just rule.

In the West on the other hand, Faggot criminal spooks tied faggot like to Israel set the agenda of the state, not unlike the Soviet Union and the infamous KGB in its last days.

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China corruption: Life term for ex-security chief Zhou

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By BBC and antiwar.com

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China's ex-security chief Zhou Yongkang has been jailed for life - the most senior politician to face corruption charges under Communist rule.
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He was found guilty of bribery, abuse of power and "intentionally disclosing national secrets", China's official Xinhua news agency reports.
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Until his retirement in 2012, Zhou was one of China's most powerful men.
He was put under investigation one year later as part of President Xi Jinping's major anti-corruption campaign.
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State TV showed a clip of Zhou, 72, pleading guilty at a closed-door trial in the northern city of Tianjin. When responding to the judge, he said he would not launch an appeal.
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"I've realised the harm I've caused to the party and the people. I plead guilty and I regret my crimes," he said.
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BBC China editor Carrie Gracie: Power politics exposed by fall of security boss
How China is reacting

Analysis: Celia Hatton, BBC News, Beijing

The verdict caught many people off guard.
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It was expected that Zhou Yongkang's trial would be played out for the Chinese public; his failings strung out for every citizen to see.
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In similar high-profile cases, like that of Zhou's protege, Bo Xilai, the foreign and Chinese media were given 48 hours' notice that Bo's trial would begin. Reporters camped outside the courthouse for days, breathlessly waiting for updates.
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In March, the head of China's Supreme People's Court had promised that Zhou Yongkang's trial would be "open in accordance with the law". The trial was set to take place in the eastern port city of Tianjin. It seemed Zhou was set to follow Bo's pattern. Like other senior officials convicted of serious crimes, it was expected he would receive a suspended death sentence. 
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Months passed without any word. Some guessed that Zhou Yongkang was not co-operating with prosecutors. Others believed that his crimes were too much of an embarrassment for the government.
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After all, Zhou Yongkang had held a seat at the very top of the Chinese government pyramid. If he was thoroughly corrupt, some in China might ask whether others at the top were rotten too. 
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In the end, the decision to keep Zhou Yongkang's trial secret matches the case surrounding him, and Zhou's own public persona: inaccessible and secretive.

The news agency said Zhou was tried behind closed doors on 22 May because the case involved state secrets. There was no public announcement until the conviction was reported on Thursday. 
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In a breakdown of the ruling, Xinhua reports that Zhou received a life sentence for directly accepting bribes worth 731,000 yuan ($117,000; £76,000), seven years for abuse of power and four years for "deliberately releasing state secrets". His family was said to have received bribes of 129 million yuan. 
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All political rights have been stripped and his property confiscated, it added.
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Reaction on Chinese social media platforms has been welcoming of the conviction, with one user commenting: "Haha! Put the old tiger in the cage!"
The jibe is a reference to President Xi Jinping's promise to crack down on both "tigers and flies" - meaning officials at all levels - in his fight against corruption.
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Zhou was charged in April, nine months after a formal investigation was announced. He has since been expelled from the Communist Party.

Zhou Yongkang pictured as a Politburo member in 2010, then again at his court hearing in 2015

He was once head of the Ministry of Public Security, as well as a member of China's top decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee.
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It is the first time such a senior Chinese figure has been convicted of corruption since the Communist Party came to power in 1949.
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Mr Xi vowed to end endemic corruption when he came to power in 2012.
Since then, a number of Zhou's former associates from his time working in the oil industry and as Communist Party chief in Sichuan province have been investigated or prosecuted as part of Mr Xi's corruption crackdown.
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The Xinhua report did not refer to Bo Xilai, a former protege of Zhou's and former Chongqing Communist Party chief, who is currently in prison on charges linked to his wife's murder of a UK businessman.

 

 

The USA military does not wish to chase after CIA created Flies

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1. The USA military wishes to gear up for mass conventional warfare, against REAL foes.

2. The USA military does not wish to chase after CIA created flies.

3. The USA military does not wish to chase after CIA created Flies, which serve ISRAEL'S far right Likud agenda's.

4. The USA military wishes to re-orientate towards real foes, and withdraw for logistical/tactical purposes and saving their energy for the real fight....what ever that may be.


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Why the US Military Opposed New Combat Roles in Iraq

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A report on discussions within the Obama administration reveals that the US military is firmly opposed to any ground combat role in the war against IS in Iraq

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by Gareth Porter at antiwar.com

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The story published in the Washington Post on 13 June shows how the US military service chiefs – who make decisions on war policy in light of their own institutional interests – prefer an inconclusive war with IS and existing constraints on US involvement, to one with even the most US limited combat role.
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The resistance of top US military officials to deepening US military involvement in the war against IS came in the wake of a major policy debate within the Obama administration following the collapse of Iraqi military resistance in Ramadi.
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In that debate, senior State Department officials reportedly supported the option of putting US advisers into Iraqi combat units to direct airstrikes on IS positions and sending US Apache attack helicopters into urban combat situations. But the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, joined top military commanders in opposing that option, the Post story recounted. Dempsey was said to have concluded that the potential gains from such an escalation were not worth the costs in terms of possible US combat losses.
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The result of that internal debate was that Obama sent 450 more advisers to Iraq, but only to bases removed from the IS combat zone.

United against combat role

Although President Barack Obama was reported to be keeping future options open, the constraints on the US military effort appear to reflect an alignment between the White House and the US military establishment against a US ground combat role in the battle against IS. 
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Obama’s concern to prevent the war against IS from involving US ground combat troops was clear from the outset. The White House appeared to be guarding against pressure for a combat role by suggesting that Islamic State is a “deeply-rooted organization” and thus could not be defeated through US military action. 
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And even after domestic political pressures for a major military action developed with the IS beheading of two Americans, Obama sought to avoid calling the US airstrikes against IS “war,” choosing instead to call them a “counter-terrorism strategy”.
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Like many other observers, when the US began its bombing campaign against Islamic State targets last August, I was certain that the bombing wouldn’t have any decisive effect on the IS forces, and feared that the logic of escalation that had operated in the failed wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan would also apply to the war against IS.
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But the US military does not view every war in the same way. The military’s position in regard to a given proposal for war is based on a set of calculations that may be crude but do follow a certain logic. Military leaders are neither disinterested servants of the commander in chief, as portrayed in the official mythology, nor agents of corporate business seeking control over the world’s resources, as the left has traditionally viewed them. 

How military views war

Since the modern US national security state emerged early in the Cold War, the posture of the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps toward different proposals for the use of military force has been shaped primarily by their views of the anticipated effect on their primary interests, which are the preservation and advancement of their own institutions.
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The interests in question are both material and psychological. They need to ensure that they obtain enough budgetary resources to maintain the health of those institutions, and they need to feel that their roles and missions are still regarded as important.
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The differences between how the US military services make decisions about war and how corporations make business decisions are obvious, but they are similar in one fundamental respect: like corporate businessmen deciding whether to invest in a new product line or expand existing operations, the military services chiefs also make calculations about the gains and costs of a new military engagement to their own institutions and to the military as a whole.
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The gains and costs in question are mediated by political conditions. The anticipated gains from a proposal for war may include increased defense spending in general or for particular military missions. A less tangible expected gain would be to impress upon public opinion the important role of one of the services.

Taking casualties

The calculation of potential losses in a proposed military engagement is focused on casualties to US troops. But the cost of those casualties depends on the political climate in the United States, which is in turn related to the actual course of the war in question. So the military leadership may view large numbers of casualties as tolerable in an early stage of one war but not tolerable at all in the context of a different war.
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The military service chiefs recall how public opposition to the Vietnam War shaped the climate of opinion toward major war for more than 15 years in the 1970s and 1980s. They also remember vividly how public support for both the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars eventually evaporated, and they have known that the US public now has little tolerance for the commitment of ground forces in any war. But they believe that they still have enough political support to continue airstrikes against terrorists.
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The question the military leaders have asked themselves is whether giving US troops and pilots more dangerous roles in the war against IS in Iraq is likely to generate more political support or have the opposite effect. Their pessimism on that question is based on the knowledge that such an escalation won’t help defeat IS. As a senior Pentagon official told the Post: “We have become very sensitive to the idea that we don’t want to risk lives and limbs if there isn’t a high probability of a payoff.” 
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The air war in Iraq and Syria is evidently expected to continue indefinitely. But the fact that the US is intervening militarily in an openly sectarian conflict without being able to affect the outcome is a fundamental political problem that is bound to come back to haunt the Obama administration and the US military.
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Gareth Porter, an investigative historian and journalist specializing in U.S. national security policy, received the UK-based Gellhorn Prize for journalism for 2011 for articles on the U.S. war in Afghanistan. His new book is Manufactured Crisis: the Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare. He can be contacted at porter.gareth50@gmail.com.
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Reprinted from the Middle East Eye with the author’s permission.

NE attack

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Attack on Assam Rifles camp in Arunachal may be prelude to bigger strike, say security agencies

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By Times of India

Sunday's attack on an Assam Rifles camp in Arunachal Pradesh could be a prelude to a major action by the NSCN (K) and its affiliates against security forces in the area, Indian security agencies suspect.
 

 On Sunday morning, just three days after militants killed 18 army soldiers in Chandel, about 50 militants attacked the camp in Tirap district. Thanks to precise intelligence given in advance to the camp, the attack was repulsed, officials said.
 

 Intelligence agencies, however, do not think that the success of Assam Rifles against militants would mean any lasting peace in Tirap and Changlang districts, which share a porous border with Myanmar. They have been observing significant movement of arms and militants into the districts in recent weeks, especially since SS Khaplang faction of NSCN (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland) pulled out of their 14-year-old ceasefire with the government.

 

Officials said they are expecting a bigger action in the area. Given the frequency with which the NSCN (K) and its allies have been attacking the security forces, the next major attack has to be expected in a few weeks' time, they said.
 

 Violence level in northeast, which had gone down over the last three-four years, has been deteriorating ever since NSCN (K) pulled out of the ceasefire agreement.
 

 The situation would be complicated by the proximity of NSCN (K) with the Burmese army and the new coalition of militant groups led by the naga rebels. Among the groups that are now with NSCN (K) are Paresh Baruah faction of ULFA, NDFB(S), KLO, and a couple of other Meitei insurgent groups.
 

 Their safe haven in Myanmar and robust supply of money and arms all portend difficult times for the region.
 

 New Delhi has adopted an aggressive security strategy in the wake of recent attacks of soldiers, and believes the success of army against NDFB in recent months can be replicated against NSCN (K). Army has stepped up its operations against militants since the Chandel attack.