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Feinstein’s Denunciation of Kirk-Menendez Iran Act May Be Decisive…
By Jim Lobe
As cash-poor as they are, newspapers are still less susceptible to the kind of pressure exerted by AIPAC and its associated PACs that are able to provide — or deny — substantial cash for political campaigns.
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The fact that the number of co-sponsors of the bill has been frozen at 59 since last week — and as important — that at least one co-sponsor, Sen. Richard Blumenthal, has said now is not the time to move the bill suggests that the pressure on Majority Leader Harry Reid to let the bill come to a vote over the next month will recede (barring some provocation by Iran). In that context, Feinstein’s speech will almost certainly strengthen the administration’s pushback against the bill.
While the speech is worth reading in full — precisely because it is so thorough — it’s worth highlighting its explicit concern about the possibility of a “wag the dog” scenario.
“While I recognize and share Israel’s concern,” she said, “we cannot let Israel determine when and where the U.S. goes to war. By stating that the U.S. should provide military support to Israel should it attack Iran, I fear that is exactly what this bill will do.” This is a remarkable and courageous statement. So is her characterization of the bill’s likely impact of undermining negotiations as a “march to war.”
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Here is her statement:
There’s been a plethora of op-eds and
Senator Dianne Feinstein Remarks on Iran Sanctions January 14, 2014
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Mr. President, I come to the floor today to discuss a critical issue of national security—how to prevent a nuclear armed Iran.
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As I was thinking about our troubled history with Iran and whether more sanctions at this time make sense for our national security interests, I asked myself these questions:
• Can a country change?
• Is it possible for an isolated regime to rejoin the community of nations and change its behavior?
• Must a country and its people be held captive because of the behavior of previous leaders in earlier times?
So I thought back on history.
I was a young girl during World War II. I remember when Imperial Japan killed millions in Southeast Asia, and particularly China, during its brutal wars of expansion. Today, Japan is a peaceful democracy and one of this nation’s strongest allies in Asia.
I remember when Hitler and the German Third Reich committed unspeakable atrocities across Europe– including the murder of six million Jews. Germany is now a close ally and a leader in the European Union, an institution created to ensure a war never again occurs in Europe.
I remember General Franco’s Spain which was so diplomatically and economically isolated that it was actually barred from the United Nations until 1955. Spain is now a close partner of the United States and a fully democratic member of the EU.
The former Yugoslavia, Vietnam and South Africa have all experienced tremendous change in recent decades.
• Independent states have emerged from the painful dissolution of Yugoslavia;
• Vietnam has opened itself to the international community, but still has much progress to make; and
• South Africa has shed apartheid and has emerged as an increasingly stable nation on a much-divided continent.
So I believe a nation can change.
This capacity to change also applies to the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
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At one time, Sweden, South Korea and Argentina each pursued nuclear weapons.(A very limited list for diplomatic reasons.....you can include Saudi Arabia with Pakistani help, Turkey, South Africa with Israeli help from the 1970's, Japan, Brazil, Myanmar, Pakistan, India, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, North Korea.......and many more countries to mention---30--60?....but the senators point is that constructive dialogue with a potential nuclear power can be dealt with by negotiations, and the offer of realistic inducements....unfreeze the $40--50 billion of Iran assets from the Shah era held in the West, and the $100 of billions of assets again frozen currently due to sanctions. Finally allow Iran to export 2.5-3 million barrels of oil from the current meager 1 million barrels per day.
Under the Shah in 1976 Iran exported 6 million barrels a day, but hostile policies from the UK in 1978 and specifically BP who cut and suddenly stopped buying 3 million barrels of oil have had a devastating effect on the Iranian economy, and brought about the artificial mullah revolution, sold by the BBC as a peoples struggle against a CIA backed tyrant.....the mullahs and their deeds since 1979, make the weak, indecisive Shah a saint in comparison to the mullahs)
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• Following World War II, Sweden pursued nuclear weapons to deter foreign attack. It mastered nuclear technology and built and tested components for a nuclear weapon. It may have even obtained enough nuclear material to build a bomb. In 1970, it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ended its nuclear weapons program.
• In the early 1970s, South Korea actively sought a nuclear device. The United States heavily pressured South Korea not to go nuclear. And in April 1975, it signed the NPT and halted its nuclear weapons-related activities.
• Throughout the 1980s – when it was ruled by a military junta with an egregious human rights record – Argentina had a covert nuclear weapons program. It built uranium production, enrichment and reprocessing facilities. And it attempted to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles before abandoning its nuclear weapons program and ratifying the NPT in 1995.
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The question comes: is Iran willing to change its past behavior and abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon? It may well be. It is the job of diplomacy to push for this change.
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Election of Rouhani
I believe there are positive signs that Iran is interested in such a change, and I’d like to explain my reasons.
The election of Hassan Rouhani was a surprise to many longtime observers of Iran because he campaigned in support of repairing Iran’s relationship with the West. And since his inauguration he has tried to do exactly that.
• For the first time since the Iranian Revolution, the leaders of our countries have been in direct communication with each other.
• Where once direct contact even between even senior officials was rare, now Secretary John Kerry and Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman are in near-constant contact with their Iranian counterparts. Those conversations produced the historic Geneva agreement which goes into effect on January 20th.
Geneva agreement
Candidate Rouhani also promised to increase nuclear transparency, and he has delivered on that as well.
Even before the Geneva interim agreement was reached, Iran slowed uranium enrichment and construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor. Maybe for technical reasons, maybe not.
Iran has also re-engaged with the IAEA to resolve questions surrounding Iran’s nuclear activities.
What has been achieved in Geneva?
The interim 6-month agreement, reached between the P5+1 countries—the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany—freezes Iran’s nuclear program in place while a comprehensive agreement is negotiated in the next 6 months. This agreement:
• Caps Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium at 5 percent;
• Stops the production of 20 percent enriched uranium;
• Requires the neutralization of Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent uranium;
• Prevents Iran from installing additional centrifuges or operating its most advanced centrifuges;
• Prohibits Iran from stockpiling excess centrifuges;
• And it halts all significant work at the Arak heavy-water reactor and prevents Iran from constructing a plutonium reprocessing facility.
Most importantly, the interim agreement imposes the most intrusive international inspection regime ever. International inspectors will independently verify whether or not Iran is complying with the interim agreement.
For the first time, IAEA inspectors will have uninterrupted access to Iran’s:
• Enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow;
• Centrifuge production plants;
• Centrifuge assembly facilities; and
• Iran’s uranium mines and mills.
And finally Iran is required to declare all planned new nuclear facilities.
In exchange, the P5+1 negotiators offered sanctions relief limited to $7 billion–an aspect of the interim agreement that has been criticized.
Here are the facts on this sanctions relief, which in my view does not materially alter the biting sanctions that have devastated Iran’s economy:
• The vast majority of sanctions relief comes in the form of Iran repatriating $4.2 billion of its own money;
• Iran will continue to lose $4-$5 billion per month in lost oil revenue from existing sanctions;
• Iran will not have access to about $100 billion of its own reserves trapped by sanctions abroad.
• For perspective, the total estimated sanctions relief is valued at approximately 1 percent of the Iranian economy. Hardly a significant amount.
I would like to take a moment to detail what is not in the interim agreement.
• First, the interim agreement does not grant Iran a right to enrich.
The United States does not recognize such a right for the five non-nuclear weapons states that currently have enrichment programs, and we will make no exception for Iran.
But Iran does have a right to peaceful nuclear energy if it fully abides by the terms of its safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
• Second, the agreement does not in any way unravel our core oil and financial sanctions.
Others have argued the suspension of any sanctions against Iran will unravel the entire sanctions regime.
The Obama Administration has taken action to make sure that does not happen.
Two days after the interim agreement was reached, the U.S. settled with a Swiss oil services company over sanctions violations. The settlement of more than $250 million was the largest against a foreign firm outside of the banking industry.
On December 12th, the Administration announced the expansion of Iranian entities subject to sanctions. These entities either helped Tehran evade sanctions and or provided support to Iran’s nuclear program.
On January 7th, the Administration halted the transfer of two Boeing airplane engines from Turkey to Iran.
Through these actions, the Obama Administration has made it abundantly clear the U.S. will continue to enforce our sanctions against Iran.
• Third, the agreement does not codify the violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
Critics have attacked the interim agreement for its failure to completely halt all of Iran’s nuclear enrichment by noting that six UN Security Council Resolutions have called on Tehran to do so and it has not done so.
The purpose of the UN Resolutions was not to suspend nuclear enrichment indefinitely.
Instead, the resolutions were designed to freeze Iran’s nuclear activities until the IAEA could determine whether or not Iran’s activities were for exclusively peaceful purposes.
This is an important point: the interim agreement achieves what the UN Resolutions could not.
It freezes Iran’s nuclear progress while a comprehensive, verifiable agreement is being negotiated.
The effect of sanctions on Iran’s economy
The interim agreement was only possible because a strong international sanctions regime has worked to convince rank and file Iranians that, candidly, enough is enough!
• According to the State Department, as a result of the sanctions, Iranian crude oil exports have plummeted from approximately 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to around 1 million barrels per day in recent months.
• This decline costs Iran $3 to $5 billion per month in lost revenue alone.
• In total, 23 importers of Iranian oil have eliminated or significantly reduced purchases from Iran.
o Iran currently has only six customers for its oil: China, India, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.
• In the last year, Iran’s gross domestic product shrank by 5.8 percent while inflation is estimated to be 50 percent or more.
• Prices for food and consumer goods are doubling and tripling on an annual basis, and estimates put unemployment as high as 35 percent while underemployment is pervasive.
Menendez legislation
This body may soon consider the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, a bill to impose additional sanctions against Iran.
Before casting a vote, senators should ask themselves what would happen if the bill passes and a promised veto by the president is not sustained?
I sincerely believe that P5+1 negotiations with Iran would end and with it the best opportunity in more than 30 years to make a major change in Iranian behavior – a change that could not only open all kinds of economic opportunities for the Iranian people, but change the course of a nation.
Passing additional sanctions now would play into the hands of those in Iran who are most eager to see diplomacy fail.
Iranian conservatives will attack President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif for seeking a nuclear compromise and argue that:
• Iran exchanged a freeze of its nuclear program for additional and harshly punitive sanctions;
• If the U.S. cannot honor the interim agreement negotiated in Geneva, it will never lift sanctions after a final agreement;
• Above all, they will argue the U.S. is not interested in nuclear diplomacy—we are interested in regime change;
The bottom line: if this body passes S. 1881, diplomatic negotiations will collapse and there will be no final agreement. Some might want that result, but I do not.
Iran’s nuclear program would once again be unrestrained and the only remaining option to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon would be a military action.
To date, the prospect of just considering this bill has prompted Iranian legislators to consider retaliation.
There is talk that the legislative branch, the Majles, may move to increase nuclear enrichment far beyond the 5 percent limit in the interim agreement and much closer to, if not achieving, weapons grade uranium.
So, the authors of additional sanctions here and Iranian hardliners there actually would combine to blow up the diplomatic effort of six world powers.
The bill’s sponsors have argued that increased sanctions would strengthen the United States’ hand in negotiations. They argue that sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table. They contend that additional sanctions would force Iran to abandon its nuclear program.
I could not disagree more.
Let me give you the views of other individuals who are knowledgeable in the arena:
Dr. Paul Pillar—a former senior U.S. intelligence official and current professor at Georgetown University—recently wrote:
It is the prospect of having U.S.- led sanctions removed that will convince Iran to accept severe restrictions on its nuclear program. Threatening Iran with additional sanctions now–after it agreed to the interim agreement–will not convince Tehran to complete a final agreement.
If this bill would help our negotiators, as its authors contend, they would say so.
This bill is an egregious imposition on the executive’s authority to conduct foreign affairs. In fact, our Secretary of State has formally asked the Congress to “give our negotiators and our experts the time and the space to do their jobs,” including no new sanctions.
To disregard this request is to effectively say we don’t care what our top diplomat says—the Senate will impose our will. And if it blows up this very fragile process, too bad! What a tragedy!
And we know what the Iranian reaction will be:
Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif has clearly stated what the result will be summarized in five words: “the entire deal is dead.”
The Ambassador of our staunchest ally—the U.K.—warned this body not to pass more sanctions. Sir Peter Westmacott recently wrote:
“Further sanctions now would only hurt negotiations and risk eroding international support for the sanctions that have brought us this far. The time for additional measures will come if Iran reneges on the deal or if negotiations fail. Now is not that time.”
A vote for this legislation will cause negotiations to collapse. The United States—not Iran—becomes the party that risks fracturing the international coalition that has enabled our sanctions to succeed in the first place.
And it says to the U.K., China, Russia, France and Germany that our country cannot be trusted to stand behind our diplomatic commitments.
These allies will question whether their compliance with sanctions (and the economic sacrifices they have made) are for naught.
Should these negotiations fall apart, the choices are few and the most likely result, in my view, is the eventual and inevitable use of military force.
Is that really the choice we want to make?
Enforcing the Interim Agreement
Instead this body should concentrate on Iranian compliance with the interim agreement.
On January 20, 2014 the interim agreement will come into effect. Over the next six months, the international community will be able to verify whether or not Iran is keeping its commitments to freeze its nuclear progress.
If Iran fails to abide by the terms of the interim agreement, or if a final agreement cannot be negotiated, Congress can immediately consider additional sanctions.
Additional sanctions should only be considered once our diplomatic track has been given the opportunity to forge a final, comprehensive, and binding agreement.
Undermining negotiations now, after achieving meaningful, historic progress, defies logic and threatens to instantly reverse fragile, unprecedented diplomacy.
Candidly, it is a march to war.
As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I know the many challenges Iran poses to U.S. interests around the world.
Iran’s patronage of the terrorist group Hezbollah and its support for Syria’s Bashar Assad through the Revolutionary Guard Corps are two of the most troubling.
And let me acknowledge Israel’s real, well-founded concerns that a nuclear-armed Iran would threaten its very existence.
While I recognize and share Israel’s concern, we cannot let Israel determine when and where the U.S. goes to war.
By stating that the U.S. should provide military support to Israel should it attack Iran, I fear that is exactly what this bill will do.
Conclusion
The interim agreement with Iran is strong, tough and realistic. It represents the first significant opportunity to change a three decade course in Iran and an opening to improve one of our most poisonous bilateral relationships.
It opens the door to a new future which not only considers Israel’s national security—but protects our own.
To preserve diplomacy, I strongly oppose the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act.
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Flaws in the Kirk-Menendez Iran Sanctions (Wag the Dog) Bill
By Jim Lobe
Ed Levine, an arms control specialist who worked for both Republican and Democratic senators for 20 years on the Intelligence Committee and another ten on the Foreign Relations Committee, has written a detailed and devastating analysis of S. 1881, the Kirk-Menendez bill, for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation on whose advisory board he currently serves. We have reproduced it below, but it makes clear that, contrary to claims by the bill’s Democratic co-sponsors, the Iran Nuclear Weapon Free Act of 2013 is designed to torpedo the Nov. 24 “first step” nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1. Passage of the bill, Levine concludes, would “leave the United States closer to a Hobson’s choice between going to war with Iran and accepting Iran as an eventual nuclear weapons state.”.
Indeed, it’s quite clear from Sen. Mark Kirk’s reaction (as well as those of other Republicans, including that of House Majority Leader Eric Cantor) to the implementation accord between the P5+1 that the entire purpose of the bill is to derail the Nov. 24 agreement, as opposed to acting as a “diplomatic insurance policy” to ensure that its terms are fulfilled, as Sen. Menendez argued last week in the Washington Post. Indeed, Senate Republicans, all but two of whom have co-sponsored the bill, are clearly doing the bidding of AIPAC and Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu in trying to subvert the Nov. 24 agreement, while the 16 Democratic senators who have signed as co-sponsors have insisted that the bill is intended to support that accord. One would think the very partisan difference in the understanding of the intent of the bill would lead some of these 16 Democrats to reconsider their support. That may well be beginning to happen anyway as a result of Sunday’s successful conclusion of the implementation accord, as pointed out in this report by Reuters. But the difference in intent will probably make it easier for the White House to keep the majority of Democrats from breaking ranks.
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As of now, the bill has 59 co-sponsors, but the magic number is 67 — a veto-proof majority. While Senate staffers close to AIPAC claimed anonymously last week that they had that many, and at least ten more, committed “yes” votes if the bill came to the floor, the combination of Sunday’s implementation agreement and the clarity of purpose shown by Kirk and Cantor in their reactions to the accord probably diminishes the chances of their reaching that goal. Moreover, unless they get at least half a dozen more Democrats to co-sponsor, Majority Leader Harry Reid is considered unlikely to schedule a vote and almost certainly not before the Presidents’ Day recess in mid-February in any case. And if even a few current Democratic co-sponsors decide to drop their support, the bill may never see the light of day. (AIPAC’s annual Policy Conference here in Washington is March 2-4.)
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This is Levine’s analysis:
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S.1881, the “Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013,” will undercut President Obama’s efforts to obtain a comprehensive solution to Iran’s nuclear activities. To the extent that it removes the diplomatic option, moreover, it will leave the United States closer to a Hobson’s choice between going to war with Iran and accepting Iran as an eventual nuclear weapons state.
Supporters of the bill, which was introduced on December 19 by Senators Menendez (D-NJ) and Kirk (R-IL), claim that enactment of it would not impede the E3+3 (AKA the P5+1) negotiations with Iran, but the text of Title III of the bill manifestly contradicts such claims. Specifically:
- Section 301(a)(2)(I) requires the President to certify, in order to suspend application of the new sanctions, that “Iran has not conducted any tests for ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 500 kilometers.” While this objective may be consistent with a UN Security Council resolution, it moves the goalposts by making the new sanctions contingent not just on Iran’s nuclear activities, but also on its missile programs. This paragraph also does not specify a time period (although the requirement in section 301(a)(1) for a certification every 30 days might imply one), so Iran’s past missile tests beyond 500 km might make it impossible for the President ever to make this certification.
- Section 301(a)(2)(H) requires the President also to certify that “Iran has not directly, or through a proxy, supported, financed, planned, or otherwise carried out an act of terrorism against the United States or United States persons or property anywhere in the world.” Once again, there is no time period specified, so Iran’s past support of terrorism might make it impossible for the President ever to make this certification. Even if a time period were clear, however, this language would mean that if, say, Hezbollah were to explode a bomb outside a U.S. firm’s office in Beirut, the sanctions would go into effect (because Iran gives financial and other support to Hezbollah) even if Iran’s nuclear activities and negotiations were completely in good faith. So, once again, the goalposts are being moved.
- Section 301(a)(2)(F) requires the President to certify that the United States seeks an agreement “that will dismantle Iran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure.” But while Iran may agree in the end to dismantle some of its nuclear infrastructure, there is no realistic chance that it will dismantle all of its uranium enrichment capability. In order for the President to make this certification, therefore, he will have to argue either that “you didn’t say all of Iran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure” (although that is clearly the bill’s intent) or that “if the negotiators agree to allow some level of nuclear enrichment in Iran, then the facilities are no longer illicit” (which begins to sound like statements by Richard Nixon or the Queen of Hearts).
- Section 301(a)(3), regarding a suspension of sanctions beyond 180 days, adds the requirement that an agreement be imminent under which “Iran will…dismantle its illicit nuclear infrastructure…and other capabilities critical to the production of nuclear weapons.” This raises the same concerns as does the paragraph just noted, plus the new question of what those “other capabilities” might be. At a minimum, such ill-defined requirements invite future partisan attacks on the President.
- Section 301(a)(4) reimposes previously suspended sanctions if the President does not make the required certifications. This paragraph applies not only to the sanctions mandated by this bill, but also to “[a]ny sanctions deferred, waived, or otherwise suspended by the President pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action or any agreement to implement the Joint Plan of Action.” Thus, it moves the goalposts even for the modest sanctions relief that the United States is currently providing to Iran. To the extent that the currently-provided sanctions relief relates to sanctions imposed pursuant to the President’s own powers, moreover, section 301(a)(4) may run afoul of the separation of powers under the United States Constitution.
- Section 301(b) allows the President to suspend the bill’s sanctions annually after a final agreement is reached with Iran, but only if a resolution of disapproval of the agreement is not enacted pursuant to section 301(c). The primary effect of this insertion of Congress into the negotiating process will be to cast doubt upon the ability of the United States to implement any agreement that the E3+3 reaches with Iran. The provision is also unnecessary, as most of the sanctions relief that would be sought in a final agreement would require statutory changes anyway.
- Section 301(b)(1) imposes a certification requirement to suspend the bill’s new sanctions after a final agreement with Iran has been reached, even if a resolution of disapproval has been defeated. This certification requirement imposes maximalist demands upon the E3+3 negotiators. Paragraph (A) requires that the agreement include dismantlement of Iran’s “enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and facilities, the heavy water reactor and production plant at Arak, and any nuclear weapon components and technology.” How one dismantles technology is left to the imagination. Paragraph (B) requires that Iran come “into compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear program,” which would require its suspension, at least, of all uranium enrichment. In all likelihood, however, the complete suspension of enrichment either will be impossible to achieve through diplomacy or will be achieved only for a short time before Iran is permitted to resume an agreed level of enrichment of an agreed quantity of uranium under international verification. Paragraph (C) requires that all the IAEA’s issues regarding past or present Iranian nuclear activities be resolved – an objective that the United States and its allies surely share, but that may prove difficult to achieve even if the other objectives are realized. Paragraph (D) requires “continuous, around the clock, on-site inspection…of all suspect facilities in Iran,” which would likely be inordinately expensive and unnecessary, and might also impose safety hazards.
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It is in that context that one should read the sense of Congress, in section 2(b)(5) of the bill, that if Israel is compelled to take military action against Iran’s nuclear weapon program, the United States should provide “military support” to Israel. While such support could be limited to intelligence and arms sales, there would be great pressure for the United States to take a more active military role. So this bill, by its many steps to close the window for diplomacy with Iran, could end the international sanctions regime and lead either to a nuclear-armed Iran or to a war in which U.S. armed forces might well be active participants.
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Eight Ways You're Wrong About Iran's Nuclear Program
By Yusuf Butt published in the National interest and antiwar.com
Oft repeated but false assertions about Iran's nuclear program—and the [3]recent deal to tamp it down [3]—may end up being more dangerous than the program itself. These wrong statements reinforce each other, get amplified in the media, and are [4]fueling a march to military action [4].
Such use of force would further inflame the Middle East and could push Iran to start a full-scale nuclear weapons project. US national security would further erode as a result—just like it has with the Iraq debacle. The 'aluminum tubes', 'mobile biological-weapons labs', and 'yellow cake from Niger' memes fueled the march to that war. Let's examine some of the current false Iran nuclear memes before we’re led [5]down the yellow-cake road again [5]:Meme 1: “If the world powers fail to reach a deal with Tehran the alternative is bombing.”
An incarnation of this shopworn meme appears in [4]Matthew Kroenig's recent piece in Foreign Affairs [4]. He states “A truly comprehensive diplomatic settlement between Iran and the West is still the best possible outcome, but there is little reason to believe that one can be achieved. And that means the United States may still have to choose between bombing Iran and allowing it to acquire a nuclear bomb.” Er, no. That's a false choice. Iran is not acquiring a nuclear bomb—the [6]US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has a “high level of confidence” [6] that no decision to weaponize has yet been taken in Tehran. This conclusion of the DNI is not based on an absence of evidence but on actual information [7] that whatever weaponization research Iran may have been doing up to about 2003 has been wrapped up a decade ago.
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The P5+1 nations—the five permanent members of the Security Council: the US, UK, France, Russia and China, plus Germany—are not negotiating with Iran to stop it from making a nuclear bomb. They are negotiating with Iran on how to continue to keep its nuclear program peaceful. The discussion is about the methods used to verify that Iran continues its peaceful nuclear program. Even if the nuclear talks fall apart the IAEA inspectors would still continue to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities.
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If we—or our allies—bomb Iran the IAEA inspectors would most certainly be expelled, Iran would likely leave the NPT, and Tehran would likely kick off a full-blown nuclear weapons development project. Iraq's nuclear weapons project also started in earnest after Israel bombed [8] Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981.
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To sum up: The negotiations with Iran are about the methods to use to continue to make sure Iran's nuclear program is peaceful. Not reaching a deal is not the end of the world. And if we do bomb Iran, it is likely to bring about the very thing the bombs were trying to prevent: a full-blown nuclear weapons program.
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That said, a deal is still the best outcome: it would give even more reassurance about Iran's nuclear program, and it would end the sanctions which are [9]punishing the weakest of the Iranian civilians while enriching the Revolutionary Guards [9] who profit from busting sanctions.
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Meme 2: “Sanctions forced Iran to the table and extracted concessions from Iran.”
This [10]meme has been expressed, [10] for example, by Senator Robert Menendez, among many others. He has stated that “Current sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table and a credible threat of future sanctions will require Iran to cooperate and act in good faith at the negotiating table.” However cliché, the statement is untrue. [11]Iran was at the negotiating table almost ten years ago [11] and offered the same concessions back then. The [12]sanctions are not what resulted in the recent breakthrough [12] interim agreement between the world powers and Iran. The main thing that changed is the improved atmospherics, which “allowed” the P5+1 to sign a deal with Iran. The election of Iranian president Rouhani, a moderate and erudite leader, permitted the world powers to sign a deal with Iran—a “reward” the US was unwilling to bestow upon the loudmouthed and provocative Ahmedinejad, mostly for domestic reasons [13].
It is important to underline that [11]Iran has offered nothing more in terms of concessions now than what it offered in 2005 [11]. The sanctions [12]did not bring Iran to the negotiating table [12]—Tehran was [13]always there [13]—and the sanctions definitely did not wring out extra concessions from Iran. Basically, were it not for [14]western intransigence [14] and the [13]bad atmospherics [13], the interim deal signed in late 2013 could have been signed in 2005.
This brings us to next false meme:
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Meme 3: “Iran has dragged out negotiations unnecessarily—the West sees the nuclear issue as an urgent matter and desperately wants to resolve it but is frustrated by Tehran's foot-dragging”
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As mentioned above, the [11]world powers could have gotten the same concessions [11] out of Iran back in 2005 but have only now [15]decided to seriously engage [15] with Iran. As the [16]New York Times has reported [16], “Mr. Obama’s aides seem content with stalemate.” The main thing this foot-dragging by the west indicates is that it does not see the Iranian nuclear issue as particularly important. This is unsurprising because the US Intelligence community is aware—with a [6]“high level of confidence” [6]— [17]that there is no nuclear weapons program in Iran right now.
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Even now, after the interim agreement with Iran has been signed, elite US analysts and commentators are yawning at the prospect of an Iranian bomb and actually urging a lackadaisical approach to negotiations with Iran. For example, [18]Mitchell Reiss and Ray Takeyh argue [18] that "to succeed in nuclear negotiations with Iran, the Western powers should be mindful...[that] Iran needs an agreement more than the United States does...There is no reason for Washington to seem more eager than Tehran to reach an agreement..." Yes, if one chooses to dismiss the issue of an alleged nuclear weapons capability in Iran, then indeed the advice of such commentators may be worth heeding. But one needs to decide: is the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons capability a serious issue or not? If not, then why place such draconian sanctions on Iranian civilians to begin with? The sanctions are causing tremendous harm to the weakest civilians in Iranian society while [9]enriching the Revolutionary Guards who profit from sanctions-busting [9]. If, as these commentators suggest, the West does not need a deal urgently they cannot simultaneously pretend that the issue is important enough to launch military action.
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If stopping an alleged Iranian nuclear weapons capability is worth going to war, it's certainly [15]worth taking the issue seriously and undertaking serious sanctions relief [15].
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Meme 4: “ The P5+1 is extra-tough on Iran because Iran signed the NPT, whereas other nations like Pakistan, India, and Israel did not, and so it's okay to tolerate nuclear weapons in the latter states and even help them with nuclear know-how and technology.”
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If the P5+1 nations want to invoke the NPT to try to limit nuclear know-how in signatory states like Iran they need to at least first show a firmer hand with the nuclear-armed NPT non-signatories. For instance, because Iran is being sanctioned for its past violations of its nuclear safeguards agreements—which were [19]somewhat gratuitously interpreted as a “threat to the peace” by the UN Security Council [19] (UNSC)—then certainly Pakistan, India and Israel should be similarly sanctioned.
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After all, the sanctions are applied to Iran only because the “trigger” of the IAEA nuclear safeguards violations raised the issue to the level of the UNSC. The only reason such triggers have not gone off for India, Pakistan and Israel is that, since they are outside the framework of the NPT, their safeguards agreements are watered-down and similar triggers simply don't exist. But since these nations already have nuclear weapons and are outside the NPT they are objectively a bigger “threat to the peace” than Iran, which is an NPT signatory and has been determined by the US DNI has having no current nuclear weapons program with a “high level of confidence”. [The UNSC sanctions are applied under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Article 39, in which the Security Council can determine a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and may recommend, or decide what measures to take...to maintain or restore international peace and security.”]
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Under no circumstances should nations who have signed the NPT—whether or not they are currently seen to be in good standing—be sanctioned and treated more severely than those that haven't signed on to the NPT and have nuclear weapons. Such heavy-handedness with signatory nations will undercut the desire of many nations to sign on to new arms control initiatives, like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
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In fact, the actions of some of the P5+1 nations, namely China and US, go against the spirit and intentions of the NPT. US and China are helping the nuclear-armed NPT non-signatory states India and Pakistan, respectively, with their civilian nuclear programs. (And before it signed the NPT in 1992, France helped Israel with its nuclear program.) But the 'firewall' between civilian and military nuclear sectors in Pakistan, India and Israel is somewhere between porous to non-existent. And, at the least, civilian nuclear assistance frees up nuclear resources—scientists and materiel much of which are dual-use—which can be applied to the military nuclear programs in these non-NPT nations. Thus the nuclear assistance given by China and the US to Pakistan and India can legitimately be seen as a violation of the NPT.
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As Daniel Joyner puts it in his book, “Interpreting the NPT [20]”: “Many NPT Non Nuclear Weapon States see this granting of nuclear technology concessions to India by an NPT Nuclear Weapon State as a positive reward for India’s decision to remain outside the NPT framework, and develop and maintain a nuclear weapons arsenal, which is the precise opposite to the incentive structure which the NPT sought to codify into international law.”
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Meme 5: “Iran is in violation of its NPT obligations.”
This meme is often repeated in the media and by policy wonks but is not true. For instance, former Obama administration official [21]Robert Einhorn has argued [21], “[W]hat is not debatable is that Iran has forfeited—at least temporarily—any right to enrichment (and reprocessing) until it can demonstrate convincingly that it is in compliance with its NPT obligations.”
But Iran has never been found to be in non-compliance with the NPT: in fact, there is no agency or international body tasked with checking compliance with the NPT. And there is no automatic nuclear fuel-cycle “forfeiture” provision in the NPT. So statements such as Einhorn's overreach.
In older treaties like the NPT and the Outer Space Treaty, there aren't any enforcement mechanisms. There is the IAEA, but it is not responsible for—nor does it have the ability to—verify compliance with the NPT. The IAEA's monitors a different set of bilateral treaties: the narrowly focused “Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements” (CSAs). And it's entirely possible for a state to be in noncompliance with its bilateral CSA and still be in compliance with the NPT. The CSA deals mostly with the precise accounting of nuclear material whereas the threshold of NPT violation for NNWSs—nuclear weaponization—is much higher and much more vague. The CSAs and the NPT are independent legal instruments, although they both deal with nuclear nonproliferation.
As Dr. Hans Blix, former head of the IAEA, [22]recently stated [22]: “So far, Iran has not violated the NPT,” adding, “and there is no evidence right now that suggests that Iran is producing nuclear weapons.” And Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate who spent more than a decade as the director of the IAEA, [23]said that he had not "seen a shred of evidence" [23] that Iran was pursuing the bomb. “All I see is the hype about the threat posed by Iran,” he concluded.
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Meme 6: “There is no right to enrich uranium in the NPT”
This meme is deceptive, being more irrelevant than wrong. The right to enrich uranium exists independent of the NPT: this right, like many many others, [24]does not need to be spelled out in the NPT [24]. In fact, theoretically—according to the letter of the NPT—signatory nations can enrich uranium to arbitrarily high concentrations, including weapons grade, so long as the enrichment is done under safeguards. The important point is that uranium enrichment is not prohibited in the NPT: the [25]inherent right to enrich uranium is not interfered [25] with by the NPT.
The official US government view on the subject was expressed early on. On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the NPT, [26]Foster said [26]:
“It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.” [emphasis added]
So not only does the NPT not interfere with the inherent right of nations to pursue nuclear fuel-cycle activities, but the official US government view was that such activities are explicitly permitted under the NPT.
As [27]Mark Hibbs recently explained [27]: “...like Iran, countries negotiating 123 agreements, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam, refused to have Washington dictate and limit their future nuclear technology choices. Some protagonists in debates on Iran and broader nuclear policy insist there is no “right” to enrich. Yet, if this were self-evidently true, it would not have been a big deal for the UAE to have agreed not to undertake enrichment.”
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Meme 7: “If a country acquires a nuclear-weapons capability, that nation is intending to acquire nuclear weapons.”
Not so. Much nuclear know-how and technology is dual use and can be used for peaceful or military purposes. Under the NPT, it is not illegal for a member state to have a nuclear-weapons capability: if a nation has a developed civilian nuclear infrastructure—which the NPT actually encourages—this implies it has a fairly solid nuclear-weapons capability. Just like Iran, Argentina, Brazil, and Japan also have a nuclear-weapons capability—they, too, could break out of the NPT and make a nuclear device in short order. Capabilities and intentions cannot be conflated.
This is like owning a car that can go faster than 35 miles per hour—having the capability to race through your neighborhood and exceed the speed limit does not mean you intend to do so.
To be sure, this is not an ideal state of affairs. It would certainly be preferable if the NPT had more teeth to prevent the research of nuclear weaponry in member states, or outlawed the collection of excess low-enriched uranium. But the treaty that exists today reflects the political compromises made to win broad international support. The current NPT is simply not a very stringent treaty. Even Pierre Goldschmidt, a former deputy director of the IAEA Safeguards Department, admits that [28]the organization "doesn't have the legal authority it needs to fulfill its mandate. [28]"
I have [29]proposed a stricter “NPT 2.0” which would strike a [29] bold new ”more-for-more” bargain. The nuclear-weapon states —or at least Russia and the United States, with a hefty 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons between them—would offer swift and drastic reductions in their weapons stockpiles in exchange for the outright elimination of nuclear fuel processing activities (such as dual-use uranium enrichment and plutonium processing) in non-nuclear weapon states. A notable difference between the current incarnation of the NPT and the [29]proposed NPT 2.0 [29] would be that the updated version would not encourage the propagation of nuclear power. It no longer makes any sense is to have a treaty force-feeding a flawed and dangerous 1960's technology to developing nations, as the NPT now does.
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Meme 8: “Iran has been deceptive in the past so we cannot trust them.”
Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was not covert by initial design. Iran’s nuclear program was kicked off in the 1950s with the [30]full encouragement and support of the United States [30], under president Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program. In 1983, after the Islamic revolution, Iran went—in an overt way—to the IAEA to get help in setting up a pilot uranium enrichment facility. And the IAEA was then quite receptive to the idea. According to an authoritative account by Mark Hibbs in [31]Nuclear Fuel [31], “IAEA officials were keen to assist Iran in reactivating a research program to learn how to process U3O8 into UO2 pellets and then set up a pilot plant to produce UF6, according to IAEA documents obtained by Nuclear Fuel.” But, [31]according to Hibbs [31], “when in 1983 the recommendations of an IAEA mission to Iran were passed on to the IAEA’s technical cooperation program, the U.S. government then ‘directly intervened’ to discourage the IAEA from assisting Iran in production of UO2 and UF6. ‘We stopped that in its tracks,’ said a former U.S. official.”
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So when Iran’s open overture to the IAEA was stymied politically, they used more covert means to set up their enrichment facilities. Enrichment facilities by their nature can be dual-use, of course, but they are certainly not disallowed under the NPT. Iran’s allegedly “covert” or “sneaky” behavior may thus have been a response to the [31]politicization at the IAEA documented in Hibbs' Nuclear Fuel article [31].
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A good way to stop the propagation of dual-use nuclear technology is to implement [29]a revamped “NPT 2.0” [29] that explicitly discourages the propagation of nuclear fuel-cycle and nuclear power technology.
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Yousaf Butt, a nuclear physicist, is director of the Emerging Technologies Program at the Cultural Intelligence Institute, a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting fact-based cultural awareness among individuals, institutions, and governments. The views expressed here are his own.
