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Two Cents About COIN
The war in Afghanistan, according to Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s recent assessment, is "a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign." McChrystal and other American leaders calling for a "surge" of additional U.S. troops into Afghanistan to mirror the alleged success of the "surge" in Iraq are voicing their belief that the doctrinal framework for the original surge – COIN, or manpower-intensive counterinsurgency warfare – is a widely-applicable tool in asymmetric warfare that the U.S. ought to employ in Afghanistan.
(Actually General, without over embellishing your position and self importance with regard to the war in Afghanistan, the solutions to the Afghan problem are quite simple.
The Afghans want peace, tranquility and a semblance of a government/governance------if we could just look at the "problem" from that perspective for a short while, after 30 years of war and invasion by RUSSIA, installing their puppet the Communists of Babrak Kamal/Nazibullah, Parcham fraction of 1980--1989{1.5 million dead, 5 million refugees},
The Afghan civil war.....many factions 1989---1996 {100,000 dead} Russian, Indian, Iranian, and Pakistani interference.
PAKISTAN, installing the Taliban puppets, with American backing. Mad regionalised SUNNI Islam faction. 1994--2001{100,000 dead }
....and the current bunch led by America 2001---2009. Wholly corrupt, American SOB/UNICOL faction {100.000 dead since 2001}
....a reasonable Afghan central government in Kabul would under cut the position of the Taliban, and allow a functioning Central Afghan government to emerge, running the whole of the country, and at the same time be strong enough to withstand external interference, especially against Pakistan. This is what Afghanistan needs.
What the Afghans, and the world have had however is an CLEAR disconnect between public rhetoric by especially American public officials in the military, and the reality of the actual situation in Afghanistan.
The Taliban militia of 40,000--50,000 in 2001 were easily defeated by American air power, special forces and the Northern Alliance, with little or no cost to lives.
If you used about a few thousand special forces against 40,000--50,000 Taliban, and defeated them in about a couple of weeks, why then do you need a future projected force of 500,000 Afghan and coalition forces to defeat a much smaller number of Taliban, fighting over a few years presumably, starting from now, after 8 years of occupation and consolidation in Afghanistan?
Whats/where is the rationale and logic of this?
"al-Qaeda" which is an intelligence hoax hollogram of Western/Israeli intelligence, no longer exists in Afghanistan, and admitted as such by the latest intelligence assessments of 2009.
Osama has been dead since December 2001. Osama's codename was "Tim Osman", and he had extensive liaison with his Western intelligence handlers right until his death in 2001. This suggests he was a puppet of Western intelligence. His real organization consisted of no more than a dozen Arab friends and fellow travelers.
NOT 5,000 men from such diverse backgrounds as Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Indonesia.............He would have had to have been a truly remarkable leader to have wielded and led such a desperate, diverse, variegated type of nationals under his sole leadership. As suggested/hinted he clearly did not lead such a group...at best he may have liaised with some of them for HIS WESTERN/ISRAELI intelligence handlers knowingly....each of the nationals in the Afghan foreign jehadi movement had their own leadership, or even not. They did not recognize him as their leader; tortured confessions not withstanding. "al-Qaeda" does not exist, never did.
They did not attack/undertake 9/11 on American soil. Their sole objective if there ever was one was to fight infedals on Muslim soil using conventional weapons in irregular warfare....in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and later Kosovo, with guidance and encouragement from America/Israel as the hidden hand to create an "al-Qaeda" hoax hologram.
The events of 9/11 in America were carried out by remote controlled planes (twin towers case.....remember space orbs by NASA are sent to Mars and back by remote control)..........pre-existing demolition teams in place a few weeks before 9/11 in Trade Center Buildings 1,2 and 7. Finally in the case of the Pentagon attack it could have been either a cruise missiles or a Predator.
These types of highly specialized technology, their theft from the American secret arsenal, their expert handling and final use,the mythical non-existent hologram "al-Qaeda" could not have had access to ALL at the same time, so coincidentally, hitting their targets with such precision..........Arabs are not superhuman, Saudi twenty something youths who are dysfunctional, unremarkable, taking dope, binging on alcohol prior to that sad event could not have had access to such technology, or the capacity to carry out such profound expert action in tandem, without fail, on their very first attempt, on a foreign soil in New York, and its hinterland.
This was the work of Israel and their agents in America, within American security. Their agents in America had the capacity and security clearance to steal these highly specialised equipment, and use them as professional experts who knew how to use them, as experts. Not 20 something Ay-Rabs.
Means, motive, opportunity---strategic objectives:
Summary real intended outcome:
1) 9/11 was primarily a criminal financial act by elements in the USA and Israel, a high percentage of those who were really involved being Jewish.
2) From an Israeli perspective 9/11 would help Israel get closer to America, 'Were in this together'. "Our war is your war"
3) 9/11 would enable the Israel first Bush administration launch a Crusade for Israel and smash countries deemed to be a threat to Israel.-------7 countries in 5 years was the talk in late 2001, at the Pentagon.
4) 9/11 would allow the Israelis to more openly pursue their agenda's without the critical Western media being too scrutinizing. Dealing with the Palestinians more harshly, as they have done so since 2001, and then attacking Lebanon and there after Syria---'A Clean Break' document 1996.
5) 9/11 would allow the Jew greater control over America, by creating a security police state, with them setting and deciding the agenda's in America.
The 5,000 international Jihadi fighters who were falsely identified as "al-Qaeda" in Afghanistan in 2001 are NOW mostly dead, or have returned to their native countries via Iran, or Pakistan/Maldives or Pakistan/Oman.
There are about 10,000 regular "Taliban" fighters fighting in the East and South East of the country, backed by the Pakistan military.......BUT this is not because these people are waging a global jihad, where upon when they finish their task in Afghanistan they are going to head towards America. Hardly; the leadership and the rank and file of the Taliban have local objectives. Indeed many of the rank and file of the Taliban are not true Taliban, but have joined because of some bad experience with the occupation forces, or grievances against the UNICOL puppet, and its security forces....eg Afghan police enter and occupy a village and rape the boys in that area, which enrages the locals into joining the Taliban....a local warlord extorts a % of the annual harvest from local Afghans which makes their lives unbearable, so they join the Taliban to fight the warlord who is allied to the occupation force.........NOTHING TO DO WITH HARMING THE WEST/ATTACKING THE WEST.
The Taliban in turn is CONTROLLED/SUPPLIED by the Pakistani military, period.
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Once this true scenario is understood, then American politicians must decide whether they wish to continue fighting an unnecessary war, or they begin to put in place a system that will preserve a realistic civilian Kabul government, which can stand alone and fight and defeat the Taliban eventually.
There are various alternative "real reason" arguments put forward as to why America is in Afghanistan:
1) To protect the pipelines from Central Asia carrying gas and oil----well it doesn't make sense to have a state of the art military machine MERELY guarding pipelines, especially where each of these boys cost $750,000---$1,000,000 each year to maintain in Afghanistan. Much more practical to have the locals, with the added incentives do the protecting.
Now I appreciate many people have subsequently questioned the "intelligence" of the Bush administration, in the full holistic sense of the word......but the passage of time and experience should allow us to adjust how strategies are pursued, and not get into policy ruts. You know Iraq, we invade and own Iraqi oil, the second largest reserves on earth......"Its mine, mine, mine, mine mine.....you hear me...no one else can have it, no one, its mine, mine....free, free, free".....under International law, this is illegal appropriation. An occupying power has certain legal obligations, lest the legal experts at the State Department forget, and one of them is that states clearly that are occupying powers, beyond reasonable requests for reparations, cannot just grab the local resources and do with them as they wish.....like in the good old days of European colonialism........But that was the presumption of the Bush administration, it seemed as they legislated away Iraqi oil rights. So not a stretch to see the rational of the Bush administration over the pipelines/and American military protection for them in the context of Afghanistan as the real reason for the invasion of that country.
2. $50--80 billion annual opium/narcotics profit from Afghanistan:----again as with the above argument, the American military does not have to be in Afghanistan to secure the profits for the criminal few in the Pentagon and their civilian contacts. The main issue for the international narcotics business is who controls the international routes and end sale business in the profitable European, North American and Russian markets. Maybe the narcotics profits from South America is about $200 billion enabled by the American military/security into North America.....and growing every year, but as with the case of South America, and so thus with AFGHANISTAN, American security personnel do not have to be in place there to secure the business for the criminal elites of America/UK.....Small military missions under the guise of fighting left-wing guerrillas in South America and the narcotics trade in those countries is enough. "Its mine, Its mine...its mine...I'm rich, very rich.....soo rich....the eyes light up and flash......pent houses in Manhattan, ........."
(Well a counter terrorism campaign is a waste of time if everybody has concluded that "al-Qaeda" is not present in Afghanistan. So from the the Pentagon's point of view a different rational and strategies have to be put forward and that seems to be COIN. There are military men who want their moment of glory....their chance to be the next MacArthur, Patton, and Grant, and be recognised for it......just amazing how General MacCrystal went about "selling" his war....and so it will be difficult to convince them that there is no real enemy to fight in Afghanistan; the politicians ultimately must decide whether America continues with this military charade and fantasy. 9/11 was a sad charade, but must it continue for ever?)
It may be true that, as military expert Stephen Biddle said in recent Congressional testimony, "the U.S. is an unusually experienced counterinsurgent force today," and "the new Army/Marine counterinsurgency doctrine…is the product of a nearly unprecedented degree of internal debate, external vetting, historical analysis, and direct recent combat experience."
(Has America won a real counter-insurgency campaign yet?......Can you be so blatantly in your face brutal to the Afghans re: Karzai, and tolerate his ilk, and their deeds....and think we can "win" in Afghanistan. The Basic premise and pattern of behavior is wrong........if you spend 98% of ALL your expenditure on the military in Afghanistan, can you win a counter-insurgency? To be sure dear fat, nasty friends.....Pashtun dominated, Eastern/South Western Afghanistan is difficult to "reach out" to but what about the rest of the country....the Central Hazara, the Persian East around Herat, The Uzbek North, or the Tajik North East?..........How many fucking schools have you built with our fucking Jew NARCO $.....How many hospitals, roads, bridges, houses, factories, offices,...............farms)
But these very factors that have encouraged so many highly capable U.S. leaders to sign on to "COIN" should cause observers to be wary of the doctrine and the currency it increasingly enjoys in the American political debate. After all, the more enthusiastic we are about the potential of COIN warfare, the more blind we will be to its costs, which are enormous.
(You might just fail, all the Iranians, Chinese or Pakistanis have to do is start supplying light SAMS to the Taliban.......they have not had these yet)
We can and must think about contemporary problems – such as what strategy the U.S. should pursue in Afghanistan – through the lenses of relevant theories and historical analogies. But it is foolish to think within the box of a single analogy, such as the Iraq "surge," or a single theory, such as the idea that we can succeed at counterinsurgency and nation-building by deploying generous numbers of ground troops and focusing on winning the "hearts and minds" of local communities.
(Very nice academic semantics about the art of war....whilst ordinary Afghan's, and yes Americans are suffering...."Through the lenses of relevant theory....." like he was lecturing at West Point or something)
Our need to make quick decisions and cope with a complex world creates a powerful incentive for us to create "rules of thumb," default beliefs, habits, choices, or courses of action that we adopt almost without thinking. And yet when those in the halls of power make major decisions on the basis of such "rules of thumb," the results can sometimes be disastrous. It behooves political observers to be aware of new decision-making habits, and the spread of some new piece of "conventional wisdom," in their leaders.
It is important to remember that military leaders have a major incentive to endorse a COIN approach in Afghanistan. According to General Petraeus and other experts, most successful COIN operations require very high numbers of U.S. troops on the ground – numbers that may be politically and logistically impossible for the Obama administration to accept.
(Once they get their quota, they'll ask for more, and more...and when they finally don't, they'll blame the politicians)
Because the number of troops that can be reasonably demanded for a COIN operation is essentially limitless, mission failure can be blamed on the executive branch for not sending enough troops rather than on military leaders, the combat environment, or the COIN playbook itself. As Gen. McChrystal wrote in his assessment: "Success is not ensured by additional forces alone, but continued under resourcing will likely cause failure."
Organizational psychology and the logic of bureaucracies provide more clues into the wave of COIN-fever that appears to have struck so many of our political and military leaders. Simply put, it was neither easy nor cheap for the military to develop COIN doctrine as we attempted to salvage the war in Iraq in recent years, and now COIN feels like hard-won wisdom that we should put to the test in another theater of war. It’s a classic case of sunk costs: it is felt that we paid too much for COIN to abandon it now.
Policymakers’ belief in the power of COIN may encourage them to see military solutions where none exist. If the U.S. opts to send tens of thousands of additional ground troops to Afghanistan in order to pursue a comprehensive COIN strategy, it will be taking on a great deal of risk and incurring substantial additional costs in pursuit of a highly uncertain outcome.
